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Introduction
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova
The origins of this book of blogs can be traced back to ‘Politics, Emotion
and Protest‘, an interdisciplinary workshop co-hosted by Bournemouth
University’s Centre for Politics and Media Group and Civic Media Hub,
the Department of Media & Communication at University of Leicester,
the Politics and Media Group of the Political Studies Association, and the
Protest Camps Research Network. This event, held on 9-10 July 2015,
brought together researchers from a variety of disciplines in order to
discuss the intersection between power, politics and emotions. Themes of
authenticity, nostalgia and sustainability were amongst those highlighted
by the workshop participants (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Themes from Politics, Emotion,
Protest workshop, Bournemouth
University, July 2015
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These themes are explored in more detail by the contributors to this book
of blogs.
There are five sections in this volume:
Politics, emotion and identity performance presents a series of personal
reflections on the ‘affective turn’ in social movement studies. Case studies
such as Anonymous, the Hong Kong protest camps and the 2016
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) march are examined in
order to explore the performance of identity in this era of global protest.
Emotion and the news media focuses on the prevalence of emotional
narratives in professional journalism today. Contributors draw on
examples such as the nostalgic framing of the past in Japanese media,
the role of personal stories in UK press coverage of the refugee crisis,
and patriotic reporting of historic events in order to shed light on these
narratives.
Women, politics, activism explores how digital media has created new
opportunities for women to participate in contemporary protest and social
movements. Examples such as the Slutwalk movement, the role of women
bloggers in Nigeria, and the Sustainable Fashion campaign on Instagram
are explored in this section.
Digital media and the politics of protest examines emotion and political
action through the lens of several case studies including so-called ‘hashtag
activism’ in Greece, the anti-TTIP-TAFTA protests on Twitter and the
role of social media in the Bahrain uprising in 2011. Contributors to this
section also reflect upon how social media (dis-)empowers activists in
these contexts.
Health activism examines the role of emotion in disability and other health
campaigns in countries such as the UK and the US. The authors consider
the extent to which these narratives help engender support for these
movements and articulate the voices of patients with a variety of
conditions.
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The purpose of this volume is not to offer conclusions or
recommendations for those readers interested in the affective turn in
protest and social movements. Rather, it is hoped that these blogposts
provoke debate and reflection in relation to how everyday and
extraordinary political actions have become infused with emotion. We
would like to thank all of our authors for contributing to this conversation
on Politics, Protest and Emotions.
Paul, Anastasia and Dimitrinka
January 2017
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PART I
Politics, emotion and identity
performance
1Politics, emotions and protest: A
polemical reflection
Ian R. Lamond, Leeds Beckett University
What follows is a very personal and emotional response to my
participation in the Politics, Emotion and Protest workshop, coordinated
by the social movements groups within the Media, Communications and
Cultural Studies Association. Whilst it is neither a piece of research, nor an
outline of my previous or current research activity, it does – polemically
– reflect the impact the workshop had on how I conceptually orientate
myself to my working practice as an academic researcher within the field
of critical event studies.
Within the cultural political economy of neo-liberalism the imaginary of
the event is construed as a commodity. Festivals fabricate lifestyle choices,
even if only for one muddy weekend in summer, with their associated
tat, and are frequently evaluated in terms of increased footfall and visitor
spend. Conferences are assessed against the growth of individual and
corporate networks, enhancements to individual skillsets augmenting
worker productivity or new business contracts signed. Even celebratory
rites of passage (weddings, christenings, even funerals) carry associated
products and services for sale to enrich the ‘experience’ of those
participating (living and dead). Space itself, within this frame of reference,
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is conceptualised as depoliticised. It is conceived as a blank canvas upon
which the event occurs – a canvas whose past is erased in some cases,
given a dressed and distorted formulation in others, but essentially one
that competes with other spaces and can be over-written with whatever
the money wants it to be.
In what ways are politics, emotion and protest commonly understood
within event studies and events management in such a context? Politics is
most frequently construed as a legislative lens through which the ‘event
manager’ gains an perspective on what is and is not permitted within the
‘event’ space, as well as what constitutes a legally permissible space for
any particular proposed ‘event’. Performing arts licences, drinks licenses,
emergency action plans, pre-set press release templates in case of a crisis
situation occurs (such as, for example, the collapse of a stage or the
drug related death of an attendee), health and safety plans, and so forth,
all frame the political context for the ‘event’. Emotion becomes little
more than a product for sale within the eventised ‘experience’; monetised
through merchandising and memorabilia. T-Shirts; DVDs; key rings –
there seems no end to the way our memories can be exploited. All those
things you never realised you didn’t want, are packaged, re-packaged,
and sold to us. Even our own documentation of the ‘event’ becomes
an imaginary of space for the fabrication of ‘spontaneous’ selfie/ photo
bombing/ cosplaying/ me with the band/ CEO/ cult TV celebrity (delete
as appropriate) opportunities, that are little more than a thin masquerade
for product placement and promotion. Whilst protest (dissent) is
portrayed as violent, in actuality or in terms of its potential as a risk:
teetering on the edge of disorder. An impeding factor that an
operationally focused ‘event’ organiser, within this commercially driven
agenda, needs to plan around or mitigate against. Civil disobedience,
protest, speaking truth to power, is a non-event event within the dominant
discourse of event management. However, as a critical event studies
researcher my focus is precisely on such supposed non-event events.
But ‘events’ are not things in themselves, they intervene the social; they
reveal space to be contested; they show it to be multiple, fractal, nuanced.
Neo-liberalism, on the other hand, construes space as a palimpsest, if
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the income generating potential is right, meaning can be written, erased
and rewritten. It is in the nature of late capitalism to operate as a means
of constructive forgetting. What was once a site where workers fought
to overthrow the shackles of domination becomes a shopping mall; an
entertainment complex; a luxury gym: forget religion – these are the new
temples for the opiates of the people.
What ‘events’ actually do, no matter how carefully any ‘event
management’ tries to contain them, is work like a tectonic on everyday
life. The ‘event’ exposes the discourses at work, particularly those that are
attempting to manage the ‘event’ within a dominant hegemony. ‘Event
management’ becomes an attempt to manage the steerage of discourse,
as well as being a discourse of ‘management’, and space is heterotopic –
but only as a heterotopia of the imaginary, so that it can be sold back
to those who have had its reality robbed from them. The act of ‘event
management’ becomes that of reproducing and sustaining a dominant
hegemony in which the ‘event’ is taking place. Yet the management of
those ‘events’ conceived as prototypical within mainstream event studies
(global sporting events; world fairs etc.) are not consciously experienced
as domination, manipulation or reinvention, as the hegemonic dynamics
of event management is either overlooked or construed as an irrelevance.
One of the things that drives me as an academic researcher is a real will
to conceive a truly critical event studies; one that asks if a genuinely
emancipatory events studies is possible; one that problematizes ‘event’;
that understands that ‘event’ and the ‘event’ spaces are essentially
contested. A critical event studies that tries to explore and, to a certain
extent, untangle the interlaced layers of contestation exposed by the
character of ‘event’ as that which intervenes. My interest is in those
non-event events, actions and interactions of groups of people, whether
social movement or not, that challenge the neo-liberal narrative of the
depoliticisation of space. I learnt a lot from participating in the workshop
– not the least of which was a greater clarity in understanding that politics,
emotion and protest were not an irritating environmental factor to be
negotiated, a marketing opportunity to be seized, or a problem to be
mitigated. They are central to what a critical event studies should aim
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
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for. Using them as a foundation for its critique, exploration, interrogation,
interpretation and values.
Ian R Lamond is Senior Lecturer in the School of
Events, Tourism & Hospitality at Leeds
Metropolitan University. His research is concerned
with the working practices of social movements and
how such movements respond to policy change.
His work has been presented at several international
conferences – spanning disciplines such as political
science; political communication, policy studies,
critical tourism studies and critical discourse analysis.
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
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2Affect and politics: A critical
assessment
Paul Rekret, Richmond University
If one wanted to locate an origin point for the increasingly widespread
adoption of the concept of ‘affect’ into theorisations of politics, the
candidate most likely to succeed would be philosopher Brian Massumi’s
(1995) essay, ‘The Autonomy of Affect‘. Working from an intellectual
tradition that posits a relatively straight line from Baruch de Spinoza and
Henri Bergson to Gilles Deleuze, Massumi’s claim is that modern – and
a great deal of contemporary – philosophy and social theory is grounded
upon privileging a conception of reason or rationality as autonomous
from the ‘bodily and autonomic nature of affect‘. Arguing against what he
takes as the dominant view of mind as rational, abstract and disembodied,
Massumi draws on the speculative regions of neuroscience to invoke a
mind that is situated, embodied, and dependent upon its experiential and
cultural context.
Taking this emphasis upon the inhuman, pre-subjective forces and
‘intensities of feeling‘, the venture of theorists of ‘affect’ centres upon the
notion that by ignoring such non-conscious intensities and resonances we
fail to understand how decisively they influence our political and social
beliefs and decisions. Not only, they argue, do we thus risk misjudging
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the effects that the disciplining of ‘intensities of feeling’ can have on
political life, but we also exclude the possibilities of ethical and political
transformation that would amount to an ‘intensification of self-
reflexivity‘. The turn to affect is thus taken as an emancipatory theoretical
move. In what remains below, drawing on a broad set of different
literatures, I seek to problematize this emancipatory claim.
A number of theorists have sought, to contextualise the contemporary
predilection for neuroscientific explanations upon which a good deal
of affect theory is grounded within broader historical transformations.
Meloni (2012) has proposed that the reductionist nature of neuroscientific
explanation for social and political phenomena has increasingly come to
fill a theoretical void once occupied by the by now bankrupt ‘grand
narratives’ of teleological political ideologies. Relatedly, Melinda Cooper
(2007) has argued that the increasing reference by social theorists to
the speculative biological sciences uncritically reflects the ontological
condition of post-Fordist capitalism. Whether we situate the widespread
adoption of affect theory within ongoing desire for global narratives or as
a reflection of transformations to capitalist social relations, these sorts of
periodising claims signal the need for more reflection upon the historical
conditions in which the concept of affect emerges.
Other critics have questioned the potency of effect theory’s endeavour
to undermine Cartesian dualism. Ruth Leys (2011) has argued that affect
theorists reproduce in reverse the sharp dichotomy between body and
mind they claim to destabilise. Leys argues that affect theorists presuppose
a highly rationalist conception of meaning which they oppose with a
broad series of ‘unexamined assumptions that everything that is not
‘meaning’ in this limited sense belongs to the body‘. Affect theorists thus
imply the very categories they claim to oppose. Moreover, Leys’ work
(2011) has been central in unveiling the selective and at times erroneous
reading of the neuroscience literature.
Recent work from philosopher Ian Hacking also problematizes the
emphasis on embodied intellect by affect theorists. We are becoming,
Hacking (2007) argues, more not less Cartesian today. Not only do
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developments in medical technology imply that we increasingly treat
human bodies as assemblages of replaceable parts but our concept of
‘brain death’ is, according to Hacking, an intensely Cartesian definition
of life itself. While Hacking does not explicitly engage affect theory, his
argument offers a formidable challenge for theories whose central claim
lies in a departure from Cartesian dualism.
As I suggested above, affect theorists tend to view their anti-Cartesian
ontological commitments as inherently liberating. But in the main, they
offer few resources by which we might think affects that reinforce rather
than challenge any dominant order. We have no rigorous analytical or
theoretical tools by which we might differentiate between good and bad
affects. This lacuna should dampen or at least qualify any celebration of
a ‘turn’ to affect and should give pause to social researchers who seek to
study social movements through this concept.
Moreover, affect theorists have not, to my knowledge, offered a rigorous
account for how we might think an affective realm that has been almost
or completely subsumed by the valorisation of capital. This is highly
problematic if, as a number of scholars have come to argue, social relations
today are increasingly organised upon and mediated by the capitalist
organisation of digital and other media.
Finally, affect theorists have to my knowledge not substantively attended
to the ways in which mental and material labor or body and mind
have continued to be strictly alienated along Cartesian lines through 21st
century capitalist processes of accumulation.
In short, while I think that affect theory has challenged some of the
narrower conceptions of a disembodied reason that dominate some
regions of the academy, I see substantial pitfalls and limitations in taking
it as an emancipatory ontological commitment.
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
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Paul Rekret is Associate Professor of Politics at
Richmond University. Before joining Richmond,
he was Lecturer in Political Theory at Queen Mary,
University of London. He holds a BA in Political
Science from the University of Toronto, an MA in
Philosophy from the Universiteit van Amsterdam,
and a PhD in Politics from Queen Mary, University
of London. His current research has two major foci.
First, a series of recent and forthcoming
publications focus upon the implications of recent developments in
International Political Economy. Second, he is currently completing a
book-length study of the ideology of childhood in popular culture. This
reflects a broader interest in the intersections of politics and popular
culture.
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
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3The psychology of protest
Barry Richards, Bournemouth University
Let’s consider a very general argument, one that goes beyond protest to
the whole field of political involvement. However we may understand our
own politics, it is important to see political participation as grounded in
some emotion, affect or feeling (I’m using these words interchangeably
here, though in another context they might require differentiation).
Moreover, this emotion has to be understood psychologically. That may
sound odd: how else could it be understood? To explain, I am using
the word ’psychological’ in a strong sense here, to mean referring to
forces within the individual. There would be other ways of understanding
emotion that made no reference to any internal drivers, and so are not
really psychological in this strong sense.
For example, the fear of nuclear holocaust, which drove many people into
the Ban the Bomb protest movement from the 1950s to the 1980s, can be
seen as a straightforward, rational response to an external world in which
antagonistic nations have nuclear weapons and an established procedure
for authorizing their use. We don’t need to ask psychological questions
about fear, such as, Why are you afraid? What are you afraid of? We can
see the answers to these questions in the external world, not in the mind
of the individual.
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Similarly, the iconoclastic euphoria of the 1967 counterculture and the
protests it spawned can be understood purely in terms of the external
environment. The explanation here is perhaps less obvious than in the case
of nuclear fear; it requires a sociological analysis of how socio-economic
change was reshaping popular culture in the 1960s. A sense of individual
freedom, of release from traditional constraints, of life as a search for
fulfillment and pleasure, was widely experienced The hippy movement
was just the purest expression of this broad cultural trend, so you can
explain the involvement of individuals in the countercultural rejection of
the existing order as a simple reflection of the times, a direct effect of
external cultural change which requires no inner, psychological variables
to understand it.
What about revolutionary anger, an emotion we may expect to find at the
core of the most radical and demanding protest movements? This is easily
seen in a sociological way as a response to manifest injustice in whatever
form, such as oppressive military occupation, gross social inequality or
endemic racism. If you see much of the suffering in the world as caused
by a particular system or set of power relations, then it is a short step
to commit yourself to the overthrow of that system. Indeed, your sense
of ethical responsibility may mean that revolutionary activism is directly
entailed by what you see happening in the world, irrespective of anything
about you as an individual with an inner life.
However, there is a large crack in the structure of these sociological
explanations. The flaw is simply this: although we all live in the same
world, we do not all respond to it in the same way. Why did everyone
not join CND in the early 1960s, or ‘drop out’ in the late 1960s, or join
the Marxist movement of the 1970s? Or, as mid-20th century Freudo-
Marxism asked, why had the German public acquiesced to Nazism? Why
had all workers not joined the revolution which students in Paris in May
1968 were trying to make?
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
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Credit: Danny Birchall/CC BY 2.0
There is a school of thought in psychology which tries to answer that
sort of question in cognitive terms, by saying that the differences in how
people respond are due to differences in how they see the world, and
therefore in how they understand it. So it all comes down to perceptions,
to how we construct the world. The problem with (social) constructionist
approaches is that they simply displace the question, which then becomes,
How and why do we construct the world differently? Why do we select
certain information to focus on, and why do we prefer one analysis
to another? The answer is that perceptions and understandings are
motivated, and that we must turn to emotion to understand the
motivations. Our world-views are driven by emotional needs to see things
in particular ways and to believe some things not others.
The achievement of the Freudo-Marxists was to break through the
rationalistic outlook which had dominated in the Marxist tradition. They
could see that argument, evidence and analysis were not in themselves
going to build the revolution. Underlying structures of feeling in the
proletariat had to be addressed. But the Freudo-Marxist question needs
universalizing. Emotional determinants, and perhaps in a sense irrational
ones, cannot be confined to those passively outside of one’s own activist
reference group. The complementary question about those who are
activists needs posing.
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
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To ask such questions is not to de-politicise the protest action. I’m
suggesting a psychosocial approach, which seeks to bring together the
internal and external factors, not to cancel out the external factors and
so invalidate or de-legitimise the protest, which is what some people
fear is going to happen when a psychologist starts analyzing the motives
underlying protest. Even if a psychological inquiry reveals that someone
is involved in protest for very self-serving reasons, that doesn’t in itself
involve any judgement on the cause which the protest in question
embodies.
Let’s take the fear which I suggested was the underpinning of many
people’s involvement in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).
Rational fear of the real possibility of nuclear war was one part of that. But
to drive protest action, that fear had to have a compelling urgency. Why
were protesters’ fears more compelling than those of others? I suggest
this was because there were other fears which became attached to the
threat of nuclear war. Typically these fears are not consciously articulated
ones; in the language of (Kleinian) psychoanalysis, they would be called
unconscious phantasies. An unconscious phantasy is a sort of template
which can shape experience of the world, similar in some ways to the
idea of a ‘frame’ in framing theory. But whereas a ‘frame’ can be about
anything, unconscious phantasies always involve the primitive forces
which psychoanalysis sees as being at the centre of psychic life: desire,
aggression, anxiety and guilt. So, our experience of a particular piece of
external reality can be loaded with powerful feelings not because of the
intrinsic nature of that reality but because we are experiencing it under
the influence of an unconscious phantasy.
This can be a dangerous process, if it results in someone feeling more
threatened than they actually are. This is shown by those cases of paranoid
psychotic individuals murdering strangers because they believe the
stranger is somehow a threat to them. And the psychoanalysis of fascism
has shown how both aggressive impulses and fears around sexuality can
be loaded into an ideology and acted out in relation to particular people,
with disastrous results.
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
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So, the question of anger in politics may be more complex than is often
recognized….
Barry Richards is Professor of Public
Communication at Bournemouth University. After
a first degree in psychology he trained and worked
as a clinical psychologist in the NHS before
becoming a lecturer and taking a PhD in sociology.
At the University of East London he led the
establishment of psychosocial studies as an
interdisciplinary teaching programme and research
paradigm, while researching and writing in a number of areas including
popular culture, advertising, consumer behaviour, political leadership, and
the rise of ‘therapeutic’ culture. At Bournemouth he has been developing
psychosocial approaches in the field of media and communication, and has
been involved in research on emotion in political communication, on
journalism and emotional literacy, and on terrorism. From 2007 to 2010
he served as Deputy Dean of the Media School. He is a founding editor of
the journal ‘Media, War and Conflict’ (Sage), and on the editorial boards
of `Psychoanalysis and Culture’, the `European Journal of Psychotherapy
and Counselling’, and `Free Associations’. His current work focuses on
psychological factors and on the role of media in the development of
political extremism.
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4Memory and history on the 2016
CND march in London
David McQueen, Bournemouth University
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) rally in London on
February 27th 2016 was described in the media as ‘the biggest anti-
nuclear weapons rally in a generation’,attracting tens of thousands who
marched from Speaker’s Corner to Trafalgar Square. Memories of the
enormous 1981 and ‘83 demonstrations in London, when at least a quarter
of a million people poured into Hyde Park,haunted the day. That was at
the height of tensions between the US and NATO allies and the Soviet
Bloc over medium range ‘cruise missiles’. These tensions, declassified
documents show, almost led to a pre-emptive nuclear strike in
1983,triggered by a large-scale U.S. military exercise in Eastern Europe
called Able Archer. The events were recently fictionalised in the German
television series Deutschland 83, which continues to promote the Cold
War myth that members of the peace movement were naive stooges of
the Soviet Union, heavily infiltrated by Warsaw Pact spies (gay spies at
that).Some things never change – and history tends to repeat itself when
it comes to protest movements and how they are represented (when they
are represented at all) in the media.
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Emerging from Paddington Station on a grey wintry Saturday with my
daughter, Isobel, who was going on her first political rally, we spoke to
two elderly protestors, a husband and wife from Wales. We could tell
from their badges that they were also heading to join the march which
began at Marble Arch. From their conversation it was clear these were
true veterans of the peace movement. They recalled the historic marches
of the early 1980s and their first march from Aldermaston in 1959, now
the stuff of black and white photographs in history books. As we walked
along North Carriage Drive at the top of Hyde Park, they explained
to Isobel where Aldermaston was and why they had marched the fifty-
three miles from there to Trafalgar Square in London more than half
a century ago. It had taken four days and they had slept on the floors
of church halls and community centres, before arriving with another
sixty thousand protestors at Trafalgar Square to hear speakers call for the
British government to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction. As we
approached Cumberland Gate, there was little sign at first that this march
might be that large. We drifted amongst protestors arriving by coach and
on foot, admiring the banners, costumes, masks and signs, and the range
of young and old from across the country, unaware that tens of thousands
were gathering nearby.
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
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The plan was to meet up with my daughter’s friends from school, and
she found them by Speaker’s Corner, next to a demonstration welcoming
refugees. This was the corner of London where free speech has been
fought for since the huge working class Chartist movement of the 1830s
and 1840s, followed by the Hyde Park riots of 1855 and the Reform
League demonstrations of 1866 and 1867. The speakers there are a
reminder that the right to speak and be heard by government was fought
for, sometimes violently,over decades. Indeed the right to speak can be
traced back to the tradition of condemned prisoners addressing their final
words to the thousands of people who used to gather at Tyburngallows
(now a traffic island by Marble Arch), perhaps as long ago as the 12th
Century. Tyburn was originally a village which stood at the west end
of present day Oxford Street, along which prisoners, including religious
martyrs, would arrive by cart to be executed. The ‘Tyburn Tree’ allowed
the authorities to execute a dozen or more people at once and was a
fearsome symbol of the power of the King, and later of Parliament. Oliver
Cromwell’s rotten body was disinterred and hung from Tyburn gallows
in 1661 on the orders of the Restoration Parliament.
Credit: © David and Isobel McQueen
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History is all around us then, as we set off on the march from Hyde
Park sometime after noon. We had not gone far when we were held
for half-an-hour half way down Park Lane, two blocks from the US
Embassy – scene of a fierce anti-Vietnam protests in March 1968. Music
from around the world was being played from sound systems, and a
Brazilian group played Samba beats on large drums as we set off again past
the Animals in War memorial. This site commemorates the millions of
horses, mules, donkeys and other animals that perished alongside countless
millions of humans in the wars of the 20th century.Across Britain there are
hundreds of memorials to the soldiers of these wars, but, unsurprisingly,
no memorials to anti-war protestors, including the 6,000 British
conscientious objectors who went to prison or the Russian and then
German protestors, who, some argue, really brought the First World War
to an end.The politics of dissent soaks the ground of Speaker’s Corner,and
Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and George Orwell are amongst the roll call
of famous non-conformists who have spoken or listened at Speaker’s
Corner. Hyde Park was the scene of Suffragette meetings, including a
massive rally of 250,000 women to hear different speakers from twenty
platforms in 1908. It was also the final destination for 100,000 unemployed
men who marched there from cities across Britain in 1931 and 1932 and
were violently repressed by police.
Credit: © David and Isobel McQueen
As the crowd turned from Park Lane onto Piccadilly, the size of the
demonstration came as a shock. It stretched a mile ahead to Piccadilly
Circus and then beyond to Trafalgar Square. Some well-dressed shoppers
stopped outside Fortnum and Masons to take photographs, others stared
as if the colourful crowd had emerged from a space ship. We stopped by
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
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Piccadilly Circus to watch the crowd go by and then followed them down
Regent Street and Pall Mall into Trafalgar Square. I’ve lost count of how
many times I and thousands of others have marched along this route, and
many wonder if such marches achieve anything, or are just a chance to
gather with like-minded dissenters. CND General Secretary Kate Hudson
introduced Bruce Kent, former General Secretary at the height of CND’s
power in the early 1980s saying how she was a young girl when she
attended the giant protests in Hyde Park. Will she too pass on the baton
of ridding the world of nuclear weapons to another generation?
The peace rally on August 2nd 1914 in Trafalgar Square, on the eve of
the First World War, failed to halt the calamity that engulfed Europe. The
rally of over a million in Hyde Park in 2003 failed to halt the invasion of
Iraq. Was this demonstration to join the list of protests that governments
in Britain have ignored? Yet without those protests we would not have
the vote for working class men, women’s suffrage, or a welfare state to
protect the unemployed. From the Chartist rally of 1848 to anti-apartheid
protests, poll tax protests, climate change protests and peace protests,
Trafalgar Square has been a crucible for social and political change.
And the 2016 CND gathering in the square, despite the usual, minimal
broadcast coverage,also suggested there is real hope for change over
nuclear weapons. Unlike the 1983 rally in Hyde Park, this wasn’t
addressed by a Labour leader (Neil Kinnock) arguing for some half-
measure. This huge march was addressed by the leader of the largest
Scottish Party, Nicola Sturgeon, the Green Party’s Caroline Lucas
MP, Plaid Cymru’s leader, Leanne Wood and the leader of Labour,
Jeremy Corbyn, who all gave full and unstinting support to
CND’sdisarmament aims. Only the Conservative Party and a rump of
Liberal-Democrats remain wedded to Trident, although the fight in the
Labour Party remains divisive. Nevertheless, we are no longer faced
with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and so the age-old argument for
upgrading a hugely expensive weapons system at a cost of £100 billion
has disappeared. With the collapse of that argument, and with austerity
bearing down on every remaining welfare service, the case for Trident
can only be made by appealing to irrational fears of invasion or nuclear
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blackmail. The reality, as Noam Chomsky reminds us, is that nuclear
weapons, along with climate change, represent the greatest threat to
mankind, and accidental nuclear war remains as much a reality as it was
in 1983. Seeing Isobel enthusiastically take part in the march and listen to
some of the same speakers that I did at the same age thirty-five years ago
in 1981, was moving. Tony Benn and many others are no longer with
us, but my daughter and her friends grasp that we cannot wait another
generation for their demand for a nuclear-free world to be realised.
David McQueen is a Lecturer in Politics, Media and
PR at Bournemouth University. His research
interests include public relations, news and current
affairs, political communications and media
management. He is currently researching various
lobbying and ‘greenwashing’ campaigns by the
fossil fuel industry and the presentation of fracking
in the news.
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5Impulsive performative identity: Is
it just pointless narcissism?
Darren Lilleker, Bournemouth University
Perhaps like many around 10pm on Friday 13 November 2015 I was dual-
screening. Flicking through social media while semi-watching television.
Breaking news invaded my dislocated concentration, gunmen had
charged a rock concert at the Bataclan in Paris causing multiple fatalities.
As the enormity of that and simultaneous attacks on local restaurants
emerged I, like many others around the world became gripped by the
news, concerned for loved ones as well as feeling compassion for
strangers. Twitter became a place for updates. In French and broken
English the survivors, those who came to help and the many bystanders
began to report events. The band, The Eagles of Death Metal, were
reported injured then safe. The number of gunmen on the loose and
stories of manhunts were reported in measured and exaggerated forms.
Those outside of Paris simply expressed their concern and solidarity. A
trend was to have a profile picture blending your current profile with the
French tricolor flag. Facebook helpfully suggested if others wished to do
that they simply had to click. I did and for a week I demonstrated my
solidarity.
Camilla Hodgson, writing in the New Statesman, derided this
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phenomenon as a fad; a meaningless act. She argued “If none of your
Facebook friends were personally affected by the attacks, then the only
people who will see your new profile picture and so-called declaration
of support are those who do not need supporting. By changing a photo
of yourself for a week, you are doing nothing for the victims; instead,
you are making the issue about yourself, by making your public, online
persona appear more sympathetic”. But is this dismissal missing the point?
It is true that no symbolic act can help the victims, either the dead
or the injured, in the aftermath of such an event. But they are sadly
not the only victims. Terrorism is designed to make the masses feel
vulnerable, to seek to blame others and to seek forms of solace. While
there were no reported figures for expressions of solidarity, many in Paris
who understandably felt under attack may have felt supported. The simple
symbolic act identified a community who cared, caring at least enough
to make a public demonstration of empathy. Therefore these random,
symbolic and impulsive acts of caring may have had some psychological
ramifications. The action may make ‘the issue about yourself’, but may
also have had a wider positive impact regardless of the intentions.
The bigger question is whether these acts are simply narcissistic.
Sociologists have long argued that social interactions are representations
of identity: through the process of communicating, people are telling
others something about themselves. These notions have their root in
Judith Butler’s theories of performative identity. Butler discussed
communication as ‘self-making’, that all forms of communication are
mechanisms for making personality, values and attitudes socially
intelligible. While Butler may well have been influenced by the explosion
in identity politics in the 1960s, others have considered how the notion of
constructing an identity translates into digital age. Rob Cover argued that
the uses of social networking sites are performative acts in and of
themselves. Firstly he argues that the use of social networking profiles
which include information about favourite films, music, quotes etc. is one
tool for performing, developing and stabilising identity as a narrative in
line with cultural demands for coherence, intelligibility and recognition.
Secondly, and more importantly, identity performances occur through
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interactions between online friends and so increasingly identity becomes
reconfigured. In other words users create an identity but, through
interactions with others, the constructed identity becomes adapted to suit
a particular set of conventions prescribed by a network. Thus, arguably, as
with many contexts of modern society, our identity is personally defined
as well as being defined by the norms of those with whom we interact.
The challenge when considering social networks is that it is less possible to
construct multiple identities, for example one for work, one for particular
friend groups and one for family. As a social network online may include
many from each of those groups the constructed identity becomes one
that might suit all groups with whom we interact.
Therefore we can argue that social networks transcend boundaries and
lead to the negotiation of identity bringing us back to the impulsive
behaviour we witness. Demonstrating public support for a cause may be
narcissistic to an extent. But it is not simply about showing off, rather it
is about belonging. Social network users have long used likes and shares
as a way of showing agreement. Such functions can be simply agreeing,
showing sympathy or empathy, saying well done or a range of similar
meanings as appropriate to the post. Changing the way you are seen,
via the profile picture, has equally become a mechanism for joining into
a demonstration, pink ribbons for breast cancer awareness for example.
Such acts, and the inclusion of the tricolor is an example, do not just say a
person cares but I am part of a community who cares. It is more of an ‘I’m
in’ than an ‘I am’ culture.
To write off such acts, which can equally express highly political
statements, as pure narcissism misses an important point. The human
desire to be part of a community, be accepted by that community and
to interact with others and be recognised. Being part of a community
involves following norms, capturing a mood or following a trend. Social
media may allow this to be achieved through simple acts which despite
their simplicity to achieve can have deep meanings, to the person acting
and to others who may witness this action. The meaning that goes into
the performance may simply be copying in order to belong. But such
actions can also be profound and considered. As in the real world, images
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can be carefully constructed and maintained through communicative acts.
They may appear trivial but that ignores the meanings hidden beneath.
Darren G. Lilleker is Associate Professor in Political
Communication in The Media School,
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in the professionalization and marketization of
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Concepts in Political Communication (Sage, 2006),
monographs Political Campaigning, Elections and the
Internet (Routledge, 2011) and Political
Communication and Cognition (Palgrave, 2014)and has co-edited The
Marketing of Political Parties (MUP, 2006), Voters or Consumers (CSP,
2008) Political Marketing in Comparative Perspective (MUP, 2005) and The
Media, Political Participation and Empowerment (Routledge, 2013).
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6The paradox of privacy on
Instagram
Elisa Serafinelli, University of Sheffield
The publicness afforded by social media creates a paradox in terms of
citizen expectations of privacy. While many appear to be comfortable
with disclosing personal information on their Facebook and Twitter
profiles, they remain wary and suspicious of efforts by government to
intercept and use such data without their permission to do so. The
subsequent need to ‘manage’ their online persona becomes an everyday
activity for many social media users, even though they appear to be unable
to guarantee the privacy of their personal information held by these sites.
This reflects the complexity of privacy in the digital age. Researchers
should as Miller (2011) has gone as far as to suggest that contemporary
notions of personal space do not exist in online environments. Users of
Instagram, for instance, appear to engage in a collective ‘self-violation
of privacy;’ they frequently share intimate details of their daily lives and
provide personal information, such as their contact details, to a potential
global audience. This publification of an individual’s private life stretches
Foucault’s conceptualisation of the panopticon; physical activities such
as ‘watching’ and ‘witnessing’, now replaced by the use of sites such as
Instagram to piece together where people are, what they are doing, what
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they ate and with whom. There are broadly three main reasons why
people choose to look at photos shared by users on Instagram: for visual
pleasure, for imitation and for entertainment.
Instagram appears to function as a participatory panopticon.
Instagrammers accept that their photos will be subject to some form of
surveillance by other users and engage in these activities themselves. This
is what Marwick (2012) refers to as ‘social surveillance,’ whereby users not
only share content with the expectation that it will be viewed by others,
but also strategically manage their online identity in order to appeal to an
imagined audience. This also leads to what Whitson and Haggerty (2008)
refer to as ‘the care of the virtual self,’ with Instagrammers constantly
feeling the need to scrutinise what they, and their peers, upload to the
photosharing site. In effect, privacy becomes almost a secondary concern
for some users who perceive that being watched makes them ‘part of
something.’
Depending on the context, users will disclose and redact personal
information in order to connect with others, as well as to protect and
reinforce existing social boundaries. In some cases this may even involve
saying or doing something controversial on social media in order to gain
attention from other users. Social media are also widely used as marketing
tools for self-promotion by celebrities and reality television stars. For
example, Kim Kardashian recently posted a nude selfie (see Figure 1) that
generated many media headlines in March 2016. Good Morning Britain
presenter Piers Morgan.branded Khardashian ‘desperate’ and ‘frenzied’ for
sharing the image, which she was forced to censor with black bars due
to. Instagram’s community guidelines.. These are increasingly normalised
behaviours for millions of people worldwide, whose lives are increasingly
mediated through sites such as Facebook and Instagram.
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A related concern might be that users of social media sites rarely, if
at all, pay attention to how these companies may use their personal
information. Instagram users appear to be only vaguely aware of the
terms and conditions that they have accepted in order to use the site,
with many admitting to having never read this document in full prior
to signing up. Indeed, the majority of Instagrammers appear to accept
that they will need to sacrifice some form of personal privacy in order to
benefit from the ability to share photos via the site. One manifestation
of this is that these users engage in a form of self-censorship of their
photosharing activities; photos of locations and individuals e.g. family and
friends deemed unsuitable for public consumption are not uploaded and
shared via Instagram (see Figure 2).
Credit: Instagram/uwa2000
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My research on Instagram suggested that users often display a ‘carefree’
attitude towards the protection of their privacy on Instagram. For
example, one of my participants joked: ‘Well, regarding privacy I am
totally convinced that once you are on the Internet, just from the first time
you get into it your privacy falls down, falls totally. […] I mean, since the
moment I signed up on Instagram I have an open account even because
otherwise it just does not make sense to me. I say… I am not interested in
privacy’.
My findings suggested that there was a passive acceptance amongst users
of the absence of personal privacy on social media platforms. Self-
regulation was perceived as the most effective way to protect their
personal information. The normalisation of surveillance practices online
leads users to be concerned only about their visual contents. Interpersonal
surveillance has emerged as a pleasurable daily ritual for users of
Instagram. While it would be easy to characterise this as a form of
voyeurism, my research suggests that this is a purposive act to gain
information from the images shared on the photosharing site. Instagram
enriches users’ visual knowledge of diverse subjects such as landscapes,
food, colour, and shapes. The ‘Big Everybody’ facilitated by social media
has seen users willingly sacrifice their personal privacy in order to gain
information about the world.
Elisa Serafinelli is a Research Associate at the
University of Sheffield (UK) working on the
European Commission Horizon 2020 funded
project ‘IMPROVER: Improved risk evaluation and
implementation of resilience concepts to critical
infrastructure’. The aim of the study is to explore
how information shared via social media can help
reduce response and recovery times and raise
awareness about the risk of future disasters. She completed her PhD in
Media, Communication and Society in 2015 at the University of Hull
(UK) with a research project on smart mobile technologies, visual
communication and social practices titled: New mobile visualities and the
social communication of photography: Instagram as a case study. Her
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academic research focuses on investigating
the relationships between mediation, mobility and visuality in order to
understand how smart mobile devices are altering humans’ perception and
visual experience of the surroundings.
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7'The playing protesters'
Pantelis Vatikiotis, Kadir Has University
In its long history collective action has been studied in the context of
the social conditions it emerged. The wide spectrum of perspectives on
the subject includes reflections on both questions of ‘how’ protesters are
mobilized and ‘why’ protests take one or another form. Accordingly,
a number of variables have been considered in different times: the
emotional and irrational nature of ‘crowd behavior’; the ‘mobilization’
of rational actors seizing political opportunities; the creation of spaces of
autonomy and ‘new collective identities’; and, the transnational character
of struggles against the ‘neoliberal, globalization order’. What is more,
the compelling contribution of social media to the wave of uprisings
that shocked the world the last five years, and the snowball inspiration
of related protest movements, has favored the study of their ‘networked’
nature.
The research on collective action has predominantly focused on the
instrumental features of the social struggles (political structures, material
resources, organization, framing, cognitive aspect of identity),
determining their very rational, ‘political’ qualities. Still, the renewed
attention to emotions in the research agenda of social movements the
last two decades (see Jasper 1998; Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta 2000)
has enriched the understanding of social movements by exploring ways
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emotions condition collective action. Being engaged in social movements
involves material, organizational as well as emotional dimensions. The
recent, global interplays between social and media activism register
significantly cognitive and affective elements in their repertoires.
Drawing on the events of May 1968 in France and May 1970 in the
United States, Katsiaficas (1987) used an affective term, ‘eros effect’, to
describe the spread from one ‘revolution’ to another. The current
uprisings in different parts of the world, teemed with feelings of
‘indignation’, set more complex, open-ended intersections among them,
and they ask for approaches and conceptual tools that fully address the
dynamics of collective action across different contexts and cultures.
Moreover, user generated practices facilitate diverse modes of political
self-expression articulated on public and private social spaces, enhancing
emphatically the realm of civic engagement.
In this regard, the metaphor of ‘play’ is employed here to grasp the diverse
practical and symbolic activities of the protesters. ‘The playing protesters’,
paraphrasing Alberto Melucci’s (1996) work (The playing self), point to
the ambiguous connection between collective processes and individual
day-to-day experience. Prominent is here the account of subjective and
intimate experiences in relation to social structural dynamics, expanding
the agonistic terrain of everyday politics beyond purposive actions,
including non-rational deliberation exchanges too.
The dominant analytical framework of the ‘networked movements’ starts
from the very assumption of the emergence (or not) of another paradigm,
assessing, uncritically or critically, commonalities to these movements: the
popular nature of the movements (large number of people joined for the
first time a protest); the lack of organizational leadership (institutional,
formal mechanisms of representation); the role of social media (conveying
open/participatory spaces and networking protesters); the occupation of
public spaces (central city squares and protest camps functioning as
laboratories for the development of discursive practices); and, the overall
context, the economic and politico-ideological crisis, of the multifarious
protest movements.
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
34
However, these approaches fail to acknowledge the diversity of interests
and emotions expressed in the different backgrounds. Building on this
field of inquiry, the perspective of ‘playing protesters’ acknowledges the
challenges of the intersection of differing and conflicting forms of
engagement, including deliberative, active as well as of monitorial,
reactive ones. For this reason, research on social movements needs to
explore collective action beyond the dominant framework of instrumental
rationality. Namely, the research agenda has to be expanded to study the
interplay of interests and emotions across different (western and non-
western) cultures and along networked platforms of activity.
A number of epistemological and methodological issues are raised here.
The study of ‘playing protesters’ requires first, starting from experience
rather than indubitable assumptions, and second, privileging the more
processual and relational notion of activity over the western notion of
goal-directed action (Lash, 1999). In addition, the evaluation of
negotiations of social configurations, formations, identities and
imaginaries – regularly and irregularly, privately and publicly,
individually and collectively, deliberately and non- deliberately, in
mediated and non-mediated terms – that produce multiple meanings and
ambivalent accounts of social actors’ experience asks for transcending
prevalent dualisms (mind-body, reason-emotion) in the research tradition,
and to rely more on ethnography and visual sociology to fully capture the
fluid dynamics of emotions (Yang, 2007).
Pantelis Vatikiotis is Associate Professor in the
Department of New Media at Kadir Has University,
Turkey. His research interests cover the areas of social
theory and media, political communication and
culture, political economy of media, alternative media,
collective action, globalization, new media and
cyberculture. His publications include several book
chapters and journal articles in international academic publications on the
subjects of democratization of communication, public sphere and civil
society, grassroots media practices, social movements, social media, and
TV programming/scheduling.
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8Anonymous: A fitting anti-ISIS
nemesis after Paris attacks
Athina Karatzogianni, University of Leicester
In a security environment which is extremely precarious, because of
the power unleashed by communication networks, asymmetric warfare
organized via digital networks is here to stay. This summer, the US
was confronted by an Internal department assessment how ‘the Islamic
State’s violent narrative has effectively “trumped” the efforts of some of the
world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations’ (link to New
York Times, ‘ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes’,
June 12, 2015), while Europe’s Interpol decided to crackdown on 50,000
accounts, as if that would solve the problem: intelligence and targets can
be exploited through these users. Although the U.S and its key allies are
aware of the importance of hundreds of thousands of messages from a
plethora of users on social media networks supporting and celebrating
atrocities against civilians, and subsequent radicalisation via inflaming
reactive affect in groups structurally steeped in violence, their
countermessaging strategy against ISIS is not yet successfully developed.
It is this gap that Anonymous started to fill. Anonymous asked supporters
or crowdsourced to identify ISIS accounts to take them down, for example
during the @OpCharlieHebdo and brought down Ansar-Alhaqq.net
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with a distributed denial of-service attack. In March 2015 (OpIsis) the
group collected and published lists of tens of thousands of Twitter
accounts, which it claimed belonged to members of ISIS or sympathisers,
where 25,000 accounts were published and a list of websites and hosts by
GostSec, while a guide was put on Pastebin on how to trackdown pro-IS
Twitter accounts. The recent reaction after the Paris attacks is on a similar
vein and it has found great support around the world.
It is only fitting that Anonymous has acted as a nemesis against ISIS/ISIL.
Anonymous and ISIS are ideological opposites with an organizational
commonality: organised networks fighting networked hierarchies. In the
case of Anonymous the ideology is one that is open, fluid and horizontal
most of the time. As it endlessly flows through rhizomes and travels
through digital networks, it eats up many different spectra, so that it can
only be pinned down by the nature of the activities of groups claiming
the Anonymous network diffuse identity each time.
What can be understood by their activities against religious, government
and corporate hierarchical institutions (i.e. US, Israel, Tunisia, Brazil,
Turkey, companies such as Paypal, VISA, Mastercard in favour of
WikiLeaks, Booz Allen Hamilton, Stratfor, against religious institutions
such as Scientology, in retaliation to anti-piracy, but also other online
players such as Fox.com, Sony, digital game companies, and paedophile
sites)? And why also ISIS?
In contrast to Anonymous ideology, which is decentralised open and
fluid (a caveat here on the anti-Zionist plus sexism controversies), ISIS
is a network which relies superficially on religion to create an imagined
community of believers: a super-hierarchical ideology which
differentiates based not on nationality, but on religious affiliation and
kinship largely relying on Wahabbism to fill the rest of its existential gaps.
Anonymous have been persecuted for cyberattacks in many countries so
far mostly under cybercrime laws, as their activities are not recognised
as a form of legitimate protest. Here it is worth mentioning the ethical
debate in hacktivism, as some hacktivists see cyberattacks which aim to
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take down sites rendering them inaccessible or taking down accounts
as not ethical, as it infringes on others’ freedom of expression. The
argument is that hacktivism should be really about creating technologies
to circumvent censorship and to enable digital equality and open access to
information.
In the case of fighting against the networks, which murder civilians
and claim ISIS affiliation, Anonymous is fighting against groups that
act, support or coordinate others to commit crimes against humanity
(‘We will unite humanity’ the Anonymous video after the Paris attacks
promises the viewers). Anonymous unite in an ideology that wants to be
inclusive and to reflect a common humanity, which embraces open fluid
identities which are not fixed and closed down to nationality, religion,
and ethnicity. Theirs, on a meta-level is almost a fight against all closures
and fixity.
What enables Anonymous to inspire is this collective framing against
hierarchizations of race, gender, class, nationality, and religion.
Anonymous have been accused of having their roots in misogynistic
internet culture, but in their largely fragmented and multi-faced actions
the group seems to aspire to much more than that: a common humanity
discourse against striation and closure by neoliberal ideologies,
corporatization, repression of dissent in authoritarian regimes and the
closure of open debate and freedom of information.
Anonymous are the opposite of the coin in relation to ISIS, not just
because they take their struggle mostly onto digital networks, but because
it is not only their structure that is decentralised, but their ideology too.
In ISIS the ideology is exclusive to one view of life, one ethical standpoint
based on reactive desire for that life or else Thanatos, which is repulsive,
because it is outside our understanding of everyday behaviour and defies
any notion of common humanity.
In some respects Anonymous is the vigilante nemesis to Isis in digital
networks, especially because of the gap in organising effective
communications against the terrorist group. Does the symbolism of
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
38
taking down ISIS promote Anonymous’ other objectives, collecting
sypathizers and support for other activities in the future? To what end?
Reports of physical addresses posted online by Anonymous of ISIS
recruiters in the aftermath of the Paris attacks pose significant problems
for ethics and rights in cybersecurity. Is it reasonable to expect that
any countermessaging coalition against ISIS could in fact include
collaboration with Anonymous as a legitimate civil society actor in the
future despite Anonymous persistent persecution by governments around
the world? It is fair to speculate that cooptation is not unprecendented,
but in the case of Anonymous, exactly because it is such a complex
fragmented actor, it would be hard to achieve. Hierarchies cannot match
with their counterparts in networks and that is going to be a problem
in any potential dialogue between Anonymous and government and
international organizations’ cybersecurity and strategic communication
entities. And yet, Anonymous has undoubtedly captured and channeled
humanity’s affective responses in their actions against ISIS over the Paris
attacks.
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9‘EuroscepticismLite’: The Greek
verdict on EU membership
George Kyris, University of Birmingham
The European Parliament elections that have just taken place were
arguably the most important in the history of the European Union.
The European Parliament has more power than ever before, demands
have grown for greater democracy in the running of the European
Commission and, above all, the elections provided an opportunity for the
public to express their views on how the EU dealt with the unprecedented
Eurozone crisis of recent years. And the public were clearly unimpressed.
Nowhere were these elections more interesting than in Greece, the
country at the heart of the European crisis.
Indeed, the Eurozone crisis and Greece’s two ‘bail-out’ agreements placed
the EU at the top of the agenda in Greek public debate. Policies of
austerity imposed on Greece inflicted real pain. The resulting resentment
towards the EU and its austerity policies by Greeks captured the
imagination of both national and international media: numerous flags of
the EU were burned as part of protests that shook the country throughout
the period of its economic adjustment.
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In theatrical fashion, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Athens
was marked by Greek protesters dressed up in Nazi uniforms as part of an
indication of the public anger.
Behind these dramatic images, public attitudes of Greeks towards the EU
have hardened. As the crisis years unfolded, so more and more Greeks
viewed the EU in a negative light. When Greece joined the Eurozone,
51% of the population had a positive image of the EU – a much higher
figure than across the rest of the EU, where support stood at 42%. Just a
few months before the outbreak of the crisis, an impressively high 48% of
Greeks still viewed the EU in a positive light, with only 16% holding a
negative attitude.
Since then, the percentage of Greeks who hold a positive image of the EU
has been constantly decreasing. By late 2013, EU support reached an all-
time low of 16% – the lowest across the Union. Half of Greeks by then
held a negative attitude. Yet Greek support for EU membership has not
seen an equally large decrease. This suggests that, despite being frustrated
with the way the EU has dealt with the crisis, Greeks do not challenge
their membership of the ‘European family’.
The campaign and results of Greece’s elections to the European
Parliament support this analysis. The election debate was fought mostly
between two camps: on the one side stood the centre-right New
Democracy and centre-left PASOK, the coalition partners for the past two
years, who represented the status quo and implementation of the bail-
out reforms put forward by the EU, the European Central Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
On the other side stood the main opposition left wing movement, Syriza,
which called for a ‘different Europe’. It portrayed itself as the ‘radical anti-
systemic choice’, opposed to the austerity ‘policies of the Chancellor’ that,
according to Syriza, were advanced by New Democracy and PASOK.
In the event, the coalition partners saw their support drop substantially,
with Syriza securing its first ever victory – though with support from little
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more than a quarter of those voting. Other parties calling for ‘a different
Europe’ – including the newcomer River – also made important gains.
As a result, the country which most nearly brought the EU to economic
disaster created a mood of Euroscepticism that was different to that in any
other part of Europe. In Greece, calls for an exit from the EU did not win
many votes. Those parties calling for Greece’s exit from the EU – Golden
Dawn and KKE (Communist Party)– remain marginal parties, backed by
only a small minority of voters.
Greece has demonstrated that it retains deep-rooted pro-European
feelings. It is a small country for which EU membership provides an
international voice. In terms of history and emotion, Greece sees itself as a
country at the heart of Europe, with which it shares and helped forge the
values of democracy and progress.
But recognising these factors behind the Greek public support for a
European identity does nothing to diminish the anger it has expressed
towards the leadership of the EU. Yet it is clear that the mood in Greece
is different from that in other parts of the EU where populist parties won
support for EU withdrawal.
Unlike the UK, France and some other countries, the Greek vote
demonstrates that there is a large population of reluctant Europeans.
While they might not challenge their membership of the EU, they do
question the type of the EU they want to be a members of.
While the left in Greece has so far failed to promote a credible agenda, its
success is important in testing how Europeans feel and this will hopefully
inform the debate on the future of the EU. For this reason,
‘Euroscepticismlite’ is perhaps the most interesting type of Euroscepticism
that the Eurozone crisis has so far generated.
Postscript
Few months after this piece was written, Greece saw Syriza, a left party,
winning elections for the first time in history in January 2015. The
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party choose to go into a coalition with the right nationalist Independent
Greeks, with whom they only shared their anti-austerity/ euroscepticism
feelings. This made clear the importance of Euroscepticism for the
country and Europe. Indeed, eurosceptic parties far away from the left,
like the National Front in France or UKIP in the UK, were amongst the
first to congratulate Syriza after its victory. Yet, after a year in power,
Syriza did not manage to put forward an alternative, had an
embarrassingly bad performance in EU circles and ended up signing yet
one more bailout programme with its creditors, exactly the opposite of
their election manifesto. Does that mean that euroscepticism in Greece
failed to make a positive change? Yes, the ‘reluctant Europeans’ that
wanted a change within the EU must be pretty disappointed. Does that
tell us anything about euroscepticism in more general? Maybe. Greece did
teach us that parties at the fringe of politics (and this where eurosceptic
parties come from) could make a breakthrough into mainstream. Yet, it
also showed us that the lack of experience and agenda that comes with
fringe politics is a major obstacle towards promoting change, especially
during moments of crisis. The irony, of course, is that euroscepticism will
thrive mostly in times of crisis.
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European Politics at the University of Birmingham.
Previously, he has been a Teaching Fellow at the
University of Warwick, a Research Fellow at the
LSE and has also taught at the University of
Manchester. His main research focus is conflict and
unrecognised states, especially in relation to the EU.
More recently, he has also been interested in the
politics of the Eurozone crisis, political parties and euroscepticism. His
regional interests lie in Southeast Europe, especially Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus.Dr Kyris’ list of publications includes his book ‘The
Europeanisation of Contested States: The EU in northern Cyprus’
(Ashgate 2015), articles for the Journal of Common Market
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comment for media like the Guardian, EurActiv, EUObserver and
the BBC TV and radio.
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The Hong Kong Protest camps,
political art and the emergence of
emotions
Georgios Patsiaouras, University of Leicester and Anastasia Veneti,
Bournemouth University
The city of Hong Kong is considered as one of the world’s largest
and immensely populated metropolitan cities, a prominent financial and
cultural center, famous for its excellent food and emblematic skyscrapers
which offer a breathtaking view to millions of visitors and tourists every
year. Some years ago, few people could guess that this special
administrative region of China would attract world’s attention due to
the sit-in protests of 2014, also known as the Umbrella Movement. In
a nutshell, the protests took place between September and December
2014 since Beijing’s administration decided in the summer of the same
year to announce a substitute electorate framework which threatened
Hong Kong citizens’ ability to democratically elect their leaders through
universal suffrage.
For a period of three and half months – which involved both police
brutality and increased tension with the government – thousands of
protesters occupied the main arterial routes of the city, creating three main
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protest camps. In general, the causes, actions and outcomes of Umbrella
Movement can be approached through the prism of several disciplines –
such as politics, media or sociology for example – however in this blog
we focus and discuss how protesters’ artistic creativity was employed so
to create emotions to the audience and engage them with the collective
aims of the movement. One of the authors of this blog spent a week in
Hong Kong protest sites observing and photographing protesters’ creative
activities and we include a couple of images which depict protesters’
efforts not only to attract passengers’ and tourists’ attention but also to
invite them to participate in the production of protest artwork. In order to
protect the anonymity of the protesters, one image captures from distance
the main protest camp and the second focuses only on artistic installations.
Below the skyscrapers of the main business district, the Occupy Admiralty
site turned into the centre of protesters’ creative activities (see Figure 1).
Entering the site someone observes banners, tents and dozens of yellow
umbrellas – which turned into the iconic symbol of the movement –and
appeared in various forms such as artistic installations including a large
canopy, the sculpture of the Umbrella Man and origami art amongst
others.
Figure 1: Hong Kong protest camp,
November 2015; Credit: © Georgios
Patsiaouras
Apart from the use of the iconic umbrella as emblem of the movement,
the revolutionary anthem from the musical ‘Les Miserables’ titled “Do
you hear the people sing’ had been playing in the protest camps offering
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a sense of unity and solidarity towards protesters’ causes. One of the
most popular sites of the Umbrella Movement had been the Lennon
Hong Kong Wall which could be found at the central protest camp.
A huge empty wall was used as platform of artistic expression where
everyone could post-it notes such as messages of commonality towards
the movement including epigrams, graphics and messages in foreign
languages (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Lennon Hong Kong Wall,
November 2015; Credit: © Georgios
Patsiaouras
Additionally, street painting events by local artists were inviting local
protesters, tourists and passengers to participate in the creation of canvases
which depicted the city of Hong Kong, the main aspects of the protest
movement and messages related to democracy and freedom.Furthermore,
few artists were publicly producing blind contour drawing within the
main protest site using pre-printed pages including short pro-democracy,
freedom and peace quotes from personalities such as Nelson Mandela,
Mahatma Ghandi and John Lennon. Social media and in particular
Facebook pages had also been used as means of depicting everyday life
in Hong Kong during the protests focusing on individuals’ stories. As
a passenger and observer of the protest site, I noticed that within this
experiential context of artistic creativity and co-creation many passengers
and tourists were gradually feeling that they were becoming part of it.
In general, several political organizations and communities have
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employed artwork so as to encourage activism or social awareness for
example. From the Occupy Movement’s artistic installations to Urban
Arts Work in Seattle for the support of mid-level juvenile offenders and
the Chicago Public Art Group for the promotion of community history,
we observe the efforts of these groups to create emotions, communication
and engagement with their audiences. Nevertheless, we can argue the
most prominent feature of the Hong Kong Movement had been the
spontaneity, improvisation and authenticity characterizing the
production, promotion and co-creation of artwork. Thereupon, we
observe the emergence of a dynamic movement and protest phenomenon
that was developed within a period of three months despite the fact
that it was lacking a central organized committee. The formation and
display of outdoor artistic galleries – within the perimeter of barricaded
streets – emerged impulsively and communicated to passengers elements
of uniqueness, genuineness and sincerity as regards protesters’ aims. As
the renowned artist Gerald Brommer said “without emotional content
we make pictures; with it, we create art.” Conclusively, it can suggested
that the Umbrella Movement artwork can be viewed as a very prominent
example of how a group of protesters can reduce – but not alleviate –
the complexity of ideological and political messages by infusing practices
of audience’s engagement and emotional elements within their artistic
production communicating universal values such as freedom, democracy
and justice.
Georgios Patsiaouras is Lecturer in Marketing and
Consumption at the School of Business, University
of Leicester. His research interests include
conspicuous consumption phenomena,
macromarketing theory, sustainability, and cultural
and historical readings of consumption. His
research has appeared in journals such as the Journal
of Marketing Management, Marketing Theory,
Journal of Macromarketing and Journal of Historical Research in
Marketing amongst others.
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Past, media, and protest: The
Japanese media’s nostalgia for the
recent past
Katsuyuki Hidaka, Ritsumeikan University
The number of Japanese media representations of a deeply nostalgic
longing for the Japanese heyday of the economic boom in the 1960s
and occasionally the 1970s has recently flourished. This phenomenon
has been called the ‘Shōwa thirties boom’ (Shōwa sanjyū nendai būmu) or
‘Shōwa thirties nostalgia’ (Shōwa sanjyū nendai nosutarujia), as the 1960s
in the Gregorian calendar corresponds to the third decade of the Shōwa
(Hirohito) Emperor’s reign (1926–1989).
Credit: Politics, Emotion and Protest
Workshop, Bournemouth University, 9-10
July 2015
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Remakes of 1960s’ and 1970s’ television dramas, and recent drama serials
that copy the style of the Shōwa 30s have also gained in popularity.
Moreover, recent years have seen the production of a number of television
documentaries, magazine articles, and popular songs that focus on the
‘glory’ of that period.
Shōwa nostalgia has been frequently discussed in Japanese journalism, but
most of these discussions are problematic because of the many unspoken
assumptions and presuppositions therein. It is presupposed, for example,
that Shōwa Nostalgia causes this time period to be regarded in a positive
light. Journalists admire this time period, and often compare it with
the present. There is a presupposition that Shōwa Nostalgia is harmless
and naive. There is also a presupposition as to why the only periods
highlighted are the Shōwa 30s and 40s.
It is worth noting that not only journalists but also academics scarcely
doubt the prevailing belief that the Shōwa 30s was a favourable period
during which people’s private lives were overflowing with happiness due
to the economic boom. Of course, some academics are sceptical about the
prevailing belief; however, what is important here is that both scholars
who glorify and criticise that time period share the preconceived notion
that nostalgia-evoking media and cultural products have a high regard for
the Shōwa 30s.
Therefore, they show little interest in analysing the narratives of these
products, which has led to the absence of a detailed analysis of Shōwa
nostalgic media and cultural products. For this reason, I have been
conducting an in depth investigation of Showa nostalgic films and
television programmes.
In my research, I demonstrate that the representations of Showa periods
in nostalgic media and cultural products are entirely different from the
arguments of journalism and intellectual discourse. Media and cultural
products that seek to invoke a sense of nostalgia resist the real history of
Japan—particularly its post-1960s’ history—while superficially expressing
a yearning for that period in stereotypical terms. In other words, a sense
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of antagonism towards Japan’s post-war history may have prompted these
nostalgic media producers to create a revisionist historical narrative of
Japan’s post-war society or a counter-narrative to the dominant
understanding of Japan’s post-war development.
What is important here is that the sense of antagonism towards Japan’s
post-war history, as reflected in popular culture products, is in fact related
to the current rise of the protest movement in Japan. Since the Great
Eastern Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Nuclear Plant disaster in 2011,
the antinuclear power movement has been increasingly active, as has been
the protest movement against the incumbent Abe cabinet, particularly
against the policy of constitutional change.
These protest movements have in common that they all critically review
Japan’s post-war society and it is worth noting that not a few film
directors, pop musicians, and manga artists of these cultural products are
members and even leaders of these protest movements. In this regard,
these movements are in fact related to Showa nostalgic popular culture
products, and these two shape an important political and cultural trend in
contemporary Japan.
I would like to mention some contentious areas here. First, as far as
Showa nostalgia is concerned, similarities exist between the arguments
of journalists, intellectuals, and politicians. Furthermore, in my opinion,
there appears to be a form of ‘unconscious collusion’ between these
outlets. This ‘unconscious collusion’ is evident in the fact that they
consider the 1960s and ‘70s in Japan to be the ‘good old days’. This is
most likely because it is advantageous for them to justify Japan’s post-war
society and ignore the numerous social contradictions and antagonisms.
These similarities between the arguments of journalists, intellectuals, and
politicians are extremely important, not least because they appear to
actually be related to the Liberal Democratic Party’s very long and
independent rule of Japan.
Secondly, there is a large dichotomy between the arguments of journalists,
intellectuals, and politicians and the representations found in popular
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culture products such as films, television dramas, and music. The films,
television programmes, magazines, and theme parks that play upon
nostalgic themes do not proudly boast of the results of Japan’s
unprecedentedly sharp economic boom in the post-war period; rather,
they tend to adhere to an incomplete picture of Japan’s economic
development. What they involve is not a simple yearning for the life of
decades past but an amalgam of love and hatred for the recent past and
memories—a mixture of regret, discontent, and nostalgia. In any case,
we can observe the massive political polarisation by investigating these
representations and real life politics.
Katsuyuki Hidaka is Professor in Media and
Cultural Studies at Ritsumeikan University in
Kyoto and also a Research Associate at the Centre
for Film Studies, SOAS, University of London.
Before he became a Media Studies scholar, he had
served as a TV director and producer for NHK
(Japan Broadcasting Corporation) for many years.
Although his current research interests are diverse,
they could be classified broadly into the following areas: first, memories,
the past, modernity and media; secondly, media narratives after
catastrophic disasters and social change (e.g. Japanese media since 3/11);
and thirdly, the application of “Radical Democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe)
to media and cultural studies. He has published widely in these fields
including his recent book, Shōwa Nosutalujia To Wa Nanika (What is
Shōwa Nostalgia?) (Sekai Shisōsha 2014).
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Emotional narratives in the tabloid
press
Jen Birks, University of Nottingham
Tabloid journalism is often disparaged for its use of emotional rhetoric,
as a sensationalised, ‘dumbed-down’, and ‘soft’ form of news that is
contrasted with the serious and dispassionate business of ‘hard’ news.
Where tabloids appeal to base fears and prejudices against marginalised
groups such as immigrants and welfare ‘scroungers’, this is clearly
problematic. However, there are times when they attempt to use
emotional narratives in a more political way that shares some
characteristics with broadsheet investigative journalism and the more
muckraking end of New Journalism, using human interest stories as forms
of testimonial against official claims about social reality.
Recent scholarship has noted the lack of political challenge to the austerity
agenda in the quality and public service sectors of news media, where
the need for cuts has been broadly accepted as necessary. News media
generally present cuts to welfare in particular as being supported by ‘the
public’. However, in the wake of the Welfare Reform Act, the Daily
Mirror and Sunday People, both owned by Trinity Mirror, ran campaigns
in opposition to the ‘Bedroom Tax’, as opponents labelled the cuts to
housing benefit for those deemed to have a ‘spare bedroom’. Both papers
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are centre-left leaning and Labour-supporting, though the Sunday People
takes less interest in political issues in general and protest in particular,
whilst the Mirror has been supportive of public sector strikes.
Credit: paul bevan/Flickr/CC BY 2.0
The basis of opposition to the policy was moral more than practical, so
the ‘evidence’ presented to support the criticisms was of social injustice,
something felt intuitively more than dispassionately calculated. Both
campaigns focused primarily on anger as a politically motivating emotion.
At first this anger was attributed to politicians, and then increasingly to
readers responding to the campaign, principally in letters to the editor.
The papers found some support in opinion polls that seemed to be shifting
in their favour, but also took protest seriously as an expression of public
outrage. Anger was also attributed to those affected by the bedroom tax,
and despite being described as victims, they were not denied agency as is
more typical in such campaigns.
The narratives of suffering aimed to legitimise a demand for political
action. The newspapers encouraged affected individuals to write to MPs
and even the Prime Minister setting out their case. However, these
emotive tales of bedrooms used to house specialist medical equipment
or kept as shrines to dead children were then treated as isolated cases
that did not constitute a challenge to the policy as a whole. Government
ministers were able to respond emotionally appropriately with sympathy
and concern to discursively shut down the argument without actually
doing anything. Commentators and letter writers accused them of being
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heartless – questioning the emotional authenticity of those platitudes – but
to little effect.
Bakhtinian narrative theory suggests that emotional personal narrative
can be useful in disrupting the dominant social narrative from within, by
fitting into a dominant understanding but shifting it. In this case, the idea
that politicians are out of touch with the lived reality of ‘ordinary people’
is practically common sense in the mainstream media, but depicting
welfare claimants as equally legitimate subjects as ‘hardworking taxpayers’
is rather more radical. The danger, though, is that the narrative can
degenerate into melodrama and lose the potential for structural critique.
Yet in opinion columns, editorials and letters to the editor, there was a
significant amount of explicit class politics, including accusing the
government of setting the ‘working poor against the workless poor’.
Even Habermas – the great rationalist – has occasionally admitted that
reasoned argument will not always be persuasive, and there may be a
case for civil society groups thematizing and dramatizing issues to show
why they are important. The danger with focusing on the suffering of
victims, is, on the one hand, to speak on their behalf, and on the other to
focus on their suffering over other more political emotions. For Deborah
Gould, the political work is in transforming the affective response to
marginalisation and exploitation into mobilizing emotions of indignance
and outrage rather than shame. It is possible that taking seriously ‘victims’
objections to the policy (via the practical and emotional impact on their
lives) could achieve that goal, through public support and solidarity.
On the other hand, the policy is criticised as unfair rather than unjust,
which is a more meritocratic sense than one based in equality, and tends
towards a focus on ‘deserving cases’ (such as the bereaved, disabled and
militarily deployed) which could undermine the attempt to challenge the
stigmatisation of welfare recipients as a whole. In individualising the issue,
such a focus could reinforce the dominant narrative that responsibilizes
the victim as a neoliberal subject. Whilst a more collective voice might
be more effective in articulating class opposition and broader public
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solidarity, however, the aggregate of such stories over time must surely
help to counter the more sensationalised tabloid narrative of large families
living in mansions at public expense.
Jen Birks is an Assistant Professor in Media and
Political Communication at University of
Nottingham. She is the author of News and Civil
Society (Ashgate, 2014), and writes on publics and
protest in news media.
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Personal stories let us know what it
means to be a refugee
Maria Rovisco, University of Leicester
As Europe struggles with a humanitarian crisis the like of which it hasn’t
seen for decades, the media coverage of the refugees dying to get to the
continent has been changing in tone.
At the beginning of August 2015, news of a ‘swarm’ of migrants causing
travel chaos and nuisance to British holidaymakers in Calais got the bulk
of the attention. By the end of the month, the term “migrant” had mutated
into a pejorative term to classify these people.
Since then, there has been a remarkably reflective discussion of the
appropriate labels to describe different experiences of migration and
asylum. Al Jazeera, for one, made a well-publicised decision to use the
term ‘refugee’ in place of ‘migrant’ when talking about the crisis in the
Mediterranean.
Labels and terminology do, of course, matter. They help us understand,
for example, why people who flee war and persecution have the right
to claim asylum, while others seek jobs in other countries purely for
economic reasons.
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Admittedly, as David Marsh recognises in his piece for The Guardian, ‘the
term is badly tarnished after years of abuse by those who seek to strip
refugees of their humanity’.
That much is certainly open to debate, but it’s not the whole story. The
way we really dehumanise refugees is not by wrongly labelling them
‘migrants’, but by denying them a voice.
Beyond counting
Until the world saw a tragic photograph of a drowned boy, Aylan (Alan)
Kurdi, the reporting of the ‘migrant crisis’ in the mainstream media was
dominated by debates about whether the numbers of people seeking to
enter Europe are sustainable.
Writing in the Sunday Times, the home secretary, Theresa May warned
of the ‘consequences of uncontrolled migration on wages, jobs and social
cohesion of the destination nations’. The British government has changed
tack somewhat since the Kurdi picture, but the terms of the discussion
haven’t really changed. David Cameron’s response and the discussion of it
are still a matter of numbers, not lives.
This is not surprising if we accept, as argued by the anthropologist Liisa
Malkki in her book Purity and Exile, that public discourse routinely
frames refugees as a pathological challenge to the ‘national order of
things’, one that requires preventative and curative measures.
Credit: Mstyslav Chernov/CC BY-SA 4.0
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Media coverage of the crisis remains firmly focused on the impotence of
European leaders in face of ‘unprecedented numbers’ of deaths, arrivals,
and people taken by particular countries. As Gavin Hewitt put it in a
piece for BBC News online: ‘The crisis has overwhelmed Europe’s leaders.
There is no plan’.
These discussions do nothing to explain why people risk their lives to
seek asylum. We need to move beyond what Martina Tazzioli calls ‘the
politics of counting‘. Treating asylum seekers and migrants as statistics
not only strips them of their humanity, but also reduces them to the
condition of voiceless and helpless victims. The personal stories of those
who seek solace in Europe remain blithely ignored and unreported in the
mainstream press.
One rare example of writing that takes into account the perspectives of
those who find themselves displaced by conflict was an Owen Jones piece
in the New Statesman. The headline read: ‘Owen Jones talks to Calais
migrants: They forget we are human.’
In it, Jones tells the story of Habib, who comes from Jalalabad, and hopes
of returning to the UK after being deported. We learn how Abdul, from
Sudan, saw his village burned to the ground by an Arab-supremacist
militia. Through these snippets of personal stories we gain new insight
into how these young men find themselves ‘caught up in very difficult
situations’. But we also learn that there’s courage and dignity in their
stories.
Voices matter
We need more news stories told from the perspective of those who
attempt to reach Europe in suffocating trucks, overcrowded trains and
sinking boats, rather than from the perspective of those who do the
counting.
We need more narratives that give voice to the individual experiences of
asylum seekers, refugees, first and second generation migrants. We need
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stories that communicate just what it means to live in a world that treats
people in dire need this way.
Only with stories like these can we foster a deeper understanding of
the appalling disparity between different people’s fortunes in and around
Europe where some highly skilled migrants are able to swiftly move jobs
across borders while others risk death to reach the continent’s shores.
There are encouraging signs. A fast-growing new clutch of grassroots
petitions and solidarity campaigns suggest that public sympathy for the
plight of forced migrants and refugees has reached a tipping point. If
the numbers of migrants are unprecedented, so is the outpouring of
compassion.
This could be the start of a whole new debate on refugees and migrants –
and the way we should treat them as humans, not numbers.
Maria Rovisco is a Lecturer in Media and
Communication at the University of Leicester, UK.
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cosmopolitanism and religion, and on the cultural
borders of Europe and globalization. She is
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West’s crisis of communication will
make terrorist atrocities more
likely
Emma L. Briant, University of Sheffield
Already the tremors of recent days are shaking fear-fuelled ideologies out
of the woodwork. In the US, senator Marco Rubio renewed talk of a ‘clash
of civilisations‘. Political and media rhetoric of this kind simply amplifies
the terrorists’ power by claiming that they represent an entire ‘civilisation’,
generating fear and therefore the impact of their atrocities.
Such rhetoric risks alienating moderate Muslims, producing ‘us v them’
polarisation and calls for the harsh retaliations that the terrorists are
seeking to bolster their recruitment drives. Sadly, the minimal press
coverage given in the West to recent terrorist attacks in Iraq and Lebanon
aids those trying to pretend that this is violence perpetrated by Muslims
against non-Muslims, rather than showing us the reality of shared
victimisation.
We will continue to fail in fighting violent extremism if we do not
begin by addressing the real-world circumstances on which it is founded,
including inequality, poverty and social injustice. In the UK, the right-
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wing media and political opportunists have also predictably attempted to
hijack the tragedy to push an anti-immigration agenda and fear is being
spread by the militarisation of policing on our streets and imagery that
recalls Nazi propaganda at its worst.
It is sadly predictable that the
scapegoats being blamed en masse
for the Paris attack are the refugee
victims of Islamic State, something
IS clearly intended. As my
research with Glasgow Media
Group shows, media
misrepresentation of refugees and
migrants is nothing new and has
been used to drive through
legislation that has hampered
integration in our communities,
including austerity cuts to public services, harsher conditions for migrants
and attacks on the Human Rights Act.
In this climate, calls to close borders and blame refugees for the problems
that they too are seeking to escape, may score easy points for some
politicians or sell papers in the wake of an attack, but they won’t deal
with the problems which led to the rise of IS and the recent migrant
crisis. In fact, such calls actually distract us from the foreign policy failures
that fuelled the rise of IS and have driven forced migration to Europe.
The media’s bolstering of anti-migrant feeling also prevents resources
going to help allieviate the poverty that makes refugees so vulnerable to
exploitation.
New ideas needed
While I was researching my recent book: “Propaganda and Counter-
terrorism: Strategies for Global Change” I interviewed journalists, PR
professionals and foreign policy, defence and intelligence personnel from
the US and UK. It worried me that over the past 14 years, US and British
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government propaganda strategies and counter-terrorism policies appear
to have been produced and reproduced in a bubble. Strategy is informed
by a small circle of government-funded or affiliated terrorism experts,
think-tanks and academics – with similar ideas and objectives.
Credit: Jacky Naegelen/REUTERS
These experts – and, of course, the politicians they advise – are over-
reported in the media, too. This leads to the recirculation of the same
ideas that have repeatedly failed us. The latest example of this is the UK
government’s Prevent strategy – an ill-conceived programme which has
been criticised by teachers, academics and NGOs for its harassment of
Muslim communities.
Such strategies increase tensions in our communities, stifle academic
freedom in schools and universities and increase feelings of alienation
among Muslims in the UK. The all-too-frequent refusal of both the
British and US governments to listen to independent social science stifles
their understanding of the causes and therefore solutions for dealing with
terrorism.
‘Huge disconnects’
The bubble in which US and UK governments’ counter-terrorism
policies have been created perpetuates a model of communication that is
doomed to fail. For the book, former CENTCOM commander, Admiral
William Fallon told me that the ‘huge disconnects’ that exist in
understanding can be addressed in Iraq through ‘messaging’. He said:
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‘You’ve got to start figuring out how you’re going to get in the people’s
heads to get them to do what you want them to do’.
Both media and policymakers repeatedly ask: ‘How can we win the
propaganda war?’ By reissuing the same old calls for the same failed
strategies? I would argue not.
Top-down propaganda and a refusal to ‘listen’ cannot create lasting peace
and stability. It divides us and prevents intercultural understanding.
In 2009, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson,
stressed to me how skillful General David Petraeus (who succeeded Fallon
as chief of CENTCOM) had been in his use of statistics and propaganda
that had ‘lulled us into taking Iraq off the front page’, distracting public
scrutiny while Wilkerson could see that: ‘Iraq has not changed, majorly,
in terms of its political disposition and where it might go into the future’.
Chilling words, given the subsequent rise of Islamic State. The lack of
transparency and debate has facilitated the developing crisis and greater
understanding of the value of independent academic expertise would, in
the long term, produce more robust solutions.
What we need is to see how recent events have been fuelled by our own
flawed policies and a media that focuses less on headlines than showing us
the truth.
Emma Briant is Lecturer in Journalism Studies at
the University of Sheffield. Her research interests
are in the areas of propaganda, influence and
censorship in the US and UK, war reporting,
counter-terrorism and governmental adaptation to
a changing media environment. Her doctoral
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communication’ since 2001, which is now the subject of her new book
Propaganda and Counter-terrorism: Strategies for Global Change. Her
other recent published research includes analyses of media coverage of
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disability and asylum in the UK with the Glasgow Media Group where
she worked before coming to Sheffield.
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Journalism and history: Either
‘patriotic’ or truthful
Andreas Anastasiou, University of Leicester
Natalie Fenton comments on claims that the internet is ‘an organizing
model for a new form of political protest‘, but she also draws attention
to Gramsci’s view, that forms of protest such as ‘the scream’ are not
necessarily ‘truly political‘. They can appear to be expressed in a political
vocabulary, yet they are rather emotional, unfounded in rational terms, I
would add. Although Fenton aims to offer a strong argument in favour
of including radical or left-wing politics as an important factor in any
analysis of protest and digital media, I suggest a broader and more general
reading of her interesting analysis. Thus, for the purpose of the present
note, I propose that we keep the possibility of some protesting views
being more emotional and less political; based more on myth and
imagination rather than on verifiable information.
Complementing these suggestions, and certainly extending them outside
Fenton’s framework of radical politics, Mojca Pajnik and John D. H.
Downing indicate that one should not equate ‘alternative’ politics or
‘alternative’ media to progressive or radical ones. Hitler’s Nazist regime
in Germany and Khomeini’s ‘brutal theocracy’ in Iran used the then
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alternative media and political tactics to persuade the public and establish
themselves. Today, the authors explain, ‘mechanisms that are supposedly
conducive to the democratization of society are seen as those which can
also function as mechanisms for the exclusion of citizens, for example in
the case of the spread of racism and xenophobia via new media’.
What, in socio-psychological terms, is described as ‘xenophobia’, can
be called ‘nationalism’ in ideological ones. ‘Nationalists’ believe in the
superiority of their nation compared to other nations. But what is a
‘nation’? It is a ‘sentiment rooted in broad historical, geographical,
linguistic, or cultural circumstances. A consciousness of belonging to
a tradition which differs from the traditions of other groups’. It is a
‘relational term; one nation consists in being what other nations are not’.
It is an entity about which ‘no ‘scientific definition’ can be devised‘. We
observe, then, a theoretical impossibility for one to provide a generally
accepted scientific definition of the ‘nation’, and a pragmatic reality, that
billions of people take this concept for granted. They consider themselves
as belonging to a nation. They feel that they are different from ‘others’.
They are proud of their collective and inherited being. Ultimately, they
may even be ready to kill or die ‘for these inventions‘.
Such a belief includes people’s readiness to accept invented myths as
history; to describe their feelings as patriotism and the same feelings of
‘others’ as nationalism; to not question why ‘we’ are always innocent
victims and ‘others’ are always aggressors. This emotion can influence
people’s understanding of contemporary issues; a great part of Europe’s
public opinion believes that most non-EU citizens permitted to reside in
the European Union in recent years came from predominantly Muslim
countries, such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, official Eurostat
data draws a very different picture; most non-EU citizens who received
residence permits in the EU during 2014 were from the United States,
Ukraine, China and India. The same emotion can influence people’s
understanding of historical realities. It can make most Greeks believe
that Greek and Christian education was forbidden and persecuted during
Ottoman times, so that Greek children had to attend a ‘secret school’; this
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belief is deeply rooted and constantly reproduced by school books and
media, despite its repeated refutation by numerous respected historians.
Reporting ‘the truth’ or what?
It would be interesting if one assessed whether journalists, the
professionals whose mission is supposed to be to report ‘the truth’ to
the public, value the duty to tell the truth higher or lower than that to
defend ‘national interest’. Hillel Nossek argues that ‘journalists generally
handle any tensions between their journalistic values and the need to
meet national ends by having a belief system such as patriotism’ argues.
Nossek notes that there are exceptions, but holds that ‘journalists who
lack the “right attitude” earn themselves labels like “irresponsible” and
“ideological”‘. Prevalent in most Greek and Turkish journalists is the belief
that they have a duty to safeguard the ‘national interest’ and the ‘national
image’, rather than their desire to report accurately in all cases. This is
caused by two factors: (1) the fear that they will be labelled as traitors and
(2) constant peer pressure.
Credit: Anna Lena Schiller/Flickr/CC
BY-NC-ND 2.0
‘I overheard a Greek journalist expressing a personal view that deviated
from the norm on a “national issue”, and yet, the very next day, I read
in the newspaper a standard (aligned with the predominant view) article
on the matter signed by the very same journalist’, said Greek journalist
Manolis Kostidis. ‘When it comes to Greece, there is a historic
preoccupation in the Turkish press. The editors of almost all newspapers,
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are rather suspicious’, added Mehveş Evin, a Turkish journalist. ‘When it
comes to a story about Turkey, I don’t see much difference between an
extreme right wing and a left of centre Greek newspaper’, commented
Mihalis Vasiliadis, publisher of a Greek minority newspaper in Turkey.
‘When I was looking at Greek matters from Turkey, I was writing one-
sidedly’, were the words of Nur Batur, a Turkish journalist – former
Athens correspondent. A statement offering some explanation of the
situation was made by Mihalis Vasiliadis, a Turkish born Greek journalist,
having worked in both countries: ‘I have been sued and taken to a
court of justice in two cases; once in Turkey, for allegedly spreading
Greek propaganda, and once in Greece, for allegedly spreading Turkish
propaganda’.
Are journalists, then, more ‘patriotic’ rather than ‘truthful’ only because
they are forced to be so? Not really. Nationalism is a feeling implanted
in almost everybody, an ideology within many other ideologies. Umut
Özkırımlı and Spyros Sofos, co-authors of a joint effort to shed academic
light on the two sides of nationalism in Greece and Turkey, honestly
admit: ‘We found that nothing was as unambiguous as we had originally
anticipated. Where one of us would see specific injustices, victims and
traumas, the other’s perspective would point out alternative ones, silenced
and repressed in the other’s proposed narrative’. Whether we are
journalists, then, academics, or anything else, it seems that we can easily
detect signs of nationalism in the words and actions of the ‘other’ but not
in our own ones; however, our own nationalist bias is evident for our
colleagues from the ‘other’ side. This is a challenge worth to be addressed,
but requiring a lot more effort than the one made so far.
Andreas Anastasiou is teaching and conducting
doctoral research in the department of Media and
Communication at the University of Leicester,
shifting to the academia after twenty five years in
journalism. He holds an MA in Communication
Media and Public Relations from the University of
Leicester and a BA in Economics from the
American College of Greece. He has taught Mass
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Communication Theory, Journalism Practice, Comparative Media
Studies and Research Methods at the University of Leicester and De
Montfort University. His research interests include journalistic
professionalism, news selection, comparative media research, ‘patriotic’
bias and representing the ‘other’ in the media.
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PART III
Women, politics, activism
16
Slutwalk, emotion and protest
Kaitlynn Mendes, University of Leicester
Back in April 2011, while listening to a Canadian rock radio station
online, I heard the news about a recent ‘SlutWalk’ protest in Toronto
which was generating much discussion, disagreement and debate, initially
in Canada, but eventually across the globe. SlutWalk was a protest in
which thousands of women, men and some children, took to the street to
challenge the ways victims (particularly women), were routinely blamed
and ‘slut-shamed’ after being sexually assaulted – the idea being that they
‘provoked’ assault by dressing or acting like ‘sluts.’ As an expert in the
ways feminist movements and activists have been represented in the media
(Mendes 2011), I was enraged by the way this movement was being
reported on, ridiculed and dismissed, initially by this group of mostly male
Toronto DJ’s, but consistently by other media commentators, pundits and
journalists.
In response, I began to follow and study this grassroots movement as it
developed. Just weeks after the first SlutWalk exploded in Toronto, other
walks were being organised in other Canadian cities, before moving south
to the US, Central and South America, and then across the Atlantic to
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Australasia and Asia. Although there have
been a number of other anti-rape movements such as Reclaim the Night,
which have been in existence for decades, something about SlutWalk
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resonated with tens of thousands of people, many of whom were sexual
assault survivors, but many others who were simply sick of the ways
women’s bodies, actions, clothing and appearance were policed, and used
as excuses to shame, blame and abuse them.
Credit: loretta.lime/Flickr/CC BY-SA
Not only did SlutWalk generate news articles, columns, features and
letters to the editor, it sparked a flurry of blog posts, particularly in the
thriving feminist blogosphere. And what was clear about SlutWalk, is
that like other protests which capitalise on anger and outrage (Jasper
1997), SlutWalk was a movement which generated emotion. Whether you
supported it or opposed it, news articles and blog posts were filled with
emotion. For example, a number of commentators noted the ways the
movement was naïve, perpetuated rather than challenged the patriarchy,
and was generally misguided. Others focused on the ways SlutWalk
participants had no clear sense of how the movement challenged the status
quo. As one of the movement’s fiercest critics, Meghan Murphy parodied:
‘We love sex and we’re sluts! Take that, patriarchy! We wear lingerie to
challenge, um…We’re not sure! SLUTS YOU GUYS!‘.
On the other hand, numerous survivors or sexual assault shared stories
about the importance of SlutWalk, not only for making visible resources
for sexual assault prevention and recovery, but for creating a ‘safe space to
publicly speak out against sexual assault’. Several sex workers used blogs
to share:
‘[H]ow important SlutWalk is to me – particularly as a sex worker, whose
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chances of being assaulted are much higher, with little to no protection
from the state because of my legal invisibility. In fact, the only thing the
state is likely to do for me is punitive. For me, SlutWalk is so much more
than just a protest against sexual assault and victim blaming – it’s about
reconfiguring cultural attitudes about women’s choices about their own
bodies, their own sexuality’.
And pissed off members of the public used the movement as a way to
reclaim bodily agency and pride:
‘I do have a sexuality, I do have physicality, I am sexy damnit. And
that is not a shameful thing, that is not a loss of dignity. It’s reclaiming
ownership of what is rightly mine from the start – and making a stand
to assert that no one has the right to abuse, insult, malign, harm, or
attack anyone AT ALL, including me, for making our own damn
bodily choices. Even if they are the slut-version of Voldemort. Even if
they are “cheap STD-infected hookers’. Even if they’re not sexy. Even if
they are sexy.
As part of my research I also interviewed 22 organisers of SlutWalks
around the world, all of whom were clearly touched, and many of whom
were left emotionally drained from their involvement with the
movement. All of this points to the affective labour involved in activism,
which is often understudied. As Umeshree Govender, organiser of
SlutWalk Cape Town pointed out, her involvement included a mixture
of ‘euphoria’ and ‘heartbreak.’ She was euphoric about being able to bring
together over 2,000 people in solidarity for a cause, but heartbroken to
hear so many stories from survivors and their efforts to convince others
they were not to blame for their assault. SlutWalk Chicago organiser
Stephanie Sutton on the other hand saw her involvement in the
movement as a crucial way of healing after her own assault. As she stated,
being involved with SlutWalk ‘felt like it was the only way I could take
power over that situation [the assault] and seek any form of justice, and I
know there are others who definitely feel that way.’
Regardless of how many cities SlutWalk spread to, or how many
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thousands attended, from a feminist perspective, it’s clear from the
thousands of testimonies, Tweets, articles and blogs that the movement
acted as a form of healing, solidarity, and even empowerment for many.
And while this individual level of healing is certainly important, SlutWalk
did more than that – it managed to introduce a range of feminist rhetoric
and discourses into the mainstream. Concepts such as rape culture, victim-
blaming, and slut-shaming are all on the public’s agenda, and are being
vociferously debated and discussed amongst students, scholars, academics,
pundits, politicians and policy makers. For its ability to raise consciousness
on these issues, and bring rape and sexual assault back onto the public’s
agenda, like it or loathe it, the movement, in my view can only be viewed
as a great success.
Dr. Kaitlynn Mendes is a Senior Lecturer in the
Department of Media and Communication at the
University of Leicester. Kaitlynn is an expert on
feminism, activism and gender issues in the media,
and has published in journals such as Feminist
Media Studies; Media, Culture and Society; The
International Journal of Cultural Studies, and the
Journal of Gender Studies. Kaitlynn is also the
author/editor of four books, Feminism in the News: Representations of
the Women’s Movement Since the 1960s (Palgrave, 2011); Feminist
Erasures: Challenging Backlash Culture (edited with Kumarini Silva,
Palgrave, 2015), The Routledge Major Works Collection: Gender and
Media (Routledge, forthcoming 2016), and SlutWalk: Feminism,
Activism and Media (Palgrave, 2015), which was recently selected as Book
of the Week for the Times Higher Education magazine. In addition to her
academic research, Kaitlynn has appeared on programmes such as the
BBC’s Woman’s Hour, numerous BBC Radio Leicester shows, and
regularly writes op-eds for publications such as The Conversation and
The Leicester Mercury.
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A lesson in self-immolation
Mariya Ivancheva, University College Dublin
Christina Grozeva and Peter Valchanov’s The Lesson (2014) is probably
the first feature film that explains the Bulgarian winter of discontent in
2013. It tells the story of a ‘normal’ week in the life Nadezhda (Margarita
Gosheva), a Bulgarian school teacher from a small town. While she tries to
punish one of her students who committed theft in a morally instructive
way, life teaches the instructor a much more serious moral lesson. The
Lesson is based on a true story from 2010, sensationally publicized in the
Bulgarian media as ‘A teacher robbed a bank with a toy gun‘. This title
attracted the attention of the two directors. The film is interesting not
only because of its unusual and curious story, but precisely because it is
told through the many painful truths in the everyday life of an ‘ordinary’
Bulgarian.
Credit: Film Movement
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At the first glance, the movie is fun. Viewers laugh heartily at the teacher’s
masterfully portrayed clumsiness, at the infantile comments and reactions
of the adult characters in the movie, at the moments when human
strength, weakness, and ingenuity backfire or lubricate stalled mechanisms
of everyday life. Yet, the smiles gradually freeze and so does the heart.
With a stunning simplicity, typical of directors such as Michael Haneke,
Grozeva and Valchanov lead Nadezhda through all the cycles of a modern
hell. Unemployment and precarity, uncertainty and exploitation, physical
threats and sexual coercion all feature in Nadezhda’s story as she tries to
pay back the last installments of her family’s mortgage.
The Lesson reveals a long-held public secret: most of the physical and
emotional labor in the world today falls on the backs of women. Beyond
the work women perform in their workplace, they are the ones who
not only take care of the family’s survival and well-being, but also
predominantly manage the household economy and debt. The film also
reveals the difficulties and the conflicts which women face in an advanced
capitalist society: the need to confront not only gender inequalities but
also the crumbling of all networks of institutional and interpersonal
solidarity and support. The story of the Bulgarian teacher shows what
happens when all forms of human dignity and mutual aid are allotted
monetary value and expected to perform according to market rules. It
reminds us that despite the promise of 1989 the post-socialist world was
not liberated from relentless bureaucracy – that it lives on and lives
well, ever more soulless and impersonal, especially in these times of new
technologies. The Lesson does not shy away from the painful topic of
corruption: the normalized impunity of informal cooperation between
the agents of law enforcement, financial capital and the criminal world.
Without becoming sensationalist, the film shows the subtle yet brutal
mechanisms of physical, sexual, and emotional coercion in a financially
and emotionally impoverished society.
Nadezhda is a woman in a man’s world. Judging by the characters in
the film, Bulgarian men (or men in general) can easily afford to act
ruthlessly, irresponsibly and with impunity toward all women around
them. Women are bullied, lied to, or left in oblivion. The audience is
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stunned by the respectable yet inexplicable pride with which the teacher
suffers humiliation from the male characters in the movie. The only
somewhat different male role is taken by Nadezhda’s unemployed
husband (Ivan Barnev). Despite his apparent naivety, however, he secretly
takes out a mortgage and only confesses this to her once it is too late. Yet,
despite his wrongdoing, Nadezhda fears hurting or humiliating him.
It is here that the events of the winter of 2013 appear as a negative
background to the movie. In late January that year Bulgaria witnessed
seven self-immolations (since then the number has increased to over
twenty). With one exception – a single mother – all who have committed
self-immolation were men. As in the case of Mohamed Bouazizi – the
man whose self-immolation ignited the fire of the Arab Spring – these
Bulgarian “living torches” are often failed breadwinners in families
exposed to prolonged poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. They
often commit suicide after failing to pay off their seemingly insignificant
household debts. For a Bulgarian household, however, these few hundreds
or few thousands of Euro debt are simply not insignificant. Still less, as
the film reminds us, when the stake of the loan is not just monetary:
paying off the debt becomes an issue of life and death. These debtors are
betwixt and between the impersonal power of the bank and the rising
institution of ‘private lenders’: thugs who will stop at nothing to collect
the loan with its huge interest. These ‘lenders’ are now a growing part
of the daily scenery of the Bulgarian economic and social life. One can
take a walk down the streets of any town to see mushrooming pawnshops,
outnumbered only by casinos, bingo halls, and bookmakers’ clubs. Named
after Western cities or tropical destinations, they prowl about, offering
risky ways to deal with the growing household debt, until a straw breaks
the camel’s back, sometimes, literally.
What the film fails to offer is even a hint to the causes and conditions:
why is it that a Bulgarian teacher decided to rob a bank in 2010? While
the movie lacks historical references, the genealogy of the Bulgarian The
Lesson is painfully clear. The introduction of market economy after 1989
deepened the growing poverty and inequality already present in the
later years of state socialism. The closure of peasant cooperatives and
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factories after mass privatization in the 1990s concentrated the political
and economic power in the hands of the banking, commercial and
political elite. It immersed a growing number of Bulgarian families in a
never-ending crisis, unemployment, and uncertainty. The global financial
crisis of 2008, portrayed as alien to our “stable economy”, was used as
a justification for continuing austerity, shrinking revenues and rises in
prices. As Romanian anthropologist Florin Poenaru recently wrote, the
message of post-socialist governments was: ‘The poor must die!‘
Although global protest movements raged in the streets expressing
indignation that ordinary people were paying the bill of the banking
crisis, in Bulgaria even timid criticisms of capitalism as a system were met
with resentment; as heretic attempts to restrict the holy freedom of the
market.Illogical alliances and antagonisms emerged. ‘Civil’ dissatisfaction
with corrupt politics was opposed to ‘social’ discontent with rising misery:
The ‘hard-working middle classes’ (main protagonists of the July protests)
did not see allies in those who protested the electricity price hikes the
preceding February. The destruction of the welfare state was presented as
a sign of improvement. Privatization and austerity were seen as remedies
to unemployment and impoverishment, while the latter were attributed
to personal laziness and lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Equality and social
justice are presented as incompatible with freedom and contrary to the
‘morality’ of the market.
The self-immolations as well as the true story ofThe Lesson show that
Bulgarians are now ‘proud’ beneficiaries of one of the main features of
advanced capitalist societies, that is, anomie: the lack of rights and clear
norms and rules of social integration, collective justice, and solidarity.
Citizens’ participation in today’s society happens almost exclusively
through consumption. In the situation of chronic poverty, precarious
income fails to meet the rising price of consumption and – as a logical
consequence – of household debt. Informal loans provide a quick-fix and
unsustainable solution. They gradually become an unbearable, dangerous
burden, as households sink deeper into the quagmire of debt.
For some the outcome is suicide (and even the spectacular form of self
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immolation). This is historically and statistically truer for men. They turn
to forms of self-aggression especially in situations that deprive them of
their symbolic masculinity: the persistent norm that men should be strong
and act as breadwinners, even today, when the largest part of productive,
and reproductive work is done by women. The gender pay-gap and
traditionally lower pay of feminised forms of work (such as teaching)
as well as formal and informal care work which women do still happen
in conditions of growing gender inequality. Thus, no surprises when
women resort to highly stigmatized and dangerous solutions as sex work,
or – less often – as bank robbery. The reasons to seek such solutions –
the economic deadlock and coercion of women (and people in general) in
the former Eastern bloc – are hardly mentioned and even less addressed in
policy reports both in Bulgaria and abroad. Campaigns against domestic
violence shy away from mentioning the economic and social reasons that
draw Bulgarian men to violence, and women – to migration, often along
dangerous paths.
I watched The Lesson with a friend who was attending a creative writing
course. He was delighted: “The directors follow the basic rule we are
taught in class: if you want to tell a credible story, be a sadist to your
characters! Torture them, don’t stop, don’t let them take a breath…”
His words stayed with me. Perhaps that is why people still withstand
capitalism – its story is credible. And so is that of The Lesson.
A version of this article was originally published in LeftEast.
Mariya Ivancheva is a sociologist and
anthropologist. She is a Post-Doctoral Research
Fellow at the Equality Studies Centre, University
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Fuck the patriarchy
Heather Savigny, Bournemouth University
I guess we could just say, fuck the patriarchy, and that would be the end of
the post; it’s a simple expression of protest. But then I may need to provide
a few more words…
Femen, Everyday Sexism and Slutwalk are just three examples of
movements that in their own ways send very clear messages of resistance;
rejection; and strength. And yet, despite years of feminist/women’s
advancement, we still have those who deny the existence or the
opportunities afforded by feminism.
Without feminists, in the UK, women would have no right to vote;
thanks to the women who were forcibly fed nearly 100 years ago.
Without women’s activism rape in marriage would still be legal (and
it was in the UK until 1991). Women’s activism has led to campaigns
to eradicate unwanted sexual behaviour on public transport (Project
Guardian) and the abolition of the TamponTax. Without women’s
activism we would not have an Equal Pay Act, or indeed many of the
rights that women in the West now take for granted (or have been
‘granted’).
So when we hear women assert ‘I am not a feminist’ or ‘I am not one
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of those shouty feminists’ it does give us pause to think: Really? Because
it was by feminism, it was by activism, it was by shouting, that women
were able to effect the changes that have loosened some of the shackles on
women’s lives.
Of course, the history of feminist thought has not been without its
own problems. Perhaps most significantly the assumption of second wave
feminists that all women’s experiences were the same as the white middle
class writers who articulated it. (For a beautiful articulation of this see
bell hooks). At the same time, the existence of tensions and debates
within feminism does not negate its utility or purpose, rather it enables
us to see myriad ways in which the patriarchy is manifest. The problems
that feminism has had to work out demonstrate that, rather than being
some idealised abstract project, feminism is about real people reacting to
the individual social, political, cultural and economic contexts in which
they find themselves. The tensions within aspects of feminism actually
legitimise it as a collective of egalitarian projects belonging to the
multifarious men and women, around the world and throughout history,
who seek to question and challenge the shifting guises and/or
manifestations of patriarchy. As patriarchy has evolved and mutated into
new forms, so must our response. Now we must say: fuck patriarchy.
The existence of contemporary feminist literature and movements, also
remind us that there is still work to do. And this work is taking place
within the academy, and beyond. Within the academy we are encouraged
to present our arguments as nuanced and subtle; this is also the case in
public discourse. Healy argues that nuance also ‘obstructs the development
of theory that in intellectually interesting, empirically generative, or
practically successful‘. In short, nuance works to shore up and diffuse,
rather than challenge or destabilise the status quo. Feminism in many of
its forms encourages us to challenge, or at least, question dominant norms.
So if we do say, fuck the patriarchy, what is it that we express? Fuck is
a word that is seen as offensive and upsetting. Yet isn’t the patriarchy
upsetting and offensive? Where Female Genital Mutilation is still taking
place, affecting an estimated 137,000 women in the UK (and these are
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the figures that are known about, and do not include those that are
‘hidden’); where rape is a weapon of war; where women are subject
to daily humiliations and sexual violations because of their biological
appearance (as documented by Laura Bates).That is pretty offensive;
presumably more so than just a word.
So the expression fuck the patriarchy can be used to transgress, to oppose
and to draw attention; and to express anger, as a way to mobilise. And so
we can also use the phrase as a call to arms and rejection of the status quo,
the systems of hierarchy and authority which bind, take up energy that
may be better spent elsewhere; articulating the ‘here and now’. Collective
action and articulation is powerful; it facilitates the reclamation of agency
in the face of oppression. I know too many women in professional roles
who are exhausted by the obstacles, placed daily, in their way through the
patriarchal structures in which they find themselves. Recognising there
are other women out there who share this discontent, this rage, means
this ‘fuck it’ attitude can be empowering in its own right; as has been
demonstrated by the numerous women who have gone before us, willing
to stand up and be counted and say: fuck the patriarchy.
Heather Savigny is Associate Professor in Politics &
Gender, in the Faculty of Media &
Communications at Bournemouth University. She
writes broadly around the areas of feminism, media
and politics and has a number of journal articles and
books in this area; most recently in Feminist Media
Studies and forthcoming in British Journal of Politics
& International Relations. She is currently working
on a book Heavy Metal, Politics and Feminism; Sexy or Sexist. And she is
utterly fucked off with the patriarchy.
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The role of female blogging in
democracy: A netnographic study
of Nigerian blogs
Diretnan Dusu Bot, University of Leicester
Recent global statistics reveal the rapid growth of female blogs in Nigeria.
It is only on the blogging platform that female presence surpasses that
of men. There is a huge readership of blogs by Nigerian women too.
For instance, Linda Ikeji’s Blog alone has over 150,000 visitors daily.
The study of female blogging and its impact on democracy is developed
on the idea that the unrestricted nature of the internet might hold the
potential to allow women’s voices to be heard, thereby improving their
democratic participation which is lacking. The use of blogs by women for
mobilization/activism to affect government policy has also been witnessed
in recent times in Nigeria. The ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ campaign of
2014 and the ‘Child Marriage’ debate of 2013 are critical examples. Being
campaigns of online origin, (particularly from blogs and Twitter) they add
credence to the discourse on the correlation between internet discourse
and offline democratic practice (having led to policy reformation).
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I therefore explore how Nigerian women have embraced the practice of
blogging and how blogs can serve as a platform for promoting women’s
equality and empowerment. Blogs are said to provide a platform for
African women to become active creators and disseminators of
knowledge by writing about what is important to them. I investigate the
extent to which these discussions qualify as a form of active ‘participatory
politics’ where discussions held about gender-based inequalities and
discrimination involve proposing solutions, organising actions to address
such issues, or dialoguing with policy-makers (or their PR representatives)
and media practitioners (e.g. popular bloggers and online journalists). The
lack of available literature on the female use of the online platform to make
their voices heard in the Nigerian democracy is also the critical aim of
my research. There is no statistical record of female writing in the online
space or blogging to advocate causes that affect them in governance. The
desire of my study is to bridge this gap, while providing information on
blog readers – a population which has been neglected by previous global
researchers who dwell mainly on the activities of blog authors.
I argue that female bloggers in Africa, who may not necessarily be
‘feminists’ by western definition (because of cultural factors and the
negative connotation of the term ‘feminist’ in Africa) can be said to
exemplify the ‘networked counter-publics’ of Jessalynn Keller based on
the definitions of third-wave feminism where ‘activism’ has been re-
defined to reflect the creation of a ‘public self’, rather than an outcome/
action-oriented activity. Hence, cultural and political activities have been
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transformed and may be unrecognizable if interpreted through a more
traditional understanding of the term, ‘activism’. Harris associates this
change with the “neoliberal cultural climate brought about by
individualization, globalization, consumer citizenship and a collapse of
class-based classifications and traditional forms of protest politics” (p. 430).
Similarly, I argue that the online experience of Nigerian women is multi-
dimensional; they may not appeal to a specific sub-culture nor identify
with a specific protest group. In most cases, they may not even position
themselves around the dominant culture in an obviously activist way.
Hence, they complicate the definition of the ‘political’.
Specifically, I examine the conversations of 30 female blogs on the
rejection of the recent ‘Gender and Equality Bill’ by the Nigerian Senate.
The bill seeks to tackle issues such as gender discrimination in political
and public life as well as prohibit violence against women. It also seeks to
establish women’s freedom of movement, female economic activity and
girls’ access to education. The major argument of the senate members
who voted against the bill was hinged on traditional and religious factors,
with senate members seen quoting the Bible and Sharia law to vote
against the bill. The rejection of the bill also stimulated a wide range of
internet discourse by women who were outraged and used diverse online
platforms to protest. Popular blogs authored by women were at the fore-
front of publishing posts and articles to put pressure on the government
to revisit the bill. This pressure seemed to draw the attention of the
senate president who released a statement urging citizens to be calm as he
promised to revisit and possibly encourage the adoption of certain aspects
of the bill. Policy-makers such as Fani Femi Kayode and Oby Ekwesili
notably congratulated social media and reputable female blogs like Linda
Ikeji and Bella Naija for putting pressure on the government to act.
Being at the early stages of the analysis, I intend to use ‘Netnography’
as a new ‘live’ method of online investigation that helps elicit data from
prolonged discourse participation and observation. This is relevant
because, as Kozinets and colleagues (2013) point out, interpretations of
online communications and communities emerge gradually, to develop
cultural codes that allow a better understanding and interpretation of
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virtual spaces. Hence, by immersing oneself in discourse, pertinent
behavioral patterns, or modes of mobilization or activism can unfold
through extensive observation or interaction. The information retrieved
is further analyzed by coding themes relevant to this research. To cope
with the Netnographic limitation of studying one online ‘platform’ in
isolation (which can yield incomplete insight), discourses that are relevant
to answering research questions will be trailed across multiple forums if
need be.
Diretnan Dusu Bot is a first year Ph.D. student at
the University of Leicester, UK. Her research
focuses on how Nigerian women have embraced
the practice of blogging and how blogs can serve as
a platform for promoting women’s equality and
empowerment. Her research explores to what
extent blog discussions qualify as a form of active
‘participatory politics’ where discussions held about
gender-based inequalities and discrimination involve proposing solutions,
organising action to address such issues, or dialoguing with policy-makers
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Exploring Instagram activism:
Emma Watson and sustainable
fashion
Miruna Virtopeanu, Independent Researcher
Instagram has become one of the fastest growing online social networks in
the world, with an estimated 400 million active monthly users (Instagram,
February 2016). This has sparked the interest of social media researchers
who have focused almost exclusively on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube
in the so-called ‘Web 2.0’ era.
Whilst earlier studies have focused more on understanding this platform
and its users, (see Hu et al. (2014) or Ferrara et al. (2014) for example)
more recent research has been concerned with aspects such as how DIY
celebrification can be achieved via Instagram (Maghfiroh and Hapsari,
2015) or how feminist self-imaging practices are being constructed on this
platform (Olszanowski, 2014). These are just a few of the issues that have
been recently tackled by researchers interested in studying Instagram, and
there’s still a lot of room for further research concerning this social media
platform.
One area worth exploring is social media activism, as according to Juanita
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Crider (2015) “Whether it is Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram, or
Periscope, most 21st century activists will tell you that social media is
integral to their work”. Hence this blogpost looks at Instagram’s potential
for becoming a place for online activism, or more precisely how it can be
used for connective action, thus proposing a topic for further research to
explore in more depth.
Applying the logic of connective action to Instagram
Whilst previous research related to connective action, such as Vromen
et al. (2015)‘s study of young people’s use of social media for political
engagement, have focused more on Facebook and Twitter, thus far there
has been very little consideration of how Instagram might facilitate new
forms of connective action.
According to Bennett and Segerberg (2012: p.750) “connective action
networks are typically far more individualized and technologically
organized sets of processes that result in action without the requirement
of collective identity framing or the levels of organizational resources
required to respond effectively to opportunities” that also have at the core
of their logic “the recognition of digital media as organizing agents” (ibid
: p.752). Therefore, a connective action can be created around a personal
frame that resonates with individuals who have no previous affiliation or
connection to the actor from which it originated.
Thus, a social media platform such as Instagram, or more precisely an
individual Instagram account, could become the basis for a connective
action, which can be propagated via network features such as hashtags, or
the social interactions taking place on that particular Instagram account.
One such example is actress Emma Watson’s use of Instagram to promote
sustainable fashion.
Emma Watson and Instagram Activism
An internationally recognised advocate of the HeforShe feminist
movement, Watson is known for addressing all sorts of issues and
movements on her social media profiles. For example, in January 2016,
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she started a feminist book club using her Twitter account. She has also
used her Instagram account to raise awareness about sustainable fashion,
leveraging her celebrity status to shine some light on ‘designers that are
considering local craft and production, artisan skills, the environment,
sustainability and the longevity of fashion’.
Figure 1: Screenshot of one of Emma
Watson’s Instagram post from her
personal account
Whilst these messages actually originated from a post by Sarah Slutsky,
her stylist, their re-posting brought them to the attention of Watson’s 6.6
million followers on Instagram. A quick glance at her account shows that
the majority of her recent posts (as of February 2016) feature the actress
posing in outfits from her press tours, all of which are produced by ethical
designers such as Ralph Lauren or Paul Andrew, which she then promotes
via the description of the posts by tagging them.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Emma Watson’s
personal Instagram account
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Thus, Instagram becomes a platform for Watson to express her support
for the sustainable fashion movement, that recently came to prominence
in the documentary The True Cost (Morgan, 2015) which the actress also
promoted on Instagram. Whilst her status as a celebrity could be seen as
the main cause for her large following on Instagram, it is the social media
network itself which gives the actress the means to quickly disseminate
this message of support and encouragement for more people to consider
sustainable fashion and engage with it. Furthermore, unlike Twitter,
which restricts its users to only 140 characters per tweet, Instagram has the
ability to offer lengthy descriptions for the images posted. In this way, it
is arguably more suited towards the promotion of the sustainable fashion
movement than other text-based social media sites such as Twitter.
Moreover, whilst initially the messages and images posted by Watson
on her personal account are primarily shared with her followers, they
inevitably end up being re-distributed by both citizens and professional
journalists on other social media platforms. Her celebrity status also leads
to these posts featuring in traditional media such as newspapers and
magazines. For example, Vanity Fair and Vogue, two of the most
important publications for the fashion industry, have used Watson’s
Instagram posts in their coverage of the sustainable fashion movement.
Whilst it’s true that Watson’s status as a celebrity is a factor that needs to
be taken into consideration, the fact that she used Instagram as a platform
to share her message with others highlights its potential as a platform
for promoting connective activism. However, more research is needed
in order to analyse the responses to this movement on Instagram, as
well as how it is used to raise awareness about other political campaigns.
How are Watson’s followers engaging with these messages? Do they take
them into account, or simply follow and like her Instagram posts because
they’re fans? Could an individual who does not benefit from a celebrity
status have the same success in disseminating messages and gathering
support for an activist cause? Such questions can only be answered
through further empirical research into Instagram’s potential as a tool of
social activism.
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PART IV
Digital media and the politics
of protest
21
Everyday online conversation,
emotion and political action
Daniel Jackson, Bournemouth University, Scott Wright, University of
Melbourne and Todd Graham, University of Groningen
Creating public spaces that foster political talk amongst citizens is
challenging business. Tell people that it’s a ‘political’ space and (however
well designed) you will invariably find it is used by political junkies,
and is largely ignored by those who don’t self-identify as ‘political’.
Consequently, many commentators will observe said disengagement by
the majority of citizens, and complain of political apathy.
But what if we are looking for the wrong things, and in the wrong
places? In our recent work, we have been arguing that a) we need to
move beyond the now well studied formally ‘political’ spaces, and see
what is going on in everyday lifestyle communities, and b) we need to
reconceive political talk as less narrow, less normative and rational, and
instead embrace the vernacular, expressive and porous characteristics of
everyday public speech.
And of course, emotions are an important link to both of these issues. If
we accept the public sphere is becoming more emotionalised, then we can
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begin to conceive the nature of political engagement itself, as well as the
spaces in which we look for it.
In this spirit, for about the last four years, we have been examining
political talk in non-political online forums: how it emerges, what
happens when it does emerge, and what we can learn about issues of
technology, community, political engagement and citizenship. We set
our focus outside of political flashpoints such as elections, protests or
social movements, and instead root our analysis in the everyday. Our
empirical focus has been on three popular, general interest UK-based
forums: www.netmums.com, www.digitalspy.com and
www.moneysavingexpert.com. These websites cover salient aspects of
contemporary culture: consumption, media and family. But first and
foremost they are spaces embedded in everyday life where people come
to share personal experiences and dilemmas, discuss their interests, meet
likeminded people, and have fun.
At this point we would like to share with you a minor revelation that our
study revealed. Across the three forums, over 50% of all discussions that
were political at some point led to political action. Further details about
the design of the study, what types of political actions we found, and who
they were directed at can be found in our journal articles. In the remainder
of this article, we want to reflect on some of the fundamental questions
our study provoked: what is it about these spaces that seemed to foster political
action, and secondly, why was one of the forums (DigitalSpy) the exception,
with little political action emerging from everyday talk?
In our article in Information, Communication and Society, we develop this
argument further, but here we offer three ruminations on how the
characteristics of the online platform/ community shape political talk and
mobilisation, with particular focus on the role of emotion therein.
1.The connection to everyday life and the personal/ emotional nature of talk;
Part of the value of examining third spaces lies in their everyday nature as
a crucible of negotiation between the public and private, the political and
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personal. Here, we found MoneySavingExpert (MSE) and Netmums to
be productive spaces for turning personal problems into political action.
When political talk arose in these spaces, it very often was deeply
connected to participants’ personal lives. Consequently, emotion is
welcomed, and talk was frequently emotional in tone. We found that
emotion can facilitate connections between people that lead to all kinds of
actions – in both private lives and public.
In MSE and Netmums, people also felt connected because their subject
matter was the self, not politics, therefore removing or side-stepping
one of the barriers to engagement for many contemporary citizens. In
contrast, for DigitalSpy (DS) the entry point for conversations was what
is in the news or on TV, hence there was immediately a greater distance
between participants and the subject matter. This mattered when politics
emerged because in DS it was framed as something to talk about but
too distant to influence, whereas in MSE and Netmums it was framed
as something that was close to home, affecting forum members, and
something they could mobilize around.
Take this example of a Netmums thread, where participants shared
experiences of Job Centre staff. It was prompted by one person who was
treated particularly poorly by a member of staff, and felt so ‘upset’ that she
felt the need to share it with others. Read through the thread and you will
see emotion running through it, often through the use of emoticons. You
will also see how other forum participants begin to mobilize around the
sharing of stories, which are then presented to those in power.
Poster 1: I have also had really bad experiences with the Job Centre and
found going there no point at all. It didn’t help me to find work at all, it
was just a big waste of time. I ended up crying at one appointment as they
made me feel that bad … I feel so strongly about this I wish that I knew
how to voice my opinions
Poster 2: I’m thinking of setting up a website/facebook page so that people
can voice their opinions and relate their experience of the staff at Job
Centres.
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
99
Poster 3: OK….I’ll do it!
I hope you will all come on and tell these same stories when it’s set up? I
intend to contact MPs etc. with details of them to prove how poorly the
JCs are performing.
2. A culture (and structure) of help and support
Both MSE and Netmums are communities organized around self-help,
where the emphasis is on goal-oriented discussions to help members
with their particular dilemmas. When you look at the culture of the
forums, people are there to listen, to help or to tell their stories and
receive support from others. Contrastingly, in DigitalSpy – and most
other political forums we would argue – people are there mainly to discuss.
MSE and Netmums participants were there, for the most part, with the
intention of taking action, namely personal actions in their everyday lives
– to save money, be a better parent and so on. This action orientated
mind-set, along with the everyday and personal nature of the forums, we
argue, helped facilitate political action.
This mind-set comes from the top. Both Netmums and MSE make clear
that they have a civic role, amongst their other functions. The purpose
of DigitalSpy is far less goal-oriented. It is about ‘news and conversation
about entertainment, technology and the media’: in essence, a talking
shop.
In the sociological literature, the political mobilization that emerges from
self-help groups has typically been positioned within the broader shift
towards lifestyle and identity politics. Hence, they can be framed as
contributing towards a retreat from civic life as people focus increasingly
on their own narrow concerns; or alternatively as an empowering
democratic force, through providing spaces for reflection on the reality
of current politics, with an emphasis on questions of identity, experience
and storytelling rather than the broad redistributive questions that had
concerned previous generations. An interesting empirical observation
from our study is how the forums performed both roles, with many
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discussions leading to personal actions that were not for societal benefit,
alongside the finding that the forums facilitated all sorts of manifest and
latent forms of political participation in aid of the common good, with
many of these actions emerging as a result of the personal actions. Thus
we would argue that an increase in personal empowerment that comes
through self-help can have civic repercussions, such as heightening
awareness of the broader social forces that impinge on people as
individuals, increasing social capital and encouraging forms of political
participation.
3. The interactive and reciprocal nature of the platforms and
communities;
The third factor was the interactive and reciprocal nature of both the
platform and communities. Much has been said about the interactive
and networking affordances of (new) social media such as Twitter and
Facebook. However, unlike many new social media, discussion forums
seem to be conducive to reciprocity: discursive reciprocal exchange. They
allow people the time to read and reply to each other’s posts. The
threading of discussions (and public access) also makes it easy for
participants to follow discussions and interact with one another. These
affordances along with the personal connection and culture of support
seemed to foster meaningful reciprocal and reflexive exchanges, allowing
relationships, and a sense of community, to develop and prosper. Indeed,
in Netmums and MSE, participants often shared very personal details,
experiences and stories with one another. These intimate and personal-
based communicative practices seemed to be conducive to affective
subject-position taking. That is, these online communities opened up
spaces of personal and emotional relationships through which participants
forged affective bonds that allowed for deeper levels of understanding,
thus fostering a sense of belonging. Such connections, we argue, made
participants more receptive to taking political actions or mobilizing
around them.
What we are essentially arguing here, is that there is a relationship
between technological affordances, emotionality, self-help and political
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action (not excluding the other ingredients we have discussed here and
in our other work). As other contributions to this volume document,
emotion can play a very positive role in facilitating political action, but as
this and our previous studies have documented, you need the right kind of
platform or culture where emotion is welcomed. And here, it might just
be that spaces rooted in the everyday, rather than the ‘political’, are more
productive than we might have imagined.
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Social media in the Bahrain
Uprising: From hope to despair
Marc Owen Jones, University of Tübingen
Casting one’s’ eyes back to 2011, there was certainly a lot of hope vested
in the potential of social media. From Egypt to Tunisia, protesters held
aloft banners bearing the logos of Facebook and Twitter. In Bahrain,
the widespread sense of hope among thousands of Bahrainis was evident
in their use of social media. Many people, grinning as only people do
when a future of unlimited possibility stretches before them, used their
smartphones to document their attendance at the Pearl Roundabout,
Bahrain’s ‘Freedom Square’. They then shared it on Facebook, Twitter,
Whatsapp, and other social media platforms.
Credit: Bahrain Center for Human Rights
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Twitter and Facebook in particularly held an almost redemptive promise;
Could this networked sense of triumph somehow galvanize a whole
population into mobilization, while raising the costs for the state of
engaging in repression? YouTube videos also allowed the refrains of
the revolution to become ingrained in people’s minds. Chants such as
as ‘silmiyya, silmiyya’ (peaceful peaceful), ‘yasqut Hamad’ (down with
Hamad) ‘ashshaʿb yurīd islāh/isqāt anniẓām’ (the people want the reform/
fall of the regime), ‘birūh, bidem, nafīdak yalBahrain’ (with our blood,
our soul, we sacrifice ourselves for you, Bahrain) grew to be iconic of
the uprising. This is especially true of the refrain of yasqut Hamad, which
was soon translated into a series of beeps or pips that were frequently
honked on car or air horns. The sounds of these pips were often written
in an onomatopoeic fashion as ‘1010 1010 or ‘tin tin tityn.’ Other, more
ambitious activists even made and distributed on YouTube a film
featuring an air horn as the protagonist. The film dramatized the arrest,
torture and death of a Bahraini citizen, with the air horn and its
indefatigable ejaculation of the tin tin tityn refrain representing the notion
of ‘Sumood’ (or steadfastness).
In addition to this, other acts of peaceful, creative defiance were circulated
on social media. These included balloon releases, in which V for victory
signs, pictures of martyrs, or slogans like ‘Down with Hamad’ were
attached to balloons and then released into the Bahraini sky. Such
seemingly harmless acts were taken seriously by the authorities, often
to comic effect. In one instance, a balloon displaying the phrase ‘Down
with Hamad’ was filmed being released. Later, another video emerged
that showed policemen attempting to capture the balloon. Eventually
the police succeeded, and put the fully inflated balloon in the back of a
police jeep. Satirically, those who filmed the video titled it Itiqal Nafaakha
Yasqut Hamad (Arrest of Yasqut Hamad Balloon). Similarly, a wooden
mannequin of a woman with a sign reading ‘free our prisoners’ was
arrested and put in the car.
Statutes of the Pearl Roundabout, which itself had become symbolic and
metonymic of the uprising itself, were often made by activists following
its vindictive destruction by the security services. These creative forms
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of resistance, mediated by social media, allowed optimism and defiance
to be shared with those who may have not witnessed the original act.
Furthermore, by allowing activists and citizens to publicize the subversive,
social media assisted in deinstitutionalising political discourse and
disrupting the agenda setting nature of the state media.
Yet in their defiance, many at the time did not realise they were making
themselves targets for the Al Khalifa dominated government, who were
digging in, stalling on reform, and using coercion to arrest, intimidate,
torture and kill many of the country’s political opposition. In a country
where even shows of disloyalty to the ruling regime can land you in
prison, photographs on social media of someone at a protest march, or
at the Pearl Roundabout, were tantamount to a confession of treason. A
platform that had held so much promise, was quickly becoming a sinister
tool for the state’s accumulation of evidence against anyone displaying
remotely critical tendencies.
Soon, Twitter vigilantes were harvesting publically available information
and accusing people of treason. Joy and optimism, mediated on social
media, was being mined. Accounts like @7areghum (Arabic for ‘the
one that burns them’) would tweet out photos of so-called ‘traitors’,
demanding their names and addresses. In Bahrain, a tiny island
community, it did not take long before government loyalists, or perhaps
members of the security forces, replied with the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of the ‘traitors.’ Some, after having their picture or
name tweeted by such accounts, fled the country. Others packed up their
things, and slept by the door, for they did not want the rest of their family
to witness what they felt was their inevitable arrest in the middle of the
night.
Before long, malicious social media accounts would be spitting out
sectarian rhetoric, attempting to exacerbate Sunni/Shi’a cleavages in
Bahrain in order to abet a divide and rule policy a historic tactic in the
country. The relative unity that had been evident early in the uprising,
began to erode. The state’s destruction of Shia religious structure, and
invocations of Iranian involvement, all contributed to driving a wedge
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between members of the opposition. Yet despair had not completely sunk
in. Even in March 2011, there were attempts to recoup this unity on
social media. One man spawned the Twitter hashtag #UniteBH (Unite
Bahrain) in order to salvage a sense of commonality. The premise was
simple, tweet about something that united all Bahrainis, regardless of sect
or political reason. The regime’s response to what became a viral show of
the potential power of social media was crude, they arrested its creator.
Even those with badges saying ‘No Shia No Sunni Just Bahraini’, a slogan
that characterised the #UniteBH campaign, were harassed at checkpoints.
The Al Khalifa regime’s commitment to protecting their position of
privilege rendered any benefits of the accountability and transparency
allowed by social media to be largely ignored. Occasionally, the Ministry
of the Interior said they would investigate egregious acts by the police
caught on video, but not much ever came of this. It was mostly done
to appease international allies. This wilful blindness to police abuse
documented and shared on social media was demonstrated when the
MOI said they responded to a video of a policeman throwing a Molotov
cocktail, 2 years after it had already been circulated. Vindictive and
efficient in using it as a tool of surveillance, the government were
lackadaisical in using it is a tool of accountability.
Helping out the government were international companies, including
the likes of Gamma International, who were selling products to the
Bahrain government that could infect a user’s smartphone or computer,
and view valuable information that could hijack your microphone, log
your keystrokes and even view you on your device’s camera. Often the
delivery method for such malware was links distributed across social media
or email. Those arrested even reported that during interrogation, the
police demanded passwords for their social media accounts.
With one of the highest internet penetration and social media take up
rates in the Middle East, social media had a special resonance in Bahrain.
Yet the fusion of technological determinism and social constructivism
was highlighted by the tug of war over the implementation of the new
technologies. With certain forces using it as a tool of social change,
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
107
others were harnessing it as a weapon of the status quo. The resultant?
A disequilibrium particularistic to Bahrain itself, yet one that ultimately
strayed from the initial hope, optimism, and joy of 2011.
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Amplified messages: How hashtag
activism and Twitter diplomacy
converged at #ThisIsACoup – and
won
Wasim Ahmed, University of Sheffield
#ThisisACoup, born in Barcelona as a part of a collective campaign
started by members of the public in protest of the stringent Greek bailout
demands, drew tweets from the mainstream media, Nobel Prize winners,
and current Prime Ministers, and attracted over 1.1 billion views
globally in July 2015.
There are some that say hashtag activism is not intended to have any effect
on the real world, nevertheless, #ThisIsACoup demonstrates the power
of social media for signifying solidarity, raising awareness, and rapidly
spreading information across the globe.
Social media scholars have conducted vast amounts of research across the
broad spectrum of online activism. For example, research has considered
whether new social media can have any real effect on contentious
politics; other research has examined the links between social media and
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public space. Research has also suggested that social media may have
played a central role in shaping Arab uprisings. Thus, developing a better
understanding of online activism, in all its forms, is of relevance to social
media scholars as it can help us to understand how users can engage with
social media platforms.
Credit: Michael Coghlan/Lots of Hash/CC
BY-SA
Online Activism
Twitter boasts 316 million monthly active users with 500 million tweets
per day, and its hashtags offer members of the public a route to signify
solidarity, and raise awareness of events around the world in order to
achieve Internet and hashtag activism.
Internet activism uses electronic communication most notably social
media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and citizen blogs
among others to disseminate information to large audiences. Notable
examples of Internet activism include social media’s role in the Arab
Spring, and the Occupy Wall Street movements.
Hashtag activism, refers to the use of hashtags, in most instances Twitter
hashtags, for the purposes of Internet activism. Notable examples of
hashtag activism
include: #BlackLivesMatter, #Kony2012,#StopGamerGate,
and #IceBucketChallenge to name a few.
Twitter diplomacy is the use of social network and microblogging
website Twitter by diplomats, heads of state, and leaders of
intergovernmental organizations in order to perform outreach activities.
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#ThisIsACoup
A recent high profile convergence of Internet activism, hashtag activism,
and Twitter diplomacy is #ThisIsACoup. The motivations behind the
hashtag, as explained by the organizers:
“We decided to support Francesca’s call to launch an online campaign to support
the democratic will of the Greek people in the face of extortion by the Eurogroup
in its negotiations with Syriza,” the statement continued. “The scandalous
Eurogroup proposals yesterday made last night the ideal moment to create a
hashtag to express and, above all, coordinate, our outrage at the extortion the
Greek government and its people were being subject to. (quoted in the Guardian
Article #ThisIsACoup: how a hashtag born in Barcelona spread across globe).”
It is clear from the hashtag organisers that they were undertaking online
activism. As users were angry at the terms being imposed on Greece and
aimed to signify solidarity and raise awareness of the situation. Further
outrage was expressed by users adding #BoycottGermany alongside
#ThisIsACoup to increase focus on the lead role Germany took in the
crisis.
Influential Twitter users often amplify the message of a Twitter hashtag,
and help it to reach viral status. One of the most influential accounts
related to #ThisIsACoup becoming viral was from the current Prime
Minister of Greece, Alexis Tsipras, which is an example of Twitter
diplomacy. Nobel Prize winning economist, Paul Krugman, picked up
the hashtag and referred to it in a blog post for the New York Times.
The post became one of the most popular websites shared alongside the
hashtag.
Online activists can have many aims. Sandor Vegh, in Cyberactivism:
Online Activism in Theory and Practice, divides online activism into three
categories:
1. Awareness and/or Advocacy, that is to say using the Internet to
disseminate alternative news and information.
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2. Organization and/ or Mobilization refers to calls for offline
action.
3. Action and/or Reaction refers to online attacks that can be
committed by hackers, for example a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack.
Those behind #ThisIsACoup clearly succeeded in fulfilling the first of
Sandor Vegh’s categories for online activism, as the hashtag undoubtedly
raised awareness. If we look at the figures, for July there were over 600
thousand tweets sent and received by over 140 thousand users whom
tweeted using the hashtag. To put it into perspective this is a hashtag that
did not exist, at all, up until the situation in Greece emerged.
The hashtag quickly became global, as the top five locations for tweets
excluding Greece were the United Kingdom, Spain, United States,
France, and Germany. As European officials stayed up all night on July 12
(Sunday) in order to secure a deal, by 09:00 GMT Monday morning the
term was tweeted over 377,000 times. Additionally, Google web searches
for Greece and Germany increased to reach their highest peak in over 10
years, seemingly corresponding to #ThisIsACoup.
A heat map of #ThisIsACoup tweeted on July 13th (Created
using follow the hashtag)
Did #ThisIsACoup make any difference?
In order to address this question, it is important to look at Internet
activism in a historical context. Josh Richman in the Oakland Tribune in
2002 outlines the case of a Berkeley website which provided a method of
sending e-mail peace pleas to Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. leaders. In one
day, 10,000 citizens had used the website, and more than 208,000 had used
the website within a week.
It is not difficult to see Twitter being used for online activism today,
considering that it allows what Internet users were doing 15 years ago in
a more rapid and public manner. Certainly the volume of #ThisIsACoup
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tweets far eclipses the Berkeley case. However, it is not clear hashtag
activism changes anything.
Historically, the question was whether this type of armchair activism
(Berkeley) alone could make a change or whether it would be
counterproductive. Many argue it makes people feel like they have done
something when they haven’t. This is sometimes known as slacktivism
(a portmanteau of the words slacker and activism) which is the act of
showing support for a cause in order to benefit a person’s sense of self-
esteem.
This was particularly a concern in the early parts of the 20th century when
sending emails and signing e-petitions as a form of activism started to gain
force. The concern from activists was that politicians would understand
how little effort it would take to click a mouse, and if it took a second
to click a mouse, the appropriate amount of acknowledgement would be
provided. Isn’t it similarly easy for politicians to ignore a hashtag?
Whether or not social media activism can directly bring about political
or social change is debatable. It was possible for the Israeli government to
block receipt of emails from activists in 2002, and certainly hashtags can
be ignored by politicians. Similarly social media platforms themselves
can be blocked by governments, and there are several well known cases
of political censorship.
However, what is clear from #ThisIsACoup is that social media can
raise awareness of a particular cause, allow members of the public to
display solidarity on an unprecedented scale, and provide a platform to
disseminate alternative news and information rapidly.
This article was originally published on the LSE Impact blog.
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The movement against TTIP-TAFTA
on Twitter
Nikos Smyrnaios, University of Toulouse
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a trade
agreement being negotiated between the European Union and the United
States for the establishment of a free trade zone between Europe and
North America.
The negotiations around it have raised criticism about the lack of
transparency of the process, the subordination of democratically elected
governments to the interests of big corporations as well as the
downgrading of social, health and environmental standards it might cause
especially in Europe.
Beyond these fundamental issues the TTIP, also called Transatlantic Free
Trade Area (TAFTA), is a misidentified political object because of the
complexity of its content but also because of the lack of media coverage
despite its importance.
Sampling the online debate
However, the TTIP has been debated with increasing intensity on the
internet. The online discussion on the issue occurs on forums, blogs and
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social networking sites such as Twitter. To understand the structure of the
debate on Twitter I collected two samples of several tenths of thousands
of tweets containing the words TTIP and/or TAFTA during two key
moments of the anti-TTIP protest.
The first moment was between July 15 and 22 2014. On July 15, the TTIP
was discussed in a stormy plenary session of the European Parliament
in Strasbourg. The same day a European civil initiative, Stop TTIP,
submitted a citizen petition demanding the suspension of negotiations.
The Stop TTIP initiative brings together 150 organizations from 18
member states of the EU. Throughout the week various demonstrations
against the TTIP took place in several European cities.
The second moment was three months later between October 9 and
13 2014. On October 11, some 400 activist groups marched all over
Europe against TTIP. At this occasion numerous events were held in
several European cities like Hamburg, Berlin, Madrid, Ljubljana, Helsinki,
London, Athens, Vienna and Paris.
Hashtag use increase amid protest
The data from Topsy below show that in both cases the TTIP protest
produced a peak in the use of the hashtags that started just before and
ended right after the demonstrations. However the peak of July 15 with
almost 3,500 tweets is much lower than the peak of October 11, which
gets up to almost 12,000 tweets.
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Figure 1: Number of tweets including TTIP of TAFTA on July and on October 2014
(Source: Topsy)
The difference is visible in the comparative chart below that illustrates the
ramping up of the use of the keywords TTIP and TAFTA on Twitter
between July and October. One can assume that this is also the case with
“physical” protests and actions.
Figure 2: Number of tweets including TTIP or TAFTA between July and October 2014
(Source: my own sample)
A similar trend can be observed on Google (data from June to October
2014). The first big peak of queries including the keywords is on May
during the campaign of the European elections in which the European
Greens and the Party of the European Left put the issue on the agenda.
The second (small) peak is during July and then the bigger yet is on
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October revealing a growing awareness about the issue among internet
users worldwide.
Figure 3: Number of queries on TAFTA and TTIP between March and November 2014
(Source: Google Trends)
Network Analysis
A network analysis of my sample produced the following graphs that
represent the networks of interactions (mentions and RTs) between
Twitter users, including the two keywords, respectively on July 15-22
and October 9-13.Giant component of RTs and mentions network from
15/07 to 22/07 composed of 20,300 links and 9,508 nodes.
Figure 4: Giant component of RTs and
mentions network from July 15 and 22
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Figure 5: Giant component of RTs and
mentions network between October 9 and
13 2014
Graph explanation: The dots represent Twitter accounts that produced at least
one message with the two keywords. The lines between the dots represent the
interactions between these accounts (RT and mentions). The topology of the
graph is the result of the intensity of interactions between accounts. The more
two accounts are characterized by an intense two-way communication between
them, the closer they are on the map. Dot size (smaller to bigger) depends on
the number of mentions and RTs received. The colour depends on the
community to which they belong. The data was collected with DMI Twitter
Analytics The graph was made with Gephi using the Open Ord algorithm.
Clusters by country or language
The first observation one can make is that the discussion is structured by
country or, at least, by language. Indeed, different clusters of accounts
are visible that correspond to linguistic or national groups. Of these the
larger groups are those of British, Germans, Austrians and Spanish in
both graphs. The cluster of French users is bigger in the second graph,
suggesting a rise of interest in the country.
The reason is because in these countries the TTIP issue is present in public
debates through different angles: weakening of the powers of Länders in
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Germany, GMOs and environment in France, defence of public health
service in Great Britain, austerity and economic crisis in Spain etc.
On the other hand the cluster of US and Canada based users diminishes
and dissolves in the second graph probably because the protest movement
of October was mainly European. Globally, European Twitter users
involved in the debate are far more numerous than those from North
America.
We can conclude that Europeans (on Twitter) feel more concerned by
the TTIP or that they are better informed about it. This distribution of
activity on Twitter is partially confirmed by statistics on keyword queries
on Google as seen in the graph below.
Figure 6: Geographical distribution of queries including TTIP between March and
November 2014 (Source: Google Trends)
Low visibility for mainstream media and politicians
The second observation, which is quite remarkable, is the absence of
mainstream media among the most cited nodes of the network. Indeed,
very few accounts of newspapers, TV channels or press agencies are
significantly cited by other users except for alternative or marginal media.
For instance in France the most cited media are the communist daily
L’Humanité and web only and politically engaged outlets such as
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Reporterre (ecologist) and Mediapart (leftist). This means either that
mainstream media downplayed this issue being focused on other topics
(this is particularly true on July when there were two important conflicts
in Gaza and Ukraine). Or it means that users who are interested in the
issue of the TTIP don’t trust mainstream media. Or both.
The same is true for established politicians, European institutions and
official TTIP negotiators. The US and EU negotiating teams’ Twitter
accounts have a large number of citations but still are very far from
accounts of activists, alternative media and non-governmental
organizations. The same goes for established politicians. The only
established European political leaders that significantly cited or mentioned
are David Cameron and Marine Le Pen. At the same time the political
organizations and parties of the ecology and the radical left that oppose
the TTIP are much more visible.
A movement dominated by civil society and marginal political
forces
Therefore it seems that the issue of TTIP is focused on by parties that
are in the margins of the European political scene such the Ecologists,
the radical Left, the Pirate Party and, to a lesser extend, right wing
populists. The social democrats and the conservatives, who are involved
in this debate, like the German SPD depute Bernd Lange, are very few.
Obviously this is because the social democrats and conservatives head the
EU and are mostly in favour of the TTIP.
But the heart of the debate is made of a multitude of non-governmental
organizations, associations, institutes, and think tanks, often created
specifically to counter the TTIP. Among the most prominent are Public
Citizen and Expose the TPP in the US, Occupy London and the World
Development Movement in Britain, Campact in Germany, ATTAC in
France and the European initiative Stop TTIP.
This kind of transnational political issue seems to be well adapted to the
political usage of Twitter. The discussions that take place are dominated
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by opposition to the TTIP, structured by national and linguistic factors,
but at the same time, interactions between groups are significant. We can
conclude that these are steps towards the emergence of a transnational
public sphere, increasingly extended, corresponding to the contours of the
EU. Meanwhile, as for the issue of austerity in Europe, the TTIP question
seems to be addressed mainly by political forces that are marginalized in
power games either nationally or inside the EU.
This blog was originally published here: http://ephemeron.eu/1335.
Nikos Smyrnaios is an Associate Professor at the
University of Toulouse, France. His research
focuses on the socioeconomic and political stakes of
the internet for democracy. His main fields of work
are online journalism and media as well the political
use of social networking sites.
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Analysing the social fingerprints of
pro-independence movements
Arkaitz Zubiaga, University of Warwick
Researchers increasingly turn to social media to analyse the online
fingerprints produced by offline political movements. Social media such
as Twitter have been exploited to learn about society in events such as
elections, major protests and other crises and emergencies. However, the
analysis of smaller, more obscure communities (with respect to Twitter,
but which have an otherwise salient presence), has been studied to a lesser
extent. This is the case of pro-independence movements where a smaller
part of an existing country makes claims for its independence from the
rest of the country. There might be many pro-independence supporters
within that region, but that does not always suffice to make it to Twitter’s
list of trending topics and/or to reach a broad share of Twitter users,
which is however crucial to ensure that the community is visible to others.
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My initial attempts at studying pro-independence movements on social
media have focused on the cases of the Basque Country and Catalonia,
two regions which, as of today, are mostly part of Spain and to a lesser
extent of France, but have historically had different cultural and linguistic
backgrounds compared to the rest of Spain. The case of these two lands
is somewhat different to that of Scotland. While the latter did have
an opportunity to vote for leaving or staying in the United Kingdom,
the former are not entitled to run a referendum, as Spain deems it
unconstitutional. Due to this, Basques and Catalans have organised
demonstrations protesting for their ‘right to decide’. Here I look at two
such demonstrations, both in the form of human chains, one 300 miles
long in Catalonia in 2013 (Via Catalana, or ‘the Catalan Way’), and the
other a 76 miles long in the Basque Country in 2014 (Gure Esku Dago,
or ‘It’s in Our Hands’). In both cases, I collected tweets using Twitter’s
streaming API both on the day of the demonstration as well as during
the week preceding it. I used the main keyword in each case to retrieve
tweets relevant to the event in question: #gureeskudago for the Basque
demonstration and #viacatalana for the Catalan demonstration.
Table 1 shows the top hashtags that people used in each case. We can
observe that other related hashtags emerge, such as #GureEskuBidea
(from Basque ‘the way is in our hands’) and #FemVia (from Catalan
‘we make the way’), both in their respective languages. Besides those,
a number of hashtags on top of the list are in English, such as
#BasquesDecide, #CatalansWantToVote, #Up4Freedom and
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#CatalanWay, while there are no hashtags in Spanish. This shows how
both communities are using the English language to try and reach out to
other communities and users from other countries so as to increase the
visibility of the demonstrations and of their demands. The high popularity
of the #CatalanWantToVote hashtag in the Basque demonstration shows
in turn the solidarity of these two communities, both of which are asking
Spain to let them determine by vote their future status.
Table 1: Top hashtags in the Basque and Catalan demonstrations
While looking at hashtags provides valuable insight into these events, one
might want to dig deeper into this data by, for instance, looking at the
content of the tweets. The largeness of the data sets, which would make
the work of a researcher sifting through the data cumbersome, requires
the use of automated methods for textual analysis and natural language
processing (NLP). However, having to perform the analyses for these
communities, each of which has its own language, leads to the following
two additional issues to deal with:
1. While Twitter does tell us what language each tweet is written in
through its API, this feature is limited to some major languages.
Twitter does not identify tweets written in Basque or Catalan at
the time of this writing. For a tweet written in Basque or Catalan,
Twitter will instead tell us that it is written in another, often
unrelated language. Table 2 shows the statistics of languages reported
by Twitter for the tweets in the two collections. Spanish is listed
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in both cases as the top language, which is unlikely to be true.
Moreover, the fact that Bosnian, Indonesian and Tagalog are so
popular in the case of the Basque demonstration is implausible
pointing to the limitations of Twitter’s language identification
algorithm. While the majority of tweets will most likely be in Basque
and Catalan, Twitter will never know that, and we get instead other
sets of languages from its API. The accurate identification of the
language of a tweet, especially in the case of languages spoken by
smaller groups of people, is still an open research task which we have
been recently working on through the organisation of a workshop
and shared task called TweetLID.
2. The automated linguistic analysis of tweets is often performed with
well-known tools for NLP such as GATE, psychologically informed
word counts analysis tools such as LIWC, or bespoke solutions for
Twitter such as Tweet NLP. However, these tools tend to be crafted
to perform well for a few major languages and hence, they leave
much to be desired when they are applied to new languages. The
development of both linguistic resources and NLP tools suitable for
these languages will be crucial for a successful analysis of this kind of
data.
Table 2: Twitter’s automated language identification results
I am confident that within the next few years we will see an increasing
body of research studying political issues around other such smaller
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communities from around the world and we will be developing more
sophisticated techniques for textual analysis of tweets for lesser-resourced,
minority languages.
Arkaitz Zubiaga is a post-doctoral research fellow at
the University of Warwick, currently involved in
the PHEME FP7 project on the study of social
media rumours. His research revolves around the
study of the spread of news and events through
social media and especially the role of citizen
journalists in news reporting. Some of his recent
research has dealt with the curation, verification and
classification of newsworthy information shared on social media involving
computational research in fields like text mining, natural language
processing and social computing, but also including an interdisciplinary
perspective from the social sciences such as journalism and psychology.
He can be found tweeting as @arkaitz.
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Tweeting for peace? Twitter and
the 2014 Ardoyne parade dispute
Paul Reilly, University of Sheffield
On 12th July 2013, there were violent clashes between loyalist protesters
and the Police Service of Northern Ireland after a ruling by the Parades
Commission that prevented the return of an Orange Order parade past
the Ardoyne shops in North Belfast. The subsequent failure of political
representatives to broker a solution to this impasse, highlighted by the
continued presence of a loyalist protest camp in nearby Twaddell Avenue,
led many observers to fear that there would be a repeat of this violence the
following year.
Tensions in the area were further raised when unionist and loyalist leaders
announced that they were planning a ‘graduated response’ to the Parades
Commission’s decision to alter the route of the return parade for the
second year in a row. These plans were heavily criticised by nationalist
residents’ groups, such as the Greater Ardoyne Residents’ Collective
(GARC). By way of response, a member of GARC unsuccessfully tried to
obtain a high court injunction to prevent the outward leg of the parade
from passing the Ardoyne shops on the morning of the 12th July.
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Fears of a repeat of the sectarian clashes previously seen in Ardoyne and
elsewhere were not realised in July 2014. Northern Ireland Secretary
of State Teresa Villiers praised all sides for their role in delivering the
most peaceful Twelfth in recent times. Therefore, this study, funded
by the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council, was designed
to investigate the ways in which the peaceful protests of loyalists and
nationalist residents in July 2014 were digitally mediated. In particular,
it focused on how users responded to rumours spread on the micro-
blogging site, which were argued to have had a negative impact upon
cross-community relations in areas such as North Belfast. The nature of
the debate amongst these ‘tweeters’ was also investigated, with a specific
focus on whether they used inflammatory, sectarian language in response
to the events as they unfolded.
A keyword search, ‘Ardoyne’ was used to identify tweets that referred
specifically to the decision to reroute the parade by the Ligoniel Orange
lodges in North Belfast. The ‘Ardoyne’ tweets peaked at 7pm on the
12th July (see Figure 1). One interpretation of this finding might be
that that viewers of ‘flagship’ teatime news programmes such as BBC
Newsline and UTV Live, which had provided coverage of the day’s
events, had turned to social media to seek out information about the
homeward leg of the parade.
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Figure 1: Tweets mentioning Ardoyne,
12th July 2014
A critical thematic analysis of all relevant tweets was then conducted in
order to analyse how critics and supporters of the Orange Order used
Twitter to respond to the rerouting of the Ardoyne parade.
Most peaceful Twelfth in years but little sign of end to Ardoyne
impasse
The absence of violence in the contested interface area meant that there
was very little for citizens or professional journalists to comment on
during this period. Nevertheless, professional journalists were still
responsible for the most frequently retweeted content referring to the
events in Ardoyne during this period.
Analysis of the words most frequently used to characterise the morning
parade showed how peaceful it had been (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Most frequently occurring words
in Ardoyne sample (11-14 July 2014)
The vast majority of original tweets in the sample expressed support for
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all those who had contributed to the morning parade passing off without
incident. The few politicians who commented on Ardoyne expressed
similar sentiments. North Belfast Sinn Fein MLA Gerry Kelly tweeted
that it had been the quietest Eleventh night in years and that the morning
parade has passed off “without trouble.” However, politicians tended to
praise the behaviour of their respective constituents while criticising the
intransigence of the ‘other’ community.
A small minority of tweeters blamed the ‘other’ side for the Ardoyne
dispute, with little sign of rational debate about how to resolve it. This
tended to revolve around crude stereotypes of groups and political leaders,
rather than specific individuals, except for a few notable exceptions such
as one loyalist woman who was identified as being responsible for sharing
a sectarian image on Facebook. Republicans characterised loyalists as a
“sectarian hate mob”, lacking the “muscle” to force their way past the
Ardoyne shops. Loyalists themselves criticised the Parades Commission
and the PSNI for supposedly rewarding the republican violence in July
2012 by rerouting the return parade away from the Ardoyne shops. The
rerouted parade was said to be further evidence of republican bigotry and
intolerance towards unionist and loyalist culture.
Twitter users move quickly to debunk rumours and misinformation
Rumours in the Ardoyne tweet sample appeared to have a short life span.
Loyalists were accused of digitally altering pictures in order to portray
GARC and the nationalist residents in a negative light. A picture of one
of the protesters that had gathered outside the Ardoyne shops began to
circulate on Twitter shortly after 7.30pm on 12th July. The placard being
held aloft by the protester contained a mock-up road sign indicating
that the Orange Order was not welcome in the area. Visual evidence
suggesting that this was a photoshopped image was shared on Twitter
within a few minutes of the tweet being posted. The original image
showed that the protester was involved in a peaceful Christian protest at
the shop fronts. His placard contained the motto “Love Thy Neighbour,”
not the anti-Orange Order slogan that had featured in the doctored
image. This was corroborated by an image of the same scene taken by
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BBC NI journalist Kevin Sharkey a few hours earlier and shared on the
site.
Loyalists also responded quickly to online rumours suggesting that an
image of Oscar Knox, a five year old who had died of a rare form
of childhood cancer, had been burnt on an Eleventh night bonfire in
Randalstown, County Antrim. A picture supposedly showing the bonfire
began to circulate on Twitter late on 11th July, prompting many angry
responses from Twitter users. This rumour was quickly refuted and
condemned by unionist and loyalists on Twitter. The Randalstown Sons
of Ulster Flute band asked people to retweet an image of their Eleventh
night bonfire, confirming that no image of Oscar Knox had been burnt
and stating that the five year old “was a hero”. One tweet provided a link
to the original image of the bonfire that had been taken by photographer
Stephen Barnes in July 2013. It was noticeable that the number of tweets
referring to the Knox incident sharply declined after this contradictory
evidence began to circulate online. As had been seen with the image
of the GARC protester, Twitter provided a platform for both sides to
correct misinformation and rumours that had the potential to increase the
sectarian tensions surrounding the Ardoyne impasse.
Social media as tools to help defuse sectarian tensions around
marches?
Although there was no equivalent of the “crowdsourced newswire” that
emerged via NPR editor Andy Carvin’s Twitter account during the ‘Arab
Spring.’ Twitter did provide users with an array of information sources
courtesy of the citizen and professional journalists who were tweeting
their perspectives on events as they unfolded. Citizens were also quick
to check the veracity of the user-generated content that was emerging
from the scene, such as the photoshopped images that were evident in the
sample. While acknowledging that social media has often been used to
reinforce divisions between rival communities in Northern Ireland, this
study suggested that Twitter may have untapped potential in facilitating
modes of communication that help defuse sectarian tensions around the
marching season.
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Politics, divisions and (mis)use of
social media
Mokhtar Elareshi, University of Tripoli
With increasing political divisions in Libya and ongoing civil war, social
media websites and interactive media have been used to deepen the
conflict and feed violence among Libyans. Political differences and
disputes have been transferred from the real world to the virtual world
and, in some cases, vice versa. The past four years have been a time
of political upheaval and reform in Libya. The reasons for the changes
are varied, but they include the high rate of unemployment among the
youth and government corruption. However, the use of social media
by anti- and pro-government groups alike has been widely publicised,
to the extent that some commentators suggest that social media have
been afforded too much credit for the political changes and reforms
taking place in the country. Nevertheless, social media sites have become
a critical outlet for describing and documenting attacks, coordinating
protests and communicating information and news to local and non-local
audiences.
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The problem with social media use in Libya goes back to early 2011,
when (anti-government) activists used sites such as Facebook, Twitter
and YouTube to recruit young people against Gaddafi’s regime. This
can be seen as a turning point in the history of Libyan media and in
the relationships or social divisions between Libyans themselves. Some
believe that these calls to action were somehow successful in changing
the Libyan political landscape. However, since then, these social media
platforms no longer play the same role ‘fairly’, as they have altered the
way they use news and information and how they communicate with
other users. Since the beginning of political pluralism and the emergence
of dozens of Libyan parties and organisations, no one could predict how
social media sites would become platforms for strife and polarisation, a
way to carry out political purges, and a means to verbally abuse, insult
and slander members of other parties or organisations. They have thus
become a tool with which to threaten others and for the promotion
of hatred and incitement to violence. Many Libyans’ pages on social
media sites feature an abundance of hate speech and threats against other
factions and divisions. In fact, every day, Libyan social media is filled
with controversies, conflicts and rumours. This has increased discourses
of insults and verbal abuse in the country’s political scene, reflecting the
widely divergent political views and territorial conflicts taking place in
Libya.
Libyans themselves have recently expressed regret about social media
platforms having transformed from something which had great merit
in supporting change in the country by means of uniting and serving
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Libyans’ shared goals into a cyber space which promotes chaos, fuels
strife and targets individuals in political parties or from other tribes.
Since the Libyan uprising in 2011, social media sites have teemed with
suspicious pages and bloggers’ accounts. There are now electronic groups
and militias such as ISIS and Jihadists behind the use of social media to
spread hatred and unrest and to increase the level of division between
Libyans for their own purposes. These electronic groups and militias
unfortunately have supporters and followers who believe in their messages
and post or tweet for them. What is happening in Libya today can
therefore be regarded as a direct result of what has been posted on social
media, particularly on Facebook pages.
Increasing numbers of Libyans, especially young adults, have day after
day started following social media more closely, in particular, Facebook
and Twitter. Statistically, the number of social media users in the country
jumped from around 360,000 in 2011 to over one million users in 2016.
Libya now ranks tenth amongst Arab countries in terms of the number
of Facebook users, despite the widespread lack of internet access and
electricity. Consequently, Facebook has become the most widely used
cyber space platform in Libya. This means, on the other hand, that all
of the speeches condoning violence pass through this platform. This
eruption of violence over the last few years constitutes a major threat and
has had a role in shaping the future of the country. This also indicates that
one of the main reasons for the continuing violence and chaos in Libya is
the content published on social media platforms.
In the last few years in Libya, a number of activists, journalists and human
rights defenders, such as Muftah al-Qatrani and Salwa Bughaighis, have
been assassinated or abducted based on their activities on social media
sites. They were followed and their activities on their personal accounts
were monitored in addition to other actions. The killing of these activists
is the latest in a string of attacks on politicians, activists and journalists
who have spoken out against the actions of certain militias. The point
is that these acts have been encouraged and organised through social
media. It can be argued that the chaos promoted on social media sites is
linked to users being young, and therefore lacking maturity and culture.
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Those young users seem to have been ‘brainwashed’, as they are ready to
respond to any calls for violence against others who may have different
political views. The situation in Libya thus indicates that social media are a
double-edged weapon, which have turned into frightening tools through
users’ misuse of the free flow of information. Rather than using them
productively, many harness them for demolition and to create chaos.
After the fall of Gaddafi’s regime and the emergence of political parties
(whereas before there was only one), several changes took place, such as
the way people use social media for either political mobilisation or social
polarisation based on tribes and regions. The content that users in the
country post and tweet tends to foster bigotry and extremism towards
others rather than reconciliation. Ideally, cyber space would be used as a
tool for communication with others and for respectfully and peacefully
debating the country’s problems and solutions. Most Libyans have, by
now, realised that after having only one party and joint mobilisation calls
in one direction (Gaddafi’s system), many calls are now made from one
group against other groups, each one reduced to defending its existence.
Hence, the negative values of social media have become clear and have
caused a split in the fabric of the country, as they are used without any
legal controls or moral scruples. It seems that, as a result, social media have
become a problem in their own right and an aspect that should be taken
into great consideration.
In light of the growing risks posed by social media, especially to the social
structure of Libyan society, and their negative effects, it can be argued that
such platforms should be subjected to legal control procedures to ensure
that they are not used for incitement to commit violence or crimes, or for
threatening society, especially in times of crises and conflicts. If no legal
action is taken to safeguard users, it would only encourage more use of
these sites to incite violence and undertake personal or partisan purges. I
would finish with this quote: “We were happy, there was hope but now
even that hope has started to fade.”
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Between enabling and restricting
dissent: The two faces of social
media
Arne Hintz, Cardiff University
From the ‘Twitter’ and ‘Facebook-Revolutions’ in Iran in 2009 and Egypt
in 2011 to the more recent activities of the Yo Soy 123 movement in
Mexico, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, or the Umbrella movement
in Hong Kong, social media have been widely credited as an important
force in supporting social and political change. While over-enthusiastic
and technologically-deterministic notions of social media-based uprisings
have been criticised, many observers maintain that digital platforms have
been ‘effective catalysts’ for change and amplifiers of social movement
activism. They have expanded the reach of protest mobilisations, enabled
the creation of forums for free speech and for shared social and political
criticism, and generated social spaces for developing critical discourses,
especially where an open public sphere does not exist. Beyond facilitating
protest, they have been vehicles to monitor elections and expose wrong-
doings, and they have served as key platforms for ‘citizen witnessing’ and
other forms of citizen journalism and grassroots reporting. As mechanisms
for peer production and for sharing remixes, memes and mash-ups, they
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have become an essential infrastructure of contemporary participatory
culture.
As crucial sites for protest and dissent, social media continue (and expand)
the roles played by earlier forms of social movement media, alternative
media, and ‘our media’. On a variety of platforms, these media have
been used for spreading dissident information and have served as
communication infrastructure for social movements – from the alternative
press to video activism, and to the Indymedia network and grassroots tech
groups (Milan, 2013). However most of these earlier media practices have
been characterized by one decisive factor: they have been self-organised
and self-managed, owned and controlled by civil society groups, typically
in a non-profit, open and participatory fashion.
Social media, in contrast, are owned by private sector entities and operate
under a commercial logic. As pointed out by Leistert, rather than guided
by activist concerns, they are centred around ‘a complex and dynamic
set of highly opaque tools for selling advertisements, commodities and
data‘. With user data collection and analysis as their main business model,
they track our online activities and preferences, and they provide a semi-
public sphere of free and democratic communication only insofar as this
aligns with their commercial goals. Social media users are customers, not
citizens.
This has led to serious challenges for activists, and here I want to point to
three of these.
First, the ‘big data’ generated through Google, Facebook and others is at
the heart of current surveillance trends, as highlighted by the Snowden
leaks. The ‘data mine’ of social media allows for the detailed monitoring
and analysis of Internet users, including their locations, activities,
preferences, friends and networks, and political orientations. Social
media-based intelligence gathering (or SOCMINT) has become an
important part of police investigations, including those that address
activism and protest. Their use for law enforcement and predictive
policing is complemented by data-based categorising of people along
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
140
social, economic and political lines. The consequences of this have been
felt, particularly, in the aftermath of ‘social media revolutions’ in the
Middle East and elsewhere, where the use of platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube served as a means for the state to identify and arrest
protesters. In Iran, Tunisia, Syria and elsewhere, authorities have used
social media to scrape user data and infect the computers of opposition
supporters with spying software.
Second, as the surveillance examples show, social media companies have
been prone to government interventions and pressures. Robert Hannigan,
Director of the British Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ), has called social media networks “terrorists’ command and
control networks of choice”, and Prime Minister David Cameron added
that he would “step up pressure on web companies such as Facebook
and Twitter to do more to co-operate with the intelligence agencies”.
Social media platforms have been blocked in countries such as China,
Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey, often as a direct reaction to protests,
uprisings, and criticism of governments. Prosecutions against bloggers
and social media users for comments posted online have risen sharply, too
– in Britain alone, at least 6,000 people a year were investigated between
2012 and 2015, in some cases leading to severe sentences.
Third, Internet companies are self-regulating what they deem acceptable
speech. Prominent examples have included Facebook censoring pictures
of breastfeeding mothers, as well as cartoons depicting naked people, such
as a naked Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, and Apple deleting an
app from its app store that marked US drone strikes on a geographic map,
but also the take-down of activist pages by Facebook in the run-up to
protest events ‘as part of a growing effort by Facebook to crack down
on the presence of political groups on its network’. In addition to direct
interventions, the algorithmic sorting of content can weaken the visibility
of activist and dissident content – for example, when Google’s inclusion
of ‘truthfulness’ as a criteria in the search ranking prioritizes mainstream
narratives. User-based measures to report problematic content – such as
the Facebook Report Abuse button – are sometimes used strategically to
stifle dissent.
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Social media platforms have provided an important means of activist and
dissident communication, but they are also key sites where the tension
between free communication and the emerging reality of restriction and
censorship is played out. They are enlisted by the state to police the net
and monitor their users, but they also play an active role in developing
and enforcing new rules for allowing as well as restricting information,
and they thus provide and withdraw vital spaces and resources for
communication.
The points raised in this blog post are discussed in more detail in the article
‘Restricting digital sites of dissent: commercial social media and free expression’
and in the book ‘Critical Perspectives on Social Media and Protest’.
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Sofia in 2033. If the protests fail
Robert Phillips, Jr., American University in Bulgaria
Sofia, 01 November 2033
It is a warm overcast day. The forecast warns that it will reach 30 for
the sixth day in a row and that people with respiratory problems should
remain indoors. On your way to your second job, you don’t pass many
people on the streets. Across from the Dvoretza in the officially designated
free-speech zone is yet another protest by yet more malcontents. Today’s
protest is pretty large—maybe 60-70 people protesting against the latest
iteration of the government. You try to remember the coalition of letters
that make up the current super grand coalition, but you get lost in the
jumble of letters.
Credit: BMW Spirit/Flickr/CC-BY-2.0
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The parties used to run against each other, but that was before they
figured out that it was easier for them to create a super grand coalition.
The same five parties have been in power for the past twelve years. You
thought about joining one of the parties a few years back, but you did not
have the 5,000 leva yearly party dues and dropped the idea.
You look at the faces of the protesters—tired and worn. Nearly all, like
you, are beginning to grey or went grey years ago. There are a few
children in the crowd attached to their grannies, but as usual almost
no one in between. You read some of the signs—the usual complaints
about work and corruption. However, you have to decipher several of the
signs because their meanings are hidden in misspellings and impossible
grammatical constructions. On the benches nearby, the only people
watching are pensioners, homeless people, and unfortunate refugees from
the latest wave.
It has been a tough twenty years all over the world. Today’s non-stop
news brings non-stop stories: civil wars; another action by the Common
European Border Protection Force (this time only 30 people were killed; it
is usually more); another super-typhoon killed 15,000; and some Chinese
investors just bought that big American soft drinks company.
Here at home, the government has lurched from small crisis to crisis.
You remember that these crises used to spawn larger protests, but that
was before biometric scanners were installed in the billboards. Advertisers
said that they would save you time and energy by showing you only
those advertisements that you wanted to see. But it didn’t take too long
to realize that the companies turned around and sold the information to
the government. So now, your face, name, financial history, and health
conditions are read every time you walk by a billboard. Of course, this
pretty much destroyed most large public protests after rumors circulated
of protesters losing their jobs or having problems getting needed
medicines.
You look down at your scratched up wrist phone. You couldn’t afford to
buy the P-27 model and the new P-28 model will have to wait as well.
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You’re expecting a call from your daughter in Shanghai in a few minutes,
so you need to get someplace a little quieter. Like most of her friends, she
went away for university and never came back. You would like to hold
her in your arms like you did when she was a little girl. She’s only four
hours away on the newest superjets, but the super cost of the ticket means
that you’ll just have to do with a scratchy small screen conversation.
You think about the situation that you find yourself in. You know you
live in a democracy because you voted in the last elections. OK, not
because you thought your vote meant anything, but because you wanted
to win a 13th salary in the election lottery. You can work wherever you
want—of course, if you have the connections to find a job. You can think
what you want—but it’s probably better not to think too loudly. You can
protest—as long as it is in the officially designated protest area. You could
even immigrate—but most places only want younger people and your
computer skills are about a year behind current and, anyway, it takes a lot
of money to immigrate.
You wonder how it all came to this. And you remember seeing some
really smart guy on a TEDx clip—he talked about the collapse of civic
trust and representative government. You think back to a politics class
you took at university. That political philosopher…what was his
name?…Constant. You did great on the exam because you actually read
and remembered what he wrote. He wrote about individual liberty and
political liberty. Individual liberty was about getting to do what you want
to do—you liked individual liberty. Political liberty was not so interesting.
It was something about all of us getting together to decide what was best
for all of us, not just some of us. You remember that Constant warned that
if we don’t find the time and energy to become involved politically that
someone else would be very happy to become involved for us.
You remember in 2013 during the spring and summer protests that some
people talked about making representative government really work. They
said that the challenge in Bulgaria was not unique. Other places were
having similar problems with representative democracy. Other people also
felt detached from their parliaments and presidents and parties and prime
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ministers, so they just disengaged. Like in most of the world, even in most
of Europe, it was easier to just go to work or more fun to go out than
to spend time thinking how we could make government work better and
smarter and cleaner and then going out and making it happen.
But it didn’t seem very important then.
This article was originally published in a special edition of Capital.
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PART V
Health, emotion, activism
30
Health, ICTs and the social
Stefania Vicari, University of Sheffield
In 1999 American physician Tom Ferguson coined the word ‘epatient‘ to
describe individuals who are “equipped, enabled, empowered and
engaged” in their health care decisions. While fighting with multiple
myeloma, he advocated for a patient-doctor relationship that could
overturn traditional paternalistic approaches to health care and
management. Over fifteen years later, now potentially anybody can
engage in health debates on social media platforms, with patients’
experiential knowledge often becoming a first port of call for individuals
seeking health information. Online – and often with a smartphone in their
hands – people talk about health, connect around health and advocate for
health. But what are the implications of this digital health socialization?
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Digital Communication and Health Discourse
In 2011, American writer Deborah Kogan published the piece “How
Facebook saved my son’s life”, reporting on how posting pictures of her
ill son on Facebook helped her identify his life threatening condition.
This and other cases show that online networking may add to or even
partially replace traditional patient-physician consultations, especially in
diagnostic phases. In fact, patient-centred social network sites
like PatientsLikeMe are now being generated to ease health social
networking, for instance to store, share and connect around information
on symptoms, therapies, and drugs.
Social media can then clearly ease health information exchange and
knowledge building, but how does their commercial networked
infrastructure impact the way patient-generated knowledge is made and
used? In technical terms, the fact that social media’s network structures
shape personalised input obviously affects the supposed “spontaneity” of
social networking dynamics. In economic terms, the possibility of
personal health data becoming object of commercial use raises ethical
issues. Part of the data shared on PatientsLikeMe, for instance, are sold
to “partners” but we are left wondering for how long these data will be
used by “partners” and – maybe most importantly – how and when these
partners’ economic benefit and scientific outputs will pay back to patients.
Social media platforms can ease interactive dynamics among individuals
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with shared health conditions like in patient communities, but they may
also host health debates crowdsourced by a wider variety of contributors.
Angelina Jolie’s May 2013 and March 2015 New York Times op-eds on
her decision to undergo preventive surgery, for instance, shed public light
on her rare genetic disorder – the BRCA1 gene mutation. A Twitter
advanced search for “BRCA and Jolie” in the month following Jolie’s first
op-ed, returns thousands of tweets where people discuss her decision and
the meaning of preventing surgery, but also the implications of having
patents on genes, the costs of genetic testing, insurance policies, and rare
diseases. How can this online public debate impact patient communities,
the general public and, more specifically, health policing and health
cultural understandings?
Digital Communication and Health Activism
Health discourse dynamics may mingle with – or lead to – different forms
of activism. A recent case of health protest following offline and online
public debate is that promoted by the Italian pro-Stamina Movement,
mobilised by patient groups demanding funding for compassionate use of
the Stamina stem cell therapy in patients with rare neurological diseases.
The case came to the fore when a popular Italian TV programme went
on air in February 2013. While medicine Nobel prizes and national
scientific committees dismissed the procedure as unscientific and risky,
patient groups mobilised “a web-based mass action, with protests, sit-ins
and a twice-a-week campaign”. Hence, on the one side, (controversial)
mainstream media coverage enacted public debate and online interactions
bolstered patients’ activism. On the other side, scientists’ expressed their
opinion primarily via scientific journals (e.g., Nature, EMBO). Could
then online connectivity help overcome the still strong divide between
patient groups and scientific experts, especially in the way they interact –
or do not interact – on controversial health issues?
While health activism is nothing new, social movement research has
recently discussed the emergence of new forms of protest where
individuals fluidly connect and disconnect via online social
networking. Bennett and Segerberg suggest that digital networking per-
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se is replacing traditional organisations, with individuals using their
personal narratives – rather than organisation or party membership – to
engage first in online networking and then in offline activism. While
health communication and social movement research have not yet
investigated the impact of connective action on health activism, we may
once again draw upon a contemporary example to start raising questions
on the impact of connectivity – and connective action – on health
activism. In 2010 Stephen Sutton, a British teenager, was diagnosed with
colorectal cancer. When two years later his cancer was deemed incurable,
Sutton made a wish list of fundraising events and became very active
online (stephensstory.co.uk), increasingly receiving mainstream media
coverage and public attention. As of November 2015, over one year
after his death, Stephen Sutton is survived by the Justgiving “Stephen’s
fundraising page” that reports a raised fund of almost 5 million pounds,
the “Stephen’s story” Facebook page liked more than 1.3 million times,
and the Twitter account @_StephensStory with over 178,000 followers.
This means that while historic TV broadcasting events – like US Labor
Day telethon – are discontinued because of “new realities of television
viewing and philanthropic giving” , personalised digital storytelling is
becoming a new source for health public engagement.
The Democratisation of Health?
In a way or another, these stories – from Kogan’s to Sutton’s – all
show that digital communication practices can enhance diversified health
discourse and activism processes and possibly help transform traditional
approaches to health care and management. However, they also show that
a series of technical, economic, ethical and cultural questions still need to
be addressed to assess the real potential of digital communication in what
may be seen as health democratisation processes.
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The public and private faces of food
activism in the fight against
childhood obesity in the UK
Jennifer Cole, University of Leicester
In February 2016 Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt declared childhood
obesity as national emergency. This was in response to the announcement
that the controversial sugar tax, championed by celebrity chef Jamie
Oliver, would be introduced in 2018. Whilst Oliver campaigned for
the tax as deterrent against the consumption of sugary drinks, critics
of the tax including other celebrity chefs, felt that the tax would not
be effective in combating the obesity crisis. They suggested that this
tax would ultimately only benefit the government by generating a new
revenue stream, rather than cutting the number of drinks consumed.
Top medical journal The BMJ has also published many articles on the
debate, a whole range of experts echo the pros and cons of sugar taxation
discussed by these celebrity chefs. So why is it celebrity chefs not these
qualified experts that we are hearing from in our mainstream media?
This role that celebrity chefs were playing caught my attention as it
reminded me of the work by Tania Lewis. Lewis suggests that traditional
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roles in expertise such as nutritionists are now being filled by popular
lifestyle experts. This is demonstrated in the coverage of the sugar tax
where the sole expert presented alongside rationales for its introduction is
Jamie Oliver. Oliver’s celebrity status and the fact that he is well known
as being a father with four (soon to be five) children, adds credibility
to his cause and allows him access to publicise the issue in a way that
a traditional expert would be unlikely to achieve within the same time
frame. Throughout this debate, Oliver has becomes the media-appointed
face of food and children’s health in the UK.
Drawing on the celebrity as a culturally powerful figure to front the
campaign is a modern form of activism where attention in generated from
TV shows, blogs and tweets, This allows for direct engagement with the
public and creates hype which has the potential, as seen here, to lead to
changes in legislation.
There are also links between the debates emerging here and my PhD
research. My research did not set out to analyse how people felt about the
amount of sugar in products or childhood obesity, but in a context where
the majority of participants were mothers and all had a strong interest in
food as an integral part of their lifestyles the topic was inevitably discussed.
The women in my study did not consider themselves to be activists in
the way that many of them referred to Jamie Oliver (who at the time
of my research was fronting the campaigns to change school dinners),
because they were not public figures and their actions did not aim to
have wider reaching social implications. Yet many felt that their singular
efforts, combined with those of like-minded parents, could contribute to
a future society with a more rational approach to food education and to
tackling obesity.
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The women in my study were readers of popular food magazines and
some used the magazines as manuals to educate themselves about good
food practices, again showing a reliance on popular expertise. Despite
this, many felt that it was wrong that future generations would also be
relying on media texts not formal educative programmes for their food
knowledge. Nearly all of the mothers felt it was morally wrong that those
involved in educating their children around health (education and the
media) were forcing negative messages around food and body image on
to their children. There was a distinct backlash about making children,
whatever their weight, conscious of obesity. Instead these women were
promoting the positives of healthy and delicious food to their children,
with the aims that this would equip them to take care of themselves and
ultimately lower their risk of becoming part of the childhood obesity
statistic. They did this, as one mother said ‘out of a moral duty not just
as being a parent and wanting the best for my child, but out of common
sense for a more positive future’ – and this starts to echo the semantics of
Oliver’s more formal political discourse.
The mothers felt engaged in a personal campaign to dispel what they
considered worrying myths around food being preached to their children.
They reinforced ideas of good eating rather than worrying about getting
fat or thin, they strongly supported a balanced approach to food
consumption. This they saw evidence in the way their children responded
was more effective than just saying no to ingredients such as sugar. It was
this mentality that many of these women hoped would become be the
core message of the formal institutions, outside of their family domains.
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Here we see there are two battles for children’s health simultaneously at
play; one in an open public and political forum, and another far more
private and personal taking place within the domestic family sphere.
Both are equally important in changing the tide of the emerging obesity
crisis and both could, and should, be considered as activism based on
the emotive core values of moral duty that drive them, which have such
deeply personal roots but much wider social implications.
Perhaps then the perfect recipe for activism is a combined effort of the
public and private sphere activists where they can both play a role in
forcing legislators to act on key issues.
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Disability rights advocacy goes
digital
Filippo Trevisan, American University
In 1980, scholar and activist Vic Finkelstein pictured a future in which
“impaired persons will […] no longer be oppressed by disabling social
conventions and disabling environments but will be absorbed in the mainstream
of social interactions.” In his vision, technology was to be an important
enabler of social change and play a fundamental role in the “liberation”
of disabled people. Today, we live in a world where connectivity is
ubiquitous and new media technologies foster “always on” lifestyles. Yet,
Finkelstein’s hypothesis remains largely untested and our understanding
of the relationship between disability and the Internet is incomplete.
“Digital disability” studies, as Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell
described the study of the relationship between disability and digital
media just over a decade ago, have grown substantially in recent years.
Yet, virtually all of this work has framed the discussion in terms of
access and accessibility. Indeed, these are crucial issues that ought to be
top priorities for policy-makers, technology developers, and disability
campaigners. At the same time, however, I also believe that limiting
ourselves to this perspective will lead us to overlook an essential part of the
picture. A different aspect that certainly deserves to be explored is that of
online disability rights advocacy.
Credit: The Leadership Conference/Flickr/
CC BY-NC 2.0
As a passionate observer of the potential of new media technologies for
empowering groups that traditionally are excluded from the civic arena,
I have been watching with great interest as UK disability rights groups
“tuned” into social media in ever increasing numbers from late 2010
onwards. This was a major shift in their approach to technology as, as
recently as 2009, disability organizations appeared somewhat distrustful
towards ICTs and particularly reluctant to engage with social media.
All this changed suddenly in response to the then Conservative-Liberal
Democrat UK government’s proposals for a radical overhaul of disability
welfare in 2010, which challenged some of the main principles behind
disability welfare entitlement and allocations. Very rapidly, a range of
different disability groups decided that it was time to use digital media
for mobilizing, organizing, and challenging legacy media narratives of
disability welfare. Not only established charity organizations
experimented with innovative tactics in digital campaigning, but new
collaborations were forged too, sometimes where ancient rifts had existed,
and wholly new groups of disabled activists were formed online. Given
their internal structure, type of leadership, and relationship with the
Internet, I proposed in previous work that these groups could be seen as
falling into three different categories, including:
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1. Formal organizations: pre-existing disability organizations that use
the Internet to boost their campaigns (including both non-profit
and membership groups);
2. “Digitized” activists: experienced disabled activists who met in
person at a protest event and thereafter decided to set up a Web
presence as a way to sustain their efforts in the longer term; and
3. Digital action networks: activist networks founded by disabled
bloggers and operating exclusively online.
Among the most high-profile representatives of this new digital wave in
disability rights advocacy were groups such as Disabled People Against
Cuts (DPAC), The Broken of Britain, The Campaign for a Fair Society,
We Are Spartacus, and issue-focused coalitions such as The Hardest Hit.
For many of these groups campaigning online against the UK welfare
reform became a journey of discovery. Since 2010, some of these groups
were disbanded, some disappeared for some time and then re-appeared
with a different name, while others continue to this day under the same
banner, most notably DPAC. My impression is that disability advocacy in
Britain is in a state of flux and digital media interact with other factors
to constantly re-shape individual groups, their membership, and tactics.
However, in broader terms, I believe that the typology I proposed back in
2011 still stands.
One thing that has really struck me as about these groups is the impressive
array of online platforms on which they have been able to operate, often
displaying terrific technological know-how. From Facebook to Twitter,
and from websites to blogs, these groups have been capable of coordinated
efforts that combine multiple digital outlets in a complementary fashion.
Moreover, interviews with disabled bloggers from digital action networks
revealed that familiarity with ICTs, combined with direct experience of
impairment, can generate innovative uses of online platforms and “DIY”
solutions to some of the difficulties determined by poor technological
design.
There is vibe and excitement in the UK around digital disability rights
campaigns, not least because “they make disabled people feel less useless,”
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as a disabled activist once told me. Disability rights advocacy is alive and
energized both online and offline, with the addition of new faces, who
often join through digital channels and bring a wealth of experience with
digital storytelling. In particular, personal stories have come to the fore
in many of these groups’ efforts to stop the welfare reform in recent
years. This has been the case, for example, with DPAC’s “ILF Stories”
campaign in 2013, which used personal accounts to provide an overview
of the beneficial effect that the Independent Living Fund has on disabled
people’s lives and illustrate what its closure would mean for impaired and
chronically ill people. While the use of tactics such as this one would
have been unthinkable just a few years ago, given the controversial role
of personal stories in disability advocacy, the groups experimenting with
them have learnt from each other, as well as drawn inspiration from
international examples. Looking at the ILF stories, similar campaigns
organized in previous years by U.S. disability organizations to protect
Medicaid provisions for disabled Americans come to mind.
Does this mean that we are witnessing a globalization of disability
advocacy tactics fostered by technological change? Not necessarily.
Online advocacy strategies, what work and what doesn’t, but also what
is acceptable and what isn’t, are born out of a mix of factors in which
technology is only one element. While cultural, historical, and political
differences also play a role, it is sometimes the policy context, and more
specifically the policy agenda of the day, that can precipitate certain uses
of social media by advocacy networks. This was the case for the groups
involved in opposing the UK welfare reform. It is when people feel
threatened that they are most likely to share their anger and frustration
through digital communications. Thus, events will continue to shape the
future of digital disability advocacy in ways that, at least in part, are
excitingly unpredictable. Future work in this area ought to include the
perspective of disabled Internet users, now a majority among disabled
people in both the UK and the U.S.
Paul Reilly, Anastasia Veneti and Dimitrinka Atanasova (eds)
160
Filippo Trevisan is Assistant Professor in American
University’s School of Communication. His
research explores the impact of new media
technologies on advocacy, activism, and political
communication. His work has focused in particular
on the use of online media in the British and
American disability rights movements. He also has a
strong interest in comparative media analysis and
has studied how voters use Google to find
information about elections in the UK, the U.S., Italy, and Egypt. His
research has been published in journals including Information,
Communication & Society, First Monday, and Disability & Society. He
can be found on Twitter as @filippotrevisan
Politics, Protest, Emotion: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
161
33
Pre-exposure prophylaxis in the
UK: Identity, stigma and activism
Rusi Jaspal, De Montfort University
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which is the cause of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), remains a major public health
concern some 35 years after its first clinical observations. In the UK, men
who have sex with men (MSM) are disproportionately affected by HIV.
According to the Public Health England HIV Situation Report in 2015,
approximately 43% of the 103700 individuals living with HIV in the UK
are MSM, while 57% of the 5850 new HIV diagnoses (through sexual
exposure) were within this demographic group. In London, it is estimated
that 1 in 11 MSM is living with HIV. These epidemiological data suggest
that existing HIV prevention methods, such as condom use, have not been
entirely effective and that novel approaches are needed in the fight against
HIV/AIDS.
This has led to discussions about the feasibility of pre-exposure
prophylaxis (PrEP), which is a novel bio-medical approach for preventing
HIV infection. The drug Truvada® (which consists of two nucleoside
reverse transcriptase inhibitors, emtricitabine and tenofovir disoproxil
fumarate) is currently used as PrEP in the US and was used in clinical
trials in the UK. PrEP works by blocking a key enzyme that enables
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HIV to replicate once it has entered a human CD4 t-lymphocyte. As
HIV is unable to replicate, infection cannot occur. Various clinical trials
in several populations suggest that PrEP is highly effective. Data from
the UK PROUD study, for instance, indicated an 86% reduction in HIV
infection among individuals in the experimental group taking Truvada.
Truvada as PrEP can be taken either on a daily basis or “on-demand” (that
is, before and after a possible exposure) in order to prevent HIV infection.
While PrEP has been available in the US since 2012, there is only limited
access to PrEP in the UK. Following the promising data yielded in the UK
PROUD study, NHS England began an economics evaluation in order
to explore the cost effectiveness of offering the prevention tool on the
National Health Service (NHS). In March 2016, NHS England decided
not to commission PrEP, arguing that commissioning HIV prevention
services is the responsibility of local authorities. In response to this
decision, supporters of PrEP launched a petition calling for PrEP to be
made available on the NHS. On the basis of robust scientific data, PrEP
activists argue that the provision of PrEP would prevent thousands of new
HIV infections among MSM, that is, it would reduce HIV incidence.
Furthermore, despite concerns about the cost of funding PrEP, HIV
prevention using PrEP is significantly less costly than life-long HIV
treatment using ART. In view of these arguments and growing activism
in favour of making PrEP available on the NHS, it is possible that NHS
England will once again consider offering PrEP on the NHS.
Credit: incidence0.org
As PrEP is currently unavailable on the NHS, it can only be obtained
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privately. The only sexual health clinic to provide access to PrEP is 56
Dean St (an NHS sexual health clinic located in Soho), which offers
Truvada privately at a cost of £400 per month. As an alternative to
Truvada, many MSM have been purchasing Tenvir-EM (a generic
version of emtricitabine and tenofovir) online at a cost of approximately
£45 per month. However, concerns have been raised about the
authenticity (and, thus, effectiveness) of PrEP purchased online, as well
as the wellbeing of patients whose condition (i.e. liver function) may
not be consistently monitored by health care professionals. Indeed, this
is concerning given that ART, such as emtricitabine and tenofovir, can
cause serious side effects. In response to these concerns, several clinics
in London, such as 56 Dean St and Mortimer Market Centre, now
offer free PrEP clinics to monitor the condition of individuals who are
purchasing PrEP privately. However, given the high cost of PrEP, uptake
has been rather low and it is likely that many of those individuals most
vulnerable to HIV infection do not have access to the prevention tool.
Incidentally, in one US study, sexual risk-taking was associated with
economic hardship, which suggests that those at highest risk may be
financially unable to access PrEP. As an alternative to purchasing PrEP,
there are also reports of “clinic hopping” which refers to the practice of
visiting several sexual health clinics and falsely claiming to have been at
risk of HIV in order to obtain post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP). As PEP
usually consists of Truvada and a protease inhibitor or integrase inhibitor,
the “clinic hopper” retains Truvada which can then be used as PrEP. The
prevalence of this practice is not currently known but, as this constitutes a
clandestine means of obtaining PrEP, the clinic hopper may not feel able
to access the PrEP clinic.
In order to understand the underpinnings of activism around PrEP, it
seems important to explore the social representations (that is, the images
and constructions) of PrEP that have been emerging in the public domain.
As the print media constitute a major source of societal information
concerning science and medicine, we conducted an analysis of all of the
articles published in UK national and regional newspaper outlets. This
yielded a modest corpus of 57 articles, of which most were published
in The Independent (20), The Guardian (13) and The Daily Mail (9). We
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explored the tone of media reporting, and the major themes, tropes and
metaphor drawn upon to describe PrEP. Overall, we identified two
competing social representations of PrEP – the hope representation, on the
one hand, and the risk representation, on the other. In creating the hope
representation, metaphors of momentous change such as “revolutionary”,
“silver bullet”, “the key” and “making history” were employed in relation
to PrEP. These articles not only emphasised the positive characteristics of
PrEP as an HIV prevention method, they also implicitly positioned it as
being superior to existing methods, such as condom use and treatment as
prevention (TasP). TasP refers to the virological suppression of the HIV-
infected individual which reduces the likelihood of onward transmission.
Furthermore, war metaphors such as “battle”, “fight”, “weapon” and
“besieged” served to position PrEP as decisively changing the course of
HIV prevention. Conversely, HIV was positioned as being weakened by
PrEP. This pattern of media reporting tended not to acknowledge the
potential shortcomings or limitations of PrEP, such as issues concerning
toxicity, drug adherence and exposure to drug resistant strains of HIV.
Conversely, the risk representation accentuated the risks and uncertainties
associated with using PrEP and positioned the prevention tool as a hazard.
This representation generally questioned the effectiveness of PrEP both in
terms of the science of PrEP and the sexual attitudes and behaviours of gay
and bisexual men which might serve to reduce the effectiveness of PrEP
in this population. There was a clear element of social stigma in relation
to gay sexuality and to the sexual practices said to be associated with this
identity, which is echoed in a recent paper on “whore shaming” published
in the Journal of Homosexuality. In short, sexual risk-taking and condom
fatigue among gay and bisexual men were cited as key reasons why PrEP
should be regarded as a risky HIV prevention method.
While the analysis suggested that the press appeared either to accentuate
social stigma in relation to PrEP or to create unrealistic expectation
vis-à-vis its effectiveness in eradicating HIV, the impact on public
understanding was unclear, particularly among MSM, a group that is
particularly likely to benefit the most from PrEP. Thus, in a separate
study which is currently under review, I interviewed an ethnically diverse
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sample of 20 HIV-negative and HIV-positive MSM to explore their
perceptions and understandings of PrEP as well as their beliefs about
how PrEP could impact their own lives and behaviours if it were to
become available in the UK. HIV-negative MSM appeared to manifest
uncertainty and fear in relation to PrEP as they believed that it would not
be completely effective and that it would leave them feeling uncertain due
to the “invisibility” of PrEP once it is taken (versus a condom which can
be examined physically to ensure that it has remained intact during sex).
Conversely, HIV-positive MSM were generally of the view that PrEP
would reduce uncertainty and fear (primarily of onward transmission of
HIV to HIV-negative partners). Similarly, there was a stark difference
in how HIV-negative and HIV-positive MSM perceived the potential
impact of PrEP on their interpersonal relations. While HIV-negative
MSM felt that their use of PrEP could induce social stigma, HIV-positive
MSM foresaw an improvement in relations with serodiscordant partners
who they believed might feel less anxious about sex given the advent of
PrEP. Although both cohorts acknowledged the possible benefits of PrEP,
they nonetheless manifested stigma vis-à-vis the prevention tool, which
led some HIV-negative MSM to reject PrEP for personal use.
It is clear that social stigma underpins attitudes towards PrEP both at
social and individual levels. The prevalence of social stigma appears to
have infiltrated thinking at an individual level, which has led individuals
who may benefit from PrEP to reject it as an HIV prevention tool that
people “at high risk” might utilise. This enables individuals to deflect from
themselves the social stigma associated with PrEP. In response to social
stigma and political inertia, social activism around PrEP has begun to
emerge and it has taken shape in a number of ways. In general, activists
have sought to educate others about PrEP in a bid to decrease stigma and,
thus, to facilitate discussion.
As HIV campaigner Sadiq Ali indicated in his moving account of living
with HIV, he was given the opportunity to take PrEP as part of the
PROUD clinical trial but decided not to do so, because of the associated
social stigma. A few weeks later, he contracted HIV. London-based
writer, journalist and influential HIV equality campaigner, Greg Owen
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describes a similar experience in relation to PrEP, which in part has led
him to become a vocal advocate of the prevention tool, engaging in
PrEP advocacy on a number of public platforms. His frank and candid
accounts of gay sexuality and sexual risk-taking have contributed to
breaking down the silence surrounding these very sensitive issues in
public discourse. Indeed, Greg Owen’s activism around PrEP has attracted
considerable support among the HIV medical community. Greg Owen
also co-founded the “I Want PrEP Now” website which seeks to provide
“the information you need to understand and start taking PrEP in one
place”. Crucially, on the website individuals are informd about how to
obtain PrEP online and how to access services vital to their wellbeing
while on PrEP. PrEPster, another awareness-raising group formed “to
educate and agitate for PrEP access in England and beyond”, has similarly
been campaigning for PrEP to become available on the NHS. The US-
based Facebook group “PrEP Facts: Rethinking HIV Prevention and
Sex” was founded by US psychotherapist Damon Jacobs in order “to
support discussions, debates, questions, and concerns that promote fact-
based information, understanding, respect, and compassion.” The group
now has over 14000 subscribers from all over the world, a paid editorial
staff team, and consistent and lively discussion around the topic of PrEP.
On the Facebook page, current PrEP users share their experiences of using
PrEP and respond to others’ queries about it.
It is important to note that these awareness-raising pressure groups have
developed in online spaces, such as Twitter and Facebook, providing
the perfect context in which to engage the public on the pressing issue
of HIV prevention and, more specifically, on the role that PrEP might
play in preventing HIV. This has facilitated collaborative work between
US- and UK-based activists advocating for PrEP. The key challenges
that PrEP activism engages with are social stigma and decreased public
understanding of PrEP, both of which can inhibit public support for
PrEP and ultimately lead to increased HIV incidence. Moreover, PrEP
activists view social stigma and low awareness of PrEP as obstacles to
making PrEP available on the NHS. The media have a key role to play in
promoting a fair and balanced view of PrEP which is the ideal starting-
point for a discussion about how PrEP ought to be implemented in
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the UK. They at least inform the views and perceptions that individuals
develop in relation to PrEP – stigma appears to be a key underlying
theme. Stigma and silence will lead only to more HIV infections. PrEP
activism must continue to decrease stigma and to facilitate dialogue.
Rusi Jaspal is Professor of Psychology and Sexual
Health, Deputy Head of Research for the Faculty of
Health and Life Sciences, and Deputy Director of
the Mary Seacole Research Centre at De Montfort
University Leicester. He is also a Chartered
Scientist, Chartered Psychologist and a Fellow of
the British Psychological Society, a Fellow of
the Royal Society of Arts, and an Associate Fellow
of the Higher Education Academy. His research focuses on the inter-
relations between social representation, identity and social action. Rusi
tweets at @ProfRJaspal.
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Four tips on using Instagram to
study the emotions of parenthood
Linnea Hanell, Stockholm University
Becoming a parent is life-changing. And in addition to being a physically
challenging experience, it is also a deeply emotional one. Parents may feel
love, joy and happiness, but also anxiety about their new responsibilities.
For new mothers the first few weeks can be a time when they find
themselves feeling moody and tearful, sometimes referred to as the ‘baby
blues.’ At this important moment, sharing one’s feelings and experiences
can be helpful. Instagram has become a site on which recent parents can
share how they cope with the various challenges they face. It also offers
researchers to study the variety of discursive practices that they engage
with.
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In a study on health discourse in the everyday life of a new parent, I
used Instagram as one of the many ways of keeping in touch with my
informant ‘Veronica.’ In particular, Instagram enabled me to keep track
of what was happening in my informant’s life between the meetings
that we actually got together for about once a month. Veronica was
quite active on Instagram, posting 340 pictures during the six months
of our working together, so her postings became an important data
source for me, being, as I was, interested in her engagement in various
forms of health communication. I discovered, however, that Instagram
can be a difficult site for conducting this kind of ethnographic, long-term
fieldwork, as it required a great deal of time and effort on my part before
producing any great insights. Therefore, I would like to share some of the
difficulties I had with the site and offer recommendations for overcoming
them. By doing so I hope to save future researchers’ time and energy that
could be better spent on their actual analysis.
There are different ways of accessing and recording Instagram activity,
and none of them seem to be optimal for ethnographic work. There is,
in short, the Instagram app, and then various online URL feeds. The app
is probably the most common way to access Instagram, and it might be
seen as the most authentic instantiation of Instagram activity. Thus, if you
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want to use visual representations of your data, you might want to present
it to your audience as it appears in the app. However, the Instagram feed
is continuously filled with new postings, and it is not possible to skip
back in time in the app; rather, you have to scroll through all postings in
reverse chronological order. This can be a problem if you are following
a very active user, as I was. Veronica has posted more than 2,000 pictures
since we finished working together, which means that I have to scroll for
around fifteen minutes to get to the time frame I am interested in seeing.
This is obviously not something one wants to do any more often than is
necessary. Hence my first tip:
• Do screenshots of postings that seem most important in the app.
Following this rule, you will not need to do screenshots of everything
that happens; stick to what you might want to use as examples when you
present the study later on.
To review what was going on during the actual period, consider my
second tip:
• Use gramfeed.com to skip back in time.
Unlike many other online Instagram feeds, this website will allow you to
skip back in time and look at only the postings made during a particular
period. However, the layout is completely different from the Instagram
app, so I have avoided using it for visual representations of my data
(therefore, take heed of tip no. 1).
You might be interested in the comments section in addition to the
actual postings of your informant. If so, note that if a person deletes their
account, the comments they have written will disappear as well. Thus, my
third tip is:
• Save the comments to important posts.
This can be done through screenshots in the app, which, again, is good
if you want to demonstrate the interaction visually as it appeared on
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Instagram. However, since only a small share of the comments will fit on
one screen, you may have to do numerous screenshots to cover them all.
In that case, it’s more practical to access the posting with an online feed,
and copy and paste the comments from there. Besides gramfeed.com,
Instagram has its own web application: instagram.com. However, if you
want to get an ultra-authentic representation of the interaction, you
might be bothered by the fact that neither gramfeed.com nor
instagram.com can show emojis the way they appear in the app.
Therefore, my fourth and final tip:
• Use iconosquare.com to access the comments section interaction
with emojis intact.
To conclude, I strongly recommend using Instagram to complement
other ethnographic work (or use as the exclusive field site, although I
have never tried this myself). For me, it has proven to be a useful way
to keep in touch with my informant and get to know her without being
too intrusive, as well as to take a peek into the everyday conversations
she engages in. I am confident that this tool will be even more useful and
rewarding for researchers who consider these four tips as they venture into
the field.
Linnea Hanell is interested in sociolinguistic and
linguistic-anthropological aspects of knowledge
and health. She is currently finishing up her PhD
project, which focuses on processes whereby
discourse enters into actions concerning health
aspects of parenthood. This project comprises a
study about a new mother (reported on here), as
well as one about an online discussion forum thread
for pregnant women, and one about midwives giving preparatory lectures
to expecting parents. She can be found on Twitter as @linneahanell.
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Social media and health: A source
of 'patient voices' or 'business
insight'?
Daniel Hunt, University of Nottingham and Nelya Koteyko, Queen Mary,
University of London
For many, smartphones and other web-enabled technologies have
become ubiquitous, mediating activities from shopping to travel, from
banking to romancing. From health apps to patient forums, the
experience of being unwell has been similarly transformed. Social
networking sites (SNSs) such as Facebook and Twitter now host
burgeoning networks for individuals with chronic conditions. The size
and reach of these networks means they have the potential to influence
health behaviours on a grand and disruptive scale.
The NHS has historically been slow to integrate new web technologies
into routine care services. So while we use social media to communicate
with friends, colleagues, companies, and politicians, healthcare
professionals have typically remained beyond patients’ reach.
Recently, however, government and professional policies have begun to
address social media and their implications for healthcare. There are good
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reasons for doing so: SNSs multiply opportunities for communication
between professionals, policy makers, patients, and the wider public. They
can enable the government to gather feedback from service users and
publicise health information, foster professional networks and patient
communities, and facilitate online consultations.
Inevitably, policy and NHS activity have focused on some of these
opportunities more than others. Policy papers from the Department of
Health and NHS England have embedded plans for social media within a
digital information strategy focused on publishing data on NHS services,
increasing patient choice, and gathering business-relevant “insight.”
Social media have been positioned as a way to facilitate consumer choice,
helping to shift healthcare towards consumer models serving not just
patients but also “clients,” “customers” and a supposed “social networking
generation.”
As members of the latter, we are said to uniformly demand greater
knowledge of service options so we can make better choices. While the
permeation of such consumerist thinking into healthcare policy predates
the Web 2.0 era, social media have nevertheless been configured as a new
vehicle for delivering consumerist policies based around increased choice,
“patient empowerment” and patient responsibility. To this end, rather
than providing or commissioning online services, the Department of
Health’s The Power of Information paper commits to “stimulating a market”
and creating “space to innovate” for non-NHS organisations.
Credit: Kevin Kruse/Flickr/CC BY-NC-ND
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At the same time, the Department’s publications have largely overlooked
social media’s potential to support therapeutic interactions between
healthcare providers and service users. In some ways, this should be
surprising. While claiming to address the demands of the “social
networking generation,” recent policies neglect a significant reason why
many individuals with chronic conditions already use SNSs —interacting
with others with the same conditions through blogging, tweeting,
reading, viewing, liking, sharing, and creating health-related content and
using this to assist in their own self-care. Indeed, beyond a few papers by
the NHS Confederation, the potential of social media to promote peer-
support has remained a peripheral concern, despite examples of health
professionalsand organisations already using sites to support patients.
In other ways, the government’s caution around social media is less
surprising; determining how to pay for digital healthcare is complicated
and remote consultations can be fraught with practical difficulties.
Similarly, concerns around patient confidentiality are magnified by the
corporate ownership of social media sites. For policy makers, managing
these risks means limiting the government’s use of dynamic, flexible
platforms to the less precarious tasks of disseminating information and
sourcing patient feedback while letting the market meet remaining
demand.
Yet, falling behind public and patient trends is also risky. Multiple
competing sources of information that do not carry the credentials of a
site like NHS Choices could create uncertainty over whose information
to trust. By promoting third-sector and commercial social media
organisations as providers of online services, policy is also encouraging
the public into a digital health economy in which the users’ online
contributions are routinely commodified and exploited for commercial
ends. This can include generating research data and refining consumer-
driven advertising for third party products but may also involve the sale of
user-generated information to other businesses.
By retreating from providing care through social media, the government
both misses opportunities and devolves risks onto the public and non-
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government organisations. Crucially, without a change in policy and
working practices to reflect how the public use new media, our healthcare
professionals will remain out of the loop with emerging patient practices.
This post was originally published on BMJ blogs.
Daniel Hunt is Assistant Professor in Discourse
Analysis at University of Nottingham. He is interest
in health discourse and media technologies. Prior to
taking up his current position, he was a research
associate on the ESRC-funded project Chronic
illness and online networking. Visit him on Twitter
at @mynameisdanhunt.
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Epigenetics, hype and harm
Brigitte Nerlich, University of Nottingham
I first became interested in epigenetics around 2010/2011. I know this
because I trawled my emails and found a link that I had sent myself on
11 February 2011 to an article in Mother Jones entitled “The illustrated
guide to epigenetics”. The first paragraph of this guide is rather prophetic:
“This month marks the ten-year anniversary of the sequencing of the
human genome, that noble achievement underpinning the less noble
sales of 23andMe’s direct-to-consumer genetic tests. To commemorate
the scientific occasion, we’ve created an illustrated introduction to one
subfield of genetics likely to produce even more dubious novelty science projects
someday: epigenetics.” (italics added) This is exactly what happened and
what I’ll reflect upon in this post. But what is epigenetics?
Epigenetics
Definitions of epigenetics are rather varied and contested, but I’ll go
with this one: “Epigenetics explores chemical tags on DNA that have the
ability to turn genes on or off … What intrigues many people about
the study of epigenetics is the idea that environmental aspects or an
individual’s lifestyle may influence these chemical tags and, therefore,
impact how our genes express themselves … Perhaps even more
intriguing is the discovery that certain epigenetic marks may be
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maintained and passed on through generations, known
as transgenerational epigenetic inheritance.”
Credit: Darryl Leja/NHGRI/Flickr/CC BY
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Speculations triggered by such intriguing discoveries led to disputes about
what some saw as a ‘crisis’ in evolutionary theory, a return
of Lamarckism and/or a return of eugenic thinking. On a more peaceful
level, there were calls for closer collaborations between biologists and
sociologists – a call eagerly taken up by sociologists keen to ‘revitalise’
sociology. And finally, as epigenetics seemed to turn the tables on so-
called ‘genetic determinism’ and focused attention on the ‘environment’
(in whatever form), policy makers began to dream about a ‘scientific’ way
of dealing with anything from health to poverty and to ask: “Can we use
epigenetic information to understand and prevent human disease through
environmental modifications (reducing exposures, dietary changes and
medication use)?”
Epi-hype
Between 2010 and 2012 I began to read more and more about epigenetics
in newspapers, academic articles, and on alternative health websites
peddling what I began to call ‘epi-woo’ – others call it flapdoodle. But
despite my doubts, I almost got sucked into an emerging cycle of natural
and social science hype about epigenetic hopes and fears. In 2013 I
wrote a slightly breathless blog post about epigenetics, but I fortunately
ended on a cautious note and said: “We have learned many lessons about
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how quickly scientific advances in, say, cloning, stem cell research or
neuroscience can be overhyped (both positively and negatively, in terms
of hopes and fears). While studying epigenetics from a social science
perspective, we should try not to contribute to this emerging hype. While
observing and watching over the emerging science, we should also pay
attention to how its results are transformed (and perhaps over-interpreted)
in various societal and political projects.” (For a more detailed discussion
of the “political implications of the emerging science of epigenetics in
specific policy domains”, read Shea Robison’s forthcoming book on the
topic.)
Hype monitoring
In the same year, 2013, Edith Heard, a Professor at the Collège de France,
holding the Chair of Epigenetics and Cellular Memory, tried to reign in
some of the emerging hype. In an article for The Guardian she is quoted
as saying: “‘Even our epigenetic changes are genetically driven. The code
of genetics is the code. It’s the only code.’ But now with epigenetics,
‘people are hoping we can pray our way out of faulty genes’…. ‘It’s
our duty as scientists to pass on the right messages. I don’t want to say
epigenetics isn’t exciting … [but] there’s a gap between the fact and
the fantasy. Now the facts are having to catch up’.” This realistic view
of epigenetics didn’t quite stop the hype. In fact, by 2014 epigenetics
was, according to Judith Shulevitz, “fast becoming the top topic in pop
science”, and, I would add, in pop social science and pop social policy.
Waves of natural and social science hype are still splashing onto the
shores of Twitter now in 2016, sometimes broken by boulders
declaring #epibollocks (andneurobollocks). It is actually quite heartening
to see how blogs and tweets have become a normal part of peer
review and are also used to monitor emerging hype. This became
particularly apparent recently when bloggers and tweeters scrutinised a
popular science article by Siddhartha Mukherjee about epigenetics
written for the New Yorker (published 2 May) and then
an article on epigenetics, depression and poverty published in Molecular
Psychiatry on 24 May.
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This doesn’t mean that ‘normal’ academic articles don’t contribute to
this process of hype monitoring as well. An article published in 2015
for example is entitled “Neural and behavioral epigenetics; what it is,
and what is hype” and says: “some of this research has also attracted
controversy and … some overblown claims. This latter problem is partly
linked to the shifting sands of what is defined as ‘epigenetics’.” Martyn
Pickersgill, an expert in social studies of biomedicine, published
an article in 2016 in which he studied efforts by natural scientists
practicing epigenetics to engage in ‘epistemic modesty’ and to guard
against ‘epistemic ostentatiousness’ and hype.
Hype and harm
So it is rather depressing to read comments like this on twitter over
the last week or so: “a new exciting & real science obscured [by] tons
of over-exposed and shoddy work”, “I think we all should use restraint
when discussing epigenetics”, “epigenetics is a useful word if you don’t
know what’s going on – if you do, you use something else”, “for some,
‘epigenetic mechanism’ means fake correlation”, “TOO
MUCH #EPIBOLLOCKS, TOO LITTLE TIME, EVEN WHEN
USING ALL UPPER CASE TEXT” and: “Great read
on #epigenetics via @NautilusMag Epigenetics Has Become
Dangerously Fashionable http://ow.ly/pvgj300hZBA”. The article
referred to in this tweet tries to fathom why social scientists in particular
have become so ‘enamoured’ with epigenetics and contribute to feeding
the hype that most epigeneticists try to get away from. As Matthew
Cobb points out in his book Life’s Greatest Secret: “Epigenetics remains
fascinating, but it is an adjunct to our understanding of the complexities
of gene regulation and the origins of plasticity, not a radical new model
of inheritance and evolution.”
It is rather worrying to see how hype has begun to devalue the concept
of ‘epigenetics’. This might harm the real and fascinating study of gene
regulation and related topics, as well as the public understanding of and
public engagement with these topics.
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I close with a cartoon displayed within a blog post by Caroline Relton for
the OUPblog on epigenetics and epidemiology, which sort of sums up
the current situation:
This post was originally published on Making Science Public.
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Fat activism in the news
Dimitrinka Atanasova, Queen Mary, University of London
‘Fat acceptance’ meaning self-acceptance and body positivity regardless
of one’s weight and ‘fat activism’ referring to the diverse activities in
which individuals engage to create livable lives both for themselves and
for others are certainly not new concepts. Fat activism has been traced
back to the 1960s and 70s when the National Association to Advance
Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) was established and The Fat Liberation
Manifesto was published. My own exposure to the concepts and the
encompassing activities is, however, recent and happened while analysing
the news reporting on ‘obesity’ in Britain and Germany – two
geographies that have been understudied, according to my literature
searches at the time.
Credit: Lauren Gurrieri/Stocky Bodies
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When we talk about ‘obesity’ we define fatness as a contributor to chronic
diseases such as cancer and diabetes or a chronic disease in its own right.
Thus, obesity is a problem in need of a solution. As a media and
communication researcher, I wanted to know what solutions are
highlighted in the media and, more generally, 1) how obesity is
problematised in mainstream online newspapers which reach large
audiences and 2) how readers react to such coverage. While I identified
different frames or representations of obesity, most news articles
problematized weight and focused on the negative impact of obesity
on physical health, national healthcare systems and the wider economy.
Individuals labelled ‘too fat to work’ were presented as a drain on scarce
resources. So while we may think of weight as an apolitical issue, it
also does not escape the attention how such representations may resonate
especially well with notions of good citizenship in neoliberal societies,
where individuals’ main goal is seen as being able to lead an economically
productive life. Obese individuals were also portrayed as a cause of
melting ice-caps and desertification, thus drawing a not unfamiliar link
between weight and global warming.
What struck me though was the admittedly much smaller number of
news articles that challenged this status of weight as a key determinant of
good health and did not problematize weight per se, but rather society’s
preoccupation with weight. These news articles explicitly referred to fat
activism, traced the origins and described the aims of the fat acceptance
movement and gave voice to individuals identifying themselves with the
movement. This was interesting because media and communication
research and social movement research has shown how difficult it is for
social movements to gain mainstream news representation, as they
normally fall outside of journalistic beats. Further, even when social
movements gain news attention, the coverage tends to be highly
dismissive. The fact that this was not the case here seemed to be a sign of
success for fat activism.
But readers’ reception of news articles describing fat acceptance and fat
activism was ambivalent. Some of those news articles were closed for
comments from the outset, others contained brief notes to indicate that
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comments had been deleted by the moderators, which suggests that their
tone did not allow for publication. It is perhaps not too difficult to imagine
what the deleted content may have involved, especially if we think of
recent instances of ‘fat shaming’. Where readers’ comments were allowed
and available, readers reacted with a lot of emotion – some spoke about
feeling disturbed or outraged by the propositions of fat activists, while
others were outraged by the former reactions.
All in all, these findings demonstrate that apart from sustaining
perceptions of obesity or weight as a problem in need of a solution,
mainstream news media can also expose readers to ideas that challenge
deeply ingrained conceptions about the meaning of weight. The fact
that fat acceptance voices were included in the coverage can also be
interpreted as success for the fat acceptance movement. But, as readers’
mixed reactions demonstrate so well, the debate on obesity and weight is
far from settled. Time has, of course, elapsed since 2011 which was the
cut off point for my analysis, the media is paying more attention to fat
activism and fat acceptance and these representations should be revisited
to update our understanding of where the weight debate is heading.
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